Alternative approach for the evaluation of road pricing strategies by Ensor, Jeffrey D. (Jeffrey Douglas)
Multi-Criteria Analysis: An Alternative Approach for the Evaluation of Road
Pricing Strategies
By
Jeffrey D. Ensor
B.S. Civil Engineering
Washington State University, 2003
Submitted to the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Transportation
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
June2005
D 2005 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
All Rights Reserved
SSACHUSETS INSTiTUTE'
OF TECHNOLOGY
MAY 3 12005
LIBRARIES
Signature of Autho
Z."'-()
Certified by
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
Jeffrey D. Ensor
May 16, 2005
I,
Joseph M. Sussman
JR East Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Engineering Systems
j ~Thesis Supervisor
I1~~ft ii A
Accepted by
................................................. LS........ r.i/ ..................
SAffidrew J. Whittle
Chairman, Department Committee for Graduate Students

Multi-Criteria Analysis: An Alternative Approach for the Evaluation of Road
Pricing Strategies
By
Jeffrey D. Ensor
Submitted to the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering on May 1 6 th in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Transportation at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ABSTRACT
Interest in road pricing among political leaders, transportation analysts, academics, and
government agencies has increased in recent years. There are myriad reasons for this newfound
consideration, but the deployment of intelligent transportation systems, the desire for additional
revenue sources, and the search for policies that can reduce congestion are among the most
important. This thesis examines the impacts of six different types of road pricing strategies,
namely: conventional tolling, facility congestion pricing, express lanes (e.g. HOT lanes), area-
wide and cordon pricing, network pricing, and distance-based pricing. It also presents a new
sketch-planning model, the Road Pricing Decision Analysis Tool (RPDAT), which highlights
each strategy's unique set of strengths and weaknesses for achieving different policy objectives
and recommends road pricing strategies for particular metropolitan areas.
Despite a growing interest in pricing, many decision makers feel unable to estimate the
impacts of pricing strategies accurately with conventional models. This thesis discusses the
factors believed to be responsible for drivers' choosing to use priced facilities, explains why
conventional models are incapable of capturing many of these factors or the aggregate effects of
a pricing policy, and identifies some improvements that could be made to existing transportation
models.
RPDAT performs a multi-criteria analysis of nine road pricing strategies, one of which is
a "no pricing" alternative, for a metropolitan area. The user inputs policy priorities and regional
characteristics, and RPDAT's algorithms calculate how well each alternative meets the decision
maker's criteria as well as index scores that reflect the overall preference for each alternative.
This tool is applied to Kuala Lumpur (KL), Malaysia and is used to recommend road pricing
strategies for the KL metropolitan area.
Thesis Supervisor: Joseph M. Sussman
Title: JR East Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Engineering Systems
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Road Pricing, Road Taxing, and Congestion Pricing
Road pricing refers to the practice of subjecting particular road trips at well-specified
places and/or times to well-defined charges (NCHRP). It entails charging motorists for the road
infrastructure and services they use and is used either to influence driver behavior or to allocate
costs of expensive facilities (e.g., bridges and tunnels) to the subset of the population that uses
them. Road pricing is also called 'pricing' or 'road user charging,' and is often confused with
other terms, such as road taxing, congestion pricing, value pricing, dynamic pricing, and variable
pricing.
'Road pricing' is a catch-all phrase that encompasses conventional tolling, congestion
pricing, and distance-based pricing schemes.' The amount of the charge depends directly on the
vehicle type and the road travel's location, time, and/or distance. Express lanes (e.g., high-
occupancy/toll (HOT) lanes), conventional tolling, facility congestion pricing, network pricing,
area-wide pricing, and cordon pricing are all examples of road pricing measures.2
Pricing can be differentiated from taxation in that taxes are compulsory contributions
exacted by a government for public purposes (U.S. Census Bureau), whereas the sole function of
pricing is not revenue generation. Road taxes are taxes that are levied on road users, but that are
only crudely correlated to the extent of their road use and are intended primarily to raise money
rather than alter behavior (NCHRP). Fuel taxes, vehicle excise taxes, annual licensing fees, and
taxes on vehicle parts are examples of road taxes.3
Some argue that forms of road pricing, such as distance-based pricing, are actually road
taxing because of the revenue generation motivation (CBS Broadcasting). Perhaps the most
'Distance-based pricing is also referred to as distance-based charging or vehicle-miles-traveled (VMT) charging.
The different forms of road pricing are defined in Chapter 3.
2 HOT lanes are a form of managed lanes that allow high-occupancy vehicles (HOVs) to travel on the lanes at no
cost or at a discount and charge low-occupancy vehicles (LOVs) a toll to use the lanes. HOV requirements are
typically two or more persons in a vehicle. Some single-occupancy vehicles (SOVs) may be willing to pay tolls to
use HOT lanes for a higher level-of-service than is available in the general-purpose lanes, which have no
requirements for use.
3 A fuel tax correlates to fuel consumption but it only corresponds to the amount of travel indirectly; it does not
relate to where and when the travel takes place well.
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appropriate classification for these measures would be 'hybrids' between road taxes and road
pricing, but measures traditionally referred to as road pricing will be defined as such in this
thesis.
Congestion pricing is an economic principle that is used in many road pricing schemes.
With congestion pricing, users are charged a fee that varies by time-of-day or congestion-level.
Higher tolls are assessed during peak hours to encourage drivers to change their time of, location
of, frequency of, mode of, or propensity to travel, which smoothes out the demand peak. It is a
method for using market forces to allocate limited facility capacity among users by their need to
travel and their willingness to pay (TCRP). Congestion pricing is commonly used in the airline,
telephone, hotel, and electricity industries in various guises and may be referred to as congestion
charging, peak-period pricing, or value pricing.
Value pricing is a marketing term used to emphasize the benefits users receive from
reduced congestion and additional toll revenue that can be used to improve transportation
services.
Dynamic pricing and variable pricing are methods of applying congestion pricing that are
often mistakenly used interchangeably. In dynamic pricing, the amount of the toll changes in
real-time according to the level of congestion. In variable pricing, the toll changes by time-of-
day and/or day-of-the-week according to a pre-determined schedule, which makes the toll
charges predictable for drivers.
1.2 Interest in Pricing
Interest in transportation pricing among political leaders, policymakers, transportation
analysts, metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs), state Departments of Transportation
(DOTs), and academics has increased in recent years. There are myriad reasons for this
newfound consideration, but three factors are responsible for advancing pricing as a realistic
alternative. First, the deployment of intelligent transportation systems (ITS) and its best-known
technology, electronic toll collection (ETC), has eliminated the need for manual toll collection,
significantly reducing the cost of collection operations and creating larger net revenue
possibilities. ETC also allows tolls to be changed in real-time, which adds flexibility and can
guarantee travel time reliability for users. Second, cash-strapped state DOTs and regions are
starting to view pricing as a means of revenue generation. Shrinking state budgets and
14
diminishing gas tax revenues are of major concern in some states-especially those with large
population growth and dwindling transportation funding available to expand capacity. Finally,
more urban areas are beginning to consider pricing and other traffic demand management (TDM)
strategies as a means to combat the recurring urban gridlock that capacity expansion and other
policies have failed to relieve. HOT lanes in particular are receiving increased attention in the
United States for the following reasons:
* They allow a greater volume of traffic to use the road than
underutilized high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes;
* They do not divert traffic to alternative roads;
* They have the potential to create revenue; and
" They are a market-based solution providing users with the option
to pay for a higher level-of-service.
Consideration of road pricing schemes has also become more common because of the
technical and political success of congestion pricing schemes implemented around the world in
recent years. Both users and non-users of the SR91 and 1-15 HOT lanes in California strongly
support the priced lanes and, as a result of this approval, the 1-15 lanes are being extended
(OCTA, 91 Express Lanes Fiscal Year 2003 Annual Report; Highway Communication
Exchange). Other forms of road pricing, such as the area-wide London Congestion Charging
(CC) scheme introduced in February 2003, have also been successful. While it was unpopular
with the media before its opening, the CC scheme has reduced congestion, radically improved
bus service, improved journey time reliability for auto users, and made the distribution of goods
and services more efficient in central London (Transport for London, Central London
Congestion Charging Scheme - Impacts Monitoring, Summary Review January 2005).
Resolving traffic problems was the top pledge of Mayor Ken Livingston's 2000 election
platform and when he was reelected in 2004 with a margin of 11 percent above his main rival
who threatened to abolish the charge, the scheme was vindicated.4 Leaders around the world
have watched the London scheme closely and many of them have begun to consider forms of
road pricing for their own regions.
Though transportation pricing can be used to address many different transportation-
related concerns, there are three major areas where it is thought to have the most significant
4 Public opinion surveys before the scheme was implemented revealed that approximately 40 percent were in favor
of the scheme and approximately 40 percent were opposed. Six months after the scheme began, 60 percent were in
favor and 25 percent were opposed.
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impacts: congestion, the environment, and finance. Pricing is also important in transitioning
from a "one size fits all" highway system to one that offers different products to different users.
A brief discussion of the role of pricing in each of these topics is discussed in this section.
1.2.1 Congestion
There is a growing consensus among researchers, decision makers, and the public that
addressing congestion is one of the most difficult-if not the most difficult-challenges for
urban transportation in the future. Congestion is a phenomenon that occurs when demand
exceeds capacity, often attributed to the good-in this case travel-being under-priced. In this
situation, drivers' perceived (and actual) cost of travel is less than fair market value, encouraging
them to travel more than they would in free market conditions. This results in an increased
number of per-person trips and, by extension, more cars on the road during peak periods.
Traffic congestion affects virtually every person in urban areas-either directly or
indirectly-across the globe. Drivers experience increased travel time delays, decreased travel
time reliability, and a greater risk of accidents. Non-drivers are also affected and may
experience congestion's negative effects on bus services and air quality on a daily basis.
Congestion inhibits the movement of goods, contributes to greenhouse gas emissions, wastes
fuel, and decreases economic productivity.
The rising costs of congestion are frequently cited by transportation analysts and decision
makers whom are trying to promote transportation projects or policies. Possibly the best-known
reference to the economic costs of congestion in the United States is the Urban Mobility Study,
which estimates those costs to be approximately $63 billion annually (Schrank and Lomax). The
methodology used in the Urban Mobility Study overestimates congestion costs compared with
what is economically efficient (Victoria Transportation Policy Institute), however, it
demonstrates the potential scale of the issue.5
Many people wonder why transportation agencies have been unable to eliminate
congestion. Anthony Downs addresses this question by suggesting that "[p]eak-hour traffic
congestion is an inherent result of the way modem societies operate. It stems from the
widespread desires of people to pursue certain goals that inevitably overload existing roads and
5 Economically efficient pricing is discussed in Chapter 2.
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transit systems every day" (1). He also notes that congestion is not primarily a problem, but
rather a byproduct of society's basic mobility problem of too many people wanting to travel at
the same time of day. Adults need to go to work, children need to attend school, and the
economy needs to move goods and provide services. Downs concludes that, "although traffic
congestion is inevitable, there are ways to slow the rate at which it intensifies. Several tactics
could do that effectively, especially if used in concert, but nothing can eliminate peak-hour
traffic congestion from large metropolitan areas" (8). Congestion pricing is one tactic that has
been proven to reduce congestion where it is implemented, and, if it is introduced in conjunction
with other measures, it can slow congestion growth and improve the mobility and overall
accessibility of a region. It is not desirable to eliminate all congestion, but Figure 1.1 shows that
removing just a fraction of the trips from peak periods can result in substantial delay reductions.
Delay
Capacity
Demand
Volume
Figure 1.1: Volume-Delay Function
1.2.2 Environment
Automobile travel has both direct and indirect effects on the environment, including air
and water pollution, ozone depletion, climate change, hazardous and solid waste production,
noise pollution, loss of habitat, reduced visibility, and reduced biodiversity. Traffic congestion is
closely related to the environmental impacts of the highway sector.
17
Pricing can be used as an instrument to influence the demand for and the means of travel.
It can provide economic incentives for users to:
* Shift trips to less congested periods of the day;
" Shift trips to transit and high-occupancy vehicles (HOVs);
* Combine trips through trip chaining or eliminate discretionary
trips;
* Demand 'greener' vehicle technology from manufacturers; and
" Take externalities into account when making auto and travel
decisions.
Although there has yet to be a road pricing scheme implemented with a primary objective
of environmental improvement, some agencies have used the pollution class of vehicles as a
factor in determining the level of the toll charge.
1.2.3 Finance
As it has in the past, road pricing can serve as a direct financing mechanism for
transportation projects.6 With growing travel demand, increasing construction costs, and
opposition to increasing fuel taxes, many regions are again considering tolling to meet their
transportation needs. However, non-traditional tolling can also generate revenue-perhaps even
more than conventional tolling in many cases.
1.2.4 Product Differentiation
The highway system has traditionally been a "one size fits all" enterprise. Most
highways in the United States were planned for and are operated by government agencies, in part
because urban transportation is mistakenly considered a public good.7 The mission of these
6 Many U.S. states-particularly those in the East-constructed toll roads in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
However, the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, commonly referred to as the Interstate system,
brought the toll road movement to a halt with 90 percent federal aid for new infrastructure construction in the 1950s.
J. G6mez-Ib65ez, "The Political Economy of Highway Tolls and Congestion Pricing," Transportation Quarterly 46.3
(1992).
7 Transportation is not a pure public good. The formal definition for public goods is that they must be non-
excludable and there must be non-rival consumption. Once non-excludable goods are provided, others cannot be
prevented from enjoying them. If non-rival consumption exists, additional people can consume the good without
reducing other consumers' enjoyment. J. G6mez-Ibifiez, "Externalities, Public Goods, and Commons,"
(Cambridge: Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, 2005). Pure public goods are rare, and
transportation does not meet these criteria. Only the public sector will provide public goods. A lighthouse and
national defense are classic examples of public goods.
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agencies historically has been infrastructure construction and expansion rather than efficient
operation of the existing transportation system. This has led to a lack of a customer-oriented
focus by transportation providers, an expectation that everyone will use the system in the same
way, and the provision of only one level-of-service (Sussman, Perspectives on Intelligent
Transportation Systems). This business model is problematic as it overlooks the heterogeneous
characteristics of users and their different service requirements.
In recent years, this traditional idea that highway transportation only needs to offer one
product has been challenged. The majority of the infrastructure system has been completed and
organizations are transitioning to a focus on operations. To support this new objective, agencies
must develop a customer orientation with a focus on quality service including the option of
premium service to those customers who demand it (Sussman, Perspectives on Intelligent
Transportation Systems). Others, such as the American Automobile Association, offer an
opposing argument and believe allowing one market group to pay for better service while others
remain in the congested general purpose lanes is a poor public policy decision (Wylie). Decision
makers will ultimately make the choice of whether premium service should be provided, but road
pricing measures will play a key role if it is to occur.
1.3 Motivation for this Research
Despite the growing interest in pricing, many decision makers still feel apprehensive
about their abilities to estimate the impacts of road pricing accurately, and there remains some
uncertainty as to which road pricing strategies are most appropriate for each metropolitan area.
Some of the most important issues of concern to a decision maker are the revenue forecasts,
potential diversions to alternative facilities, social implications, land-use changes, and
environmental effects. Although there are multiple models that have been either developed or
adapted to estimate one or more of these criteria for road pricing policies, each has only a limited
capacity to do so accurately. One potential cause for poor estimates in the modeling process is
that road pricing involves influencing driver behavior, which requires predicting human nature.
Another explanation is that the most common model used to evaluate road pricing strategies, the
four-step model (4SM), was developed for evaluating large-scale infrastructure projects and was
not meant to evaluate policies that involve little or no change in the infrastructure supply such as
road pricing. The model was not intended to analyze complex policies involving management
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and control of existing infrastructure or policies that directly influence travel behavior
(McNally). Adding to these difficulties, there is little empirical evidence available for
researchers to develop a better understanding of the effects of pricing measures and its influence
on driver behavior.8
Modeling transportation demand is a difficult process, and as Small and Winston note,
"[florecasts for new travel options, whether conventional or exotic, have often been far from the
mark" (Small and Winston 47). The introduction of toll charges makes estimating demand even
more problematic. Toll road demand forecasting has a history filled with poor and wildly
varying estimates, which has led to considerable uncertainty in the forecasting process (Estache,
Trujillo and Quinet; Fitch Ratings; Standard & Poor's).9 At least one credit rating agency has
stated that it believes the regional planning models, which use the four-step process, are "not
necessarily appropriate for use to support the issuance of toll road debt," (Fitch Ratings 2). The
direct relationship between revenue estimates and travel demand also demonstrates the
difficulties associated with determining the amount of traffic diversion that will occur if pricing
is added to an existing facility.
Other issues, such as perceived equity and fairness, are also concerning to many decision
makers. Some groups are worried that road pricing may change the distribution of benefits and
costs relative to the existing distribution, which would be an "equity" impact. There are two
types of equity concerns: horizontal equity and vertical equity. Horizontal equity refers to the
distribution of benefits between users and non-users or geographic areas, while vertical equity
refers to the impacts on disability, race, or income groups. Road pricing is likely to be more
equitable from the horizontal perspective than most other approaches to congestion reduction or
capacity expansion because the users who benefit the most pay for the improvements through
tolls (TCRP); similar arguments are often used to justify new toll roads. In the case of
converting an underutilized HOV lane to a HOT lane, non-users are recognizing they can also
receive benefits, albeit smaller ones than those received by HOT lane users, because this action
may reduce the number of vehicles traveling on the untolled general purpose lanes.
Demographics, as an example of vertical equity, are one factor influencing whether a driver will
8 The exception is conventional tolling, which has abundant data, although a noticeable amount of this is proprietary.
9 Standard & Poor's (S&P) found the standard deviation of toll road demand estimates to be 0.26, which is quite
large. Additionally, their empirical evidence suggest that toll road forecasts have, on average, overestimated traffic
forecasts by 20-30 percent.
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choose to use priced lanes, however, there are several others. Experience in California has
shown that reliability is a very important factor (Brownstone and Small) and that drivers from all
income groups use the lanes (TCRP). It is difficult to estimate equity impacts with accuracy,
however, because there is a lack of sufficient data on road pricing and current models are
incapable of modeling some of these factors. A recent Transit Cooperative Research Program
(TCRP) Report agrees that "[e]xisting forecasting and accounting methodologies are often
incomplete in addressing [equity] issues" (14-36).
In part because of the current inability to model road pricing well and the small number
of road pricing projects with actual data to study, it is argued that decision makers are not
comfortable with all of the estimates provided by existing models. If they were, the decision-
making process would be much easier and it would be more clear which road pricing strategies
would be the most beneficial.
Decision makers have to consider and weigh many factors and make trade-offs among
them when coming to a decision about a policy or strategy. Tools to assist the decision maker
with narrowing the range of alternatives would improve decision-making.
The hypothesis of this thesis is that decision makers have multiple conflicting objectives
and a tool that helps them to understand how well different road pricing measures meet their
criteria would be useful in determining the most appropriate forms of road pricing for their
regions. Existing transportation models are not capable of providing accurate estimates of all the
impacts many decision makers wish to consider, so an alternative evaluation approach is
proposed. While this thesis presents a detailed discussion of the impacts of different road pricing
measures, the tool presented in Chapter 5 gives decision makers a rank ordering of alternatives
and qualitative assessments rather than specific numerical estimates of the impacts.' 0 The tool
can be used to determine which road pricing measures are most appropriate for a particular
metropolitan area. The objectives of this research are discussed in Section 1.4.
1.4 Thesis Objectives and Organization
The primary objectives of this thesis are four-fold. First, it provides a comprehensive
overview of the different forms of road pricing and discusses the impacts these measures are
' In other words, the tool might determine a pricing measure decreases the number of accidents "very well," but it
does not provide a numerical estimate of how many accidents a pricing measure will eliminate.
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believed to have on areas of concern to decision makers. Chapter 3 categorizes road pricing
strategies into six types, which will allow generalized statements to be made regarding the
strengths and weaknesses of each form of road pricing. Chapter 2 provides background
information on the economic principles of road pricing.
The second objective is to identify the difficulties associated with modeling road pricing
and to explain why decision makers are not comfortable with using existing models to estimate
the impacts of pricing strategies. Additionally, Chapter 4:
* Outlines the factors believed to be responsible for drivers'
choosing to use a priced facility;
" Notes the models that are being used in practice to perform both
sketch-planning and detailed analysis of road pricing alternatives
in the United States;
" Explains why these models are incapable of modeling road pricing
well;
* Presents the modeling issues that need to be resolved in order to
model road pricing better; and
* Acts as background information in support of the development of
an alternative method for evaluating road pricing strategies
The third objective is to develop a framework and tool that decision makers can use to
assess road pricing strategies. Chapter 5 presents a tool, the Road Pricing Decision Analysis
Tool (RPDAT), which was created to assist decision makers in determining which pricing
strategies are most appropriate for a metropolitan area. The tool is not intended to evaluate
specific projects or provide detailed estimates of the impacts associated with different measures,
but it can be used as a sketch-planning tool to narrow the range of pricing alternatives to one or
two that should be considered further. RPDAT can be applied quickly and allows the user to test
how well different forms of road pricing work with different policy scenarios, thus improving the
user's understanding of road pricing measures. One of the goals of this tool is that it can be used
in the larger context of Regional Strategic Transportation Planning (RSTP)." RPDAT has been
created with the idea that it would be easily adaptable to meet future planning and decision-
making needs. A detailed description of the new framework and tool are located in Chapter 5.
" For more information on RSTP, see: (i) J. Sussman, S. Sgouridis and J. Ward, A New Approach to Transportation
Planning for the 21st Century: Regional Strategic Transportation Planning as a CLIOS (Cambridge: Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 2004) and (ii) S. Sgouridis, "Integrating Regional Strategic Transportation Planning and
Supply Chain Management: Along the Path to Sustainability," Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005.
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The fourth and final objective of this thesis is to apply RPDAT to a specific region in
order to demonstrate the tool's usefulness. In Chapter 7, RPDAT is applied to the Kuala Lumpur
Metropolitan Area (KLMA). To establish the decision-making context for the KLMA
application, Chapter 6 presents background information on Kuala Lumpur and Malaysia.
The thesis concludes with Chapter 8, which presents a summary of the findings and
recommendations for further research. Appendices A1-A4 provide additional explanations of
some topics and Appendix B defines several acronyms and terms referred to throughout the
thesis.
1.5 Contributions to Existing Literature
There are at least three contributions to the existing literature in this thesis. Chapter 4
documents the state-of-the-practice of modeling road pricing and identifies the modeling
improvements and data requirements that would enhance the capacity of transportation analysts
to estimate the impacts of road pricing strategies. There are many researchers attempting to
incorporate road pricing into their models, however, there is no documentation found in the
literature that explains why existing models have fundamental problems with estimating the
impacts of road pricing policies.
A specific framework does not yet exist to help decision makers decide which road
pricing strategies might be most appropriate for a metropolitan area. This research presents a
decision-making tool (RPDAT) that takes various inputs from the user, such as prioritized
criteria and regional characteristics, and produces recommendations identifying which forms of
road pricing meet the user's set of criteria best and should be analyzed further. One of the major
contributions of this tool is that it provides a quick and simple way for regional decision makers
to develop a better understanding of the differences among road pricing strategies.
This thesis also applies RPDAT to Kuala Lumpur (KL) in Chapter 7. KL has certain
characteristics that make it different from other major metropolitan areas, but it also has many
traits that are similar. Although congestion pricing policies for KL have been studied in the past
(Wilbur Smith and Jurutera Konsultant; Armstrong-Wright), these studies are quite dated. This
analysis updates the existing studies and recommends road pricing measures for Kuala Lumpur,
demonstrating the use of RPDAT for a metropolitan area.
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2 ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS
2.1 Chapter Purpose and Organization
This chapter discusses the economic rationale for road pricing strategies. Marginal-cost
pricing, Ramsey pricing, and congestion pricing are reviewed to provide fundamental
information for these concepts and terms, which will be referred to throughout the thesis. If the
reader is already familiar with the economics of road pricing, he or she may wish to move
directly to Chapter 3.
This chapter is presented in a hierarchical organization rather than according to level of
significance. Marginal cost pricing is presented first, followed by Ramsey pricing, and then
congestion pricing.
2.2 Function of Pricing in Urban Transportation
Road pricing has two primary functions in urban transportation; it (i) finances
infrastructure and (ii) rations and allocates the use of infrastructure. Fuel taxes and conventional
tolling are the most commonly used methods of infrastructure finance. Although the public and
its elected representatives are primarily interested in tolling as a means to finance the expansion
of facilities rather than as a means to manage existing facilities, economists and planners are
usually more interested in the second function-rationing the use of transportation services
(G6mez-Ibafiez, "The Political Economy of Highway Tolls and Congestion Pricing").
Congestion pricing and marginal-cost pricing are primarily methods of rationing and allocating
road space, but Ramsey pricing can also encourage more efficient use of infrastructure. All three
economic principles can be used to generate revenue.
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2.3 Economic Principles and Definitions
2.3.1 Long Run vs. Short Run
The long run is the period that is long enough for a firm to adjust all of its inputs to their
optimal levels. Conversely, a firm is defined to be operating in the short run when at least one
factor is assumed to be fixed. Though the short run has fixed costs and variable costs, all costs
and decisions are assumed to be variable in the long run.
From the users' perspective, a household often plays the role of the firm in transportation
and the unit of output, or production, is a trip. When a household considers making a trip, the
household will take a range of (input) factors into account, all of which have costs associated
with them. These factors include the household's income, number of autos owned and their
associated costs, and the trip's purpose, timing, cost, mode, and length, among others. Inputs
that are assumed to be fixed in the short run, making them long-run factors, are household
location, income, number of vehicles, and the fixed costs of auto ownership. Firms seek to
minimize their variable costs in the short run.
From a transportation provider's perspective, the short-run is defined to be the period in
which capacity is fixed and cannot be adjusted. Thus, as will be explained in Section 2.3.2,
economists consider the passive toleration of increased congestion to be the short-run method of
accommodating an additional vehicle. The long-run method would be investment in the facility
to expand capacity.
2.3.2 Externalities
Externalities arise when the social or economic activities of one group of persons have an
impact on another group and that impact is not fully accounted for or compensated for by the
first group (European Commission). Externalities usually occur because of a lack of clear
property rights. With negative externalities, those that cause negative impacts on third parties,
the private market produces too much because producers and consumers do not recognize the full
costs (G6mez-Ib6fiez, "Externalities, Public Goods, and Commons").
Transportation has many negative externalities that drivers do not consider when
choosing to make a trip because these externalities do not present a readily observable cost to
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them. Externalities include environmental impacts, the cost of accidents, and the congestion
delay imposed on other road users. Consumers will only purchase a product-in this case, make
a trip-if they value it at least as much as their personal cost; thus, internalizing negative
externalities creates net benefits for society.
Some argue that congestion is not an externality because many of the negative effects are
borne by a single user group.' 2 With this argument, each driver causes an increase in congestion
that delays other drivers who choose to use the system, making the effects internalized by a
common group. This argument is incorrect, however, because multiple firms use the highway
facilities and they do not consider the negative effects of their actions on other firms when they
decide whether, when, where, and how to make a trip. The internal congestion costs to each
additional driver are small compared to the additional congestion costs incurred by the system
associated with that vehicle. Each vehicle also imposes additional delay costs on bus and non-
motorized transportation users, which are outside the "drivers" system. Finally, emissions are
additional costs for which drivers are not responsible, also contributing to the argument that
congestion has negative externalities.
G6mez-Ibhiez ("Externalities, Public Goods, and Commons") identifies four methods for
correcting externalities: property rights can be established, standards can be set, corrective taxes
or subsidies can be imposed, or a cap can be established with tradable permits. Considered in the
context of road pricing, the third method, taxing, is the most reasonable option for correcting
highway externalities.
2.3.3 Marginal-Cost Pricing
The marginal cost is the additional cost incurred from producing one more unit of output;
in this context, a vehicular trip. It is equal to the average user cost plus the change in average
cost from serving one more user. 13
Infrastructure is used most efficiently in an economic sense when users perceive they are
paying the marginal cost of each trip. In a first-best world, which assumes perfect competition,
12 By definition, an externality does not exist if there are no effects outside the system.
13 In this thesis, marginal-cost pricing and congestion pricing are presented as economic principles or techniques
used by pricing strategies.
27
prices are equated with marginal costs. However, first-best conditions generally do not exist in
the real world and road prices are often set below the marginal cost in nearly all congested urban
areas. Misleading signals about resource scarcity are conveyed to users and the incentive to use
resources and capital assets efficiently is diminished accordingly. As seen in Figure 2.1, the
marginal cost is equal to the average user cost (assuming the only externality considered is
congestion) when there is no congestion. The marginal cost of another vehicle on the facility
increases faster than the average user cost during congested periods because of the delay curve in
Figure 1.1, but the user costs incurred by the marginal vehicle usually remain unchanged or vary
only slightly, thus encouraging excessive use of the facility. 5
User
Cost Marginal Cost Average
Cost
Peak Demand
Off-Peak Demand
Volume
Figure 2.1: User Average and Marginal Costs
If externalities are considered, the average user cost is less than the social marginal cost
of a trip during peak periods. The social marginal cost of a trip is the opportunity cost, or total
sacrifice to society, of producing that trip. One of the primary causes of congestion (and the
14 First-best conditions assume perfect competition; complete information; no externalities; no subsidies; and no
indivisibilities of supply or demand.
" Users only consider the average cost of a trip because they are from different firms. Users would consider the
marginal costs of delay if they were from the same firm, because these costs are then internalized. A railroad
facility used by only one firm is an example of where users consider the marginal cost of delay.
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level of externality impacts) in an urban transportation system is that the user does not pay 100
percent of the costs. Users are subsidized, thus encouraging them to consume more (i.e., make
more trips) than is optimal for society.
Motor fuel taxes and other road use taxes and fees are not high enough to offset
congestion and pollution externalities, so peak-hour driving is priced below the marginal social
cost (G6mez-Ibaez, "Pricing"). This problem could be alleviated through marginal-cost
pricing, which charges users for the marginal cost of their trip, improving economic efficiency
and supporting an efficient allocation of resources. As will be explained in Section 2.3.3.1, the
short-run marginal cost (SRMC) and the long-run marginal cost (LRMC) are composed of
different items. Charging the LRMC requires frequent toll schedule adjustments (different from
variable pricing), which is undesirable from a customer service standpoint.16 As a result,
economists recommend charging the SRMC because it creates better utilization of the facility
than the LRMC. Where there is strong demand and an absolute constraint on capacity
expansion, tolls set at the SRMC would likely generate revenues far in excess of optimal
investment that could be used to finance the cost of constructing roadways and subsequent
maintenance costs (G6mez-Ibahez, "The Political Economy of Highway Tolls and Congestion
Pricing").
2.3.3.1 Short-Run and Long-Run Marginal Cost
The SRMC is the cost of accommodating one more vehicle by tolerating additional
congestion. Traffic delays imposed on other road users caused by the additional vehicle and the
pavement damage caused by the additional vehicle's passage are included in the SRMC. The
SRMC does not include the costs of right of way acquisition, grading and constructing the road
surface, or structures because such costs are fixed or sunk in the short run (G6mez-Ib65ez, "The
Political Economy of Highway Tolls and Congestion Pricing"). Accident and environmental
externality costs can also be considered as components of the social SRMC.
The LRMC is the amortized cost of accommodating one more vehicle with infrastructure
expansion such that congestion does not increase. It includes the costs of right of way, grading,
structures, etc. The LRMC is higher for peak-period and peak-direction traffic because the peak
16 Variable pricing changes tolls by time-of-day and/or day-of-the-week, while LRMC pricing might require the toll
schedule be adjusted on a monthly basis.
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volume determines the amount of capacity that is required to accommodate demand. When the
level of transportation investment is not optimal, which is often the case, the SRMC does not
equal the LRMC. If there is excess capacity on the highway facility (i.e., the level of investment
is larger than optimal for current traffic volumes), the short-run marginal cost will be less than
the long-run marginal cost. When the SRMC is greater than the LRMC, it is less costly to
expand the facility than tolerate additional congestion. However, setting the price at the short-
run marginal costs, which economists usually recommend, would cause toll revenues to fall short
of the highway authority's costs (G6mez-Ib6ez, "Pricing"). Pricing that reflect the short-run
marginal cost will produce more efficient utilization of the facilities, while prices that reflect the
long-run marginal cost will send better signals for the optimal level of investment.
When an untolled substitute facility is present, however, there are complications to the
rule that facilities should be priced at the SRMC. It is more difficult to calculate the optimal toll,
which is mostly an esoteric interest of economists, and the appropriate toll is not necessarily the
SRMC. Perhaps the most serious problem is that untolled competition may seriously reduce the
effectiveness of tolls in managing demand (G6mez-Ibinez, "The Political Economy of Highway
Tolls and Congestion Pricing"). Untolled competing facilities are thus a very important factor in
determining the amount at which a facility should be priced. Untolled competition, which is
almost always present in urban transportation, makes determining the "correct" toll difficult in
practice.
2.3.3.2 Benefits of Marginal-Cost Pricing
Economists recommend that prices be set at marginal cost instead of average cost
because it ensures that users "will make an extra trip or shipment only when the value to them of
doing so is at least as great as the cost of providing it" (G6mez-Ib6aiez, "Pricing" 99).17
According to welfare economics, social welfare is maximized when prices equal marginal costs
17 Transportation economics assumes the goal of pricing is to maximize net social benefits, which is the difference
between the consumer willingness to pay and the cost of producing the service. This assumes the distribution of
income is either just or not an appropriate concern for the pricing of this service, the consumer is the best judge of
his or her own welfare, there are no externalities of production and consumption unless specified, and that all other
goods that are close substitutes or complements are appropriately priced. These can be strong assumptions (G6mez-
Ibdfiez, "Pricing," adapted from Turvey). See also: C. Hendrickson and M. Wohl, "Efficient Prices for Roadways
and Transit Services," Transportation Quarterly 36.3 (1982).
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in a first-best world.18 Empirical research supports this argument (G6mez-Ibiez, "Pricing" 101)
and the World Bank also advocates this approach (Cities on the Move: A World Bank Urban
Transport Strategy Review). Therefore, it is appropriate to suggest that transportation providers
align user prices more closely with the true marginal costs. Pure marginal-cost pricing is not
feasible because some costs cannot be reasonably allocated; nonetheless, various pricing
measures can approximate marginal-cost pricing relatively well.
Fair and efficient infrastructure pricing should support the development of a sustainable
transportation system.' 9 Failing to charge the marginal social cost for road transportation has
several negative effects, including:
" Mode choice is distorted in favor of road transport, particularly
private automobiles;
* Excessive use of infrastructure is encouraged, which can create
"excess" congestion;
" Conventional commercial investment criteria cannot be used to
determine the amount of capacity to provide because there is no
direct revenue; and
* Funding to properly maintain existing infrastructure may be
insufficient because the revenues are not distributed to the
responsible local authority (World Bank, Cities on the Move: A
World Bank Urban Transport Strategy Review 142).
Despite the increased social benefits, many decision makers are hesitant to charge users
the marginal cost. As G6mez-Ib6iez explains, "policymakers often find raising prices more
controversial than spending more money on infrastructure capacity, so Americans frequently
enjoy more capacity and lower prices than would be optimal" ("Pricing" 106).
2.3.4 Ramsey Pricing
Inverse elasticity pricing, also referred to as Ramsey pricing, is recommended by
economists where "first-best" conditions exist and marginal cost pricing would not generate
enough revenue to meet budgetary constraints.2 0 Ramsey pricing uses price discrimination and
charges users with the least price elastic demand the highest amount over the marginal cost. By
18 It is desirable to maximize welfare because doing so creates net benefits for society.
19 The distribution of the benefits and costs, however, are fundamental considerations of whether a policy is indeed
"sustainable."
20 For further information on Ramsey pricing, see: E. Ramsey, "A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation,"
Economic Journal 37.March (1927).
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segmenting price elasticities of users, the reduction in consumption due to higher prices is
minimized. If the cross-price elasticities of demand between different customers are zero, the
Ramsey pricing formula to minimize distortions is:
P, - MC /Pz = k / E, where,
Pi = price charged to user i;
MCi = marginal cost of serving user i;
k = constant reflecting the amount of revenue needed to meet the
budget; and
Ei = absolute value of the price elasticity of demand of user i.
The left-hand side of the equation is the percentage markup over marginal cost for user i. If
there were a group of users with perfectly inelastic demand, this group could, in theory, be
charged whatever amount was required to balance the budget. The formula reflects that as the
price elasticity of demand becomes lower (i.e., more inelastic), the user should be charged a
greater markup over the marginal cost.
Although Ramsey pricing is quite attractive from an economic theory standpoint, there
are limitations in its practical application. It is frequently difficult to estimate the elasticities of
demand for different user groups and Ramsey pricing creates strong incentives for customers
paying high markup prices to find alternative services or sources (G6mez-Ibdfez, "Pricing").
This phenomenon essentially changes the demand elasticities for these users, modifying their
Ramsey prices, and reduces the number of customers with inelastic demand, which can make
Ramsey pricing responsible for its own failure. Another limitation is the assumption of "first-
best" conditions, which implies that all complements, substitutes, and inputs to the service are
also priced at the marginal cost. This is often a poor assumption in the highway sector because
most roads are not priced at the marginal cost-especially in the United States. "Second-best"
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conditions are more prevalent in the real-world.
A common example of Ramsey pricing is the segmentation of business and pleasure
22travelers used by legacy carriers in the commercial airline business. Business and pleasure
passengers traveling coach class receive the same product, but the airline imposes fare
restrictions to make the majority of business travelers pay a higher fare. The airline industry
21 Second-best conditions and pricing are discussed in Appendix Al.
2 Legacy carriers traditionally provide high quality passenger airline service to both business and pleasure travelers
and use hub-and-spoke operations. United, Delta, Northwest, and American Airlines are examples of legacy
carriers, while Southwest Airlines, JetBlue Airways, and Ryan Air are examples of non-legacy carriers.
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takes advantage of the price elasticity of demand for business travelers being less elastic than for
pleasure travelers by using a form of Ramsey pricing to increase profits.
HOT lanes may be another example of Ramsey pricing. Many HOT lanes allow HOVs
to travel for a reduced rate or at no charge. The difference in price elasticities associated with
the two user groups (HOVs and LOVs) is illustrated in this situation; some travelers (LOVs) are
willing to pay for the HOT lane service and others (HOVs) are more sensitive to price and would
rather carpool to save the expense of the HOT lane toll. 23
2.3.5 Congestion Pricing
Congestion pricing is a technique that uses market forces to allocate limited facility
capacity among users by their need to travel and their willingness to pay (TCRP). It involves
varying the price for road use according to the level of traffic congestion to encourage people to
travel during less congested hours, by less congested routes, by alternative routes, or not at all
(NCHRP). The first ideas of congestion pricing were suggested by Pigou and Knight, and were
built upon by Vickrey ("A Proposal for Revising New York's Subway Fare Structure";
"Congestion Theory and Transport Investment"; "Pricing in Urban and Suburban Transport"),
who was later awarded a Nobel Prize for his work. Congestion pricing, also known as
congestion charging, peak-period pricing, or value pricing, is commonly used in the airline,
telephone, hotel, and electricity industries. It is particularly useful in infrastructure intensive
systems such as urban transportation. The fundamental concept is charging higher tolls for the
right to use a service or facility during peak periods, which smoothes out the demand peak.
The problem of congestion is essentially one of resource scarcity; demand exceeds supply
for a given timeframe-the peak-period. Excess demand is accommodated by queuing and is the
result of a market failure. Without prices that reflect the scarcity of the infrastructure resource
(i.e., marginal costs), users only consider their private cost of travel and ignore the additional
cost of their trip on society. Pricing is therefore necessary to correct the market failure and
allocate the transportation service to those who value it the most.
Congestion can be an indicator of a strong economy, and Section 2.3.2 explained that
some level of congestion is desirable from an economic perspective. However, there are
23 This example assumes HOVs would otherwise be low-occupancy vehicles if the HOV discount did not exist.
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numerous negative effects with this phenomenon and many regions may benefit economically by
reducing congestion because it:
" Is economically inefficient due to lost time incurred by persons and
goods;2 4
" Decreases travel time reliability and predictability;
* Reduces the attractiveness of road-based public transportation;
* Creates adverse environmental impacts with more pollution per
vehicle-miles-traveled (VMT) than free-flowing traffic;
* Decreases the quality of urban life;
" Increases the chance of road accidents; and
* Encourages sprawl.
Marginal delays from additional automobiles are very small when there is no congestion.
Figure 2.2 shows that average vehicle speed can increase considerably by eliminating just a few
trips when volume is near or at capacity. As Sussman states, "the linkages between capacity,
cost, and level-of-service-the lumpiness of investment juxtaposed with the [speed-volume]
function as volume approaches capacity are the central challenges of transportation system
design" (Introduction to Transportation Systems 81). In urban areas where additional capacity is
particularly expensive, the LRMC (and SRMC) of accommodating additional peak-period
vehicles can be very expensive.
- Delay is economically inefficient because people value their time.
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Speed
Capacity
Demand
Volume
Figure 2.2: Speed-Volume Function
Some level of congestion in urban transportation is always economically desirable
because the optimal level of investment occurs when SRMC equals LRMC. If the operating
entity were to either impose extremely high tolls or widen the facility such that congestion was
eliminated, the SRMC would be relatively low. The LRMC of this facility, however, is likely to
be quite high because it is expensive to build urban roads; the level of investment would be
especially poor if the facility were continuously expanded to accommodate increased traffic
demand.
A congestion toll, shown in Figure 2.3, should be charged to levy the marginal cost of the
facility to the users. If the LRMC equals $3 and the congestion toll equals $2, the facility
operator should charge the congestion toll because LRMC is greater than SRMC. If the LRMC
equals $3 and the congestion toll equals $4, however, the highway should be expanded.
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Figure 2.3: Congestion Toll
Tactics aimed at reducing congestion by influencing driver behavior can be generalized
into two categories: "carrot" or "stick." The first approach can be considered the carrot, which
attempts to entice drivers with incentives to act in a preferred manner. Many congested cities
would prefer more drivers to take transit, which could reduce congestion, so transit farebox
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revenues are subsidized in the United States. This carrot approach has had limited success,
however, with encouraging a mode shift to transit; transit ridership accounts for less than ten
percent of peak period trips in almost every North American city and has so far failed to have a
large impact on mitigating congestion in most regions. Transit subsidies have not been
effective at influencing driver behavior in North America because "the convenience of auto
travel is so great that, at its current heavily subsidized price, luring a substantial share of peak-
period travelers from their autos would require negative fares of appreciable magnitude" (Moses
and Williamson, cited in Mohring 192). Peak-period auto subsidies exist in North America
because of the absence of marginal-cost pricing techniques and low fuel taxes. Imperfect pricing
2 Other factors, such as social obligation to provide mobility for the poor, are also motivation for providing transit
subsidies.
2 Eliminating transit where it is highly utilized, however, could have largely negative congestion impacts in some
metropolitan areas.
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measures, such as the vehicle fuel tax, exacerbate congestion when drivers are charged less than
the marginal cost of travel.
The contrasting approach is analogous to the stick and reduces or eliminates peak-period
auto subsidies. Congestion pricing is a most often analyzed as a stick approach for lowering
peak-period congestion; however, it can also be considered as a carrot. Japan has used peak-
period discounts to attract traffic to toll roads in order to alleviate congestion on the free parallel
facilities (Matsuda, Tsukada and Kikuchi 9). This form of peak-period pricing might be thought
of as reverse congestion pricing.2,
An attractive feature of congestion pricing is, as a NCHRP report explains, that it
''encourages motorists to find many ways to reduce congestion rather than promoting only a few"
(NCHRP 5). Carpool and transit programs narrowly aim to persuade drivers to switch modes,
but congestion pricing provides economic incentives to switch time-of-day, route, location,
mode, or frequency of travel. Travelers are given the choice of which tactic to adopt rather than
prescribing a particular change in behavior.
Box 1: Japan's Reverse Congestion Pricing Experiment
Japan's expressway network has a very low utilization rate; the total
traffic volume is less than 13 percent of all traffic, compared to 20 percent in the
United Kingdom, 21 percent in France, 30 percent in Germany, and 31 percent in
the United States. Low utilization of the tolled expressways is blamed on missing
links in the expressway network, long distances between interchanges, and the
high tolls themselves as the primary reasons why drivers choose toll-free
alternative routes. The Japanese government is performing demonstration
projects to determine the effects of morning and evening peak-period toll
discounts in an effort to encourage drivers to use the toll roads instead of the
congested toll-free roads. The goals of the demonstration projects are to improve
the roadside environment, mitigate congestion, and promote traffic safety
measures (Matsuda, Tsukada and Kikuchi).
Congestion pricing is a way of managing existing capacity to limit the amount of new
capacity necessary to maintain traffic speeds and level-of-service. A relatively large share of
economic and employment activity often occurs in the central business district (CBD) for
developing countries, resulting in a large number of commute trips to and from the city center
during the morning and evening periods, respectively. Directional peaking requires additional
27 Reverse congestion pricing would be analogous to a carrot approach.
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capacity to accommodate the peak traffic demand, which makes the incremental cost of
accommodating peak-period users much more expensive because infrastructure used for peak
and off-peak travel is a joint cost (Box 2).28
Box 2: Joint Costs
Joint costs occur when there is little or no cost to provide a second service
once a primary service is provided. An example of a joint cost in transportation is
the provision of infrastructure for peak- and off-peak demand. Once a highway is
constructed for use during the peak period, it is automatically available for off-
peak users at very little or no cost. If a joint cost exists, the costs of the facility
should be allocated to the primary service, which is the peak period in this case
(G6mez-Ibfiez, "Pricing").
The presence of joint costs in transportation strongly supports the use of
congestion pricing. Prices should reflect the costs of provision, and since the
majority of the costs are associated with the peak periods, higher prices should be
charged during peak periods, i.e., congestion pricing.
Another example of a joint cost is the replacement of an underutilized
HOV lane with a HOT lane. From an economic perspective, the underutilized
HOV lane is the primary service and all costs associated with the lane should be
allocated to the HOV portion of the project. By its nature of existence and
underutilization, excess capacity can be provided to LOVs at very little cost.
Despite being a better approximation of the marginal cost of travel than fuel taxes,
congestion charging schemes are not true marginal-cost pricing. They are second-best tools
traditionally used to manage demand-the degree of MCP approximation depends heavily on the
characteristics of the particular scheme.
While pure marginal-cost pricing is not the primary goal of many municipalities, it is
important to understand that there are differences between the marginal-cost approximations of
policies. Congestion pricing has a higher correlation with the full social costs of vehicle travel
than fuel taxes and vehicle excise duties. As seen in Figure 2.4, fuel consumption has little
correlation to the social (marginal) cost associated with the amount, type, location, and time of
travel. The social cost of congestion and pollution is small in rural areas but can be high in urban
areas; this difference cannot be captured with fuel taxes. Congestion pricing is fairer than
conventional tolling because it charges drivers who use the roadway at the most congested time
28 Higher directional peaking implies that a greater portion of all corridor traffic is traveling in the same direction
during a given peak period.
29 Examples of costs that should be allocated to the toll portion of the HOT lane would be the electronic toll
collection infrastructure, toll collection costs, and any other costs above what would be required for HOV lanes.
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the highest price, thereby approximating the social cost more closely. Congestion pricing can
also charge users different tolls based on vehicle type, allowing externalities and variable costs to
be assessed more accurately than with a tax.
User
Cost MC AC + Fuel
Tax
AC
Peak Demand
Volume
Figure 2.4: Effect of a Fuel Tax
The World Bank (Cities on the Move: A World Bank Urban Transport Strategy Review)
cites several reasons why economists have long advocated congestion pricing measures. First,
peak-period pricing increases economic efficiency by creating correct incentives over the entire
range of dimensions involved in travel decisions, including travel time, choice of destinations,
mode of transport, route, etc. Second, congestion pricing applied in the context of a flexible land
and property market would create cities with more compact forms, more mixed land use, less
resources devoted to spread of the road network into surrounding areas, and more funds available
for improving infrastructure in currently urbanized areas. Most importantly, congestion pricing
generates revenue instead of creating additional costs like many of the administrative measure
alternatives. This potentially substantial revenue source can be used to build additional
infrastructure, finance ITS projects, improve socially desirable aspects of the transportation
system such as public transportation, or even be used for non-transportation purposes such as
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health care and education. Although most transportation professionals with congestion pricing
experience recommend using the revenue to improve auto travel alternatives, the use of the
revenue is dependent upon the case-specific legal framework and objectives of the implementing
government; excess revenues could theoretically be used for other government programs or
returned through lower taxes to the general public.
Congestion pricing can take several forms and therefore unique characteristics of each
scheme and location need to be recognized. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 will identify the attributes
of different road pricing measures. There are, however, several common characteristics of
"good" congestion pricing systems, which are identified in the following section.
2.3.5.1 Characteristics of 'Good' Congestion Pricing Systems
There are several characteristics associated with a "good" congestion charging scheme.
These often include:3 0
* Clearly defined goals;
* Part of an overall transportation strategy;
* Net benefits;
* Hypothecated revenues for transportation improvements instead of
general government funds;
* A viable transportation alternative mode or route;
* Reliable and proven technology;
* Easy for visitors and infrequent users;
* Able to accommodate future objectives;
* Ensuring personal privacy;
* Enforceable;
* Consideration of differences between vehicle types;
* Starting simple and being understandable for drivers;
* Effective marketing and educational campaigns;
* Predictable prices so drivers can make appropriate decisions ahead
of time;
* Multiple payment options;
* Low administrative costs and burdens;
* Perceived as effective by the public;
* Perceived as fair by the public; and
* Exercising other controls, specifically land-use, in tandem.
30 Adapted from: J. Cracknell, Experience in Urban Traffic Management and Demand Management in Developing
Countries (World Bank, Department for International Development, UK, 2000).
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While many of these criteria relate to choice of technology and implementation, others are quite
relevant for this thesis. One of the most important qualities of the tool discussed in Chapter 5 is
its focus on helping the decision maker clearly define the overall objectives for road pricing
policies. Many times projects are pursued without a clear set of goals, which can lead to
implementing projects that have no apparent contribution to an agency's mission.
2.3.5.2 Criticisms and Opposition to Congestion Pricing
Despite the many benefits of congestion pricing and though more cities are considering
pricing policies, few schemes have been implemented. The World Bank Urban Transport
Strategy Review (Cracknell) cites the following reasons for the lack of congestion charging
implementation:
* Political, and some public opposition;
* Failure of transportation planners to present convincing arguments
as to the benefits of congestion pricing;
* Legal and institutional constraints associated with direct charging
for road use;
* Lack of legal framework for dealing with offenders (e.g., "owner"
versus "driver" liability);
* Institutional shortcoming in planning, designing, implementing,
and managing a scheme on a continuous basis; and
* Tendency to regard congestion pricing as a "stand-alone" scheme
and thus a failure to recognize and develop integrated policies for
improved, quality public transportation as an alternative to car use.
In addition to the factors named by the World Bank, congestion pricing has also been
opposed because the net financial benefits are not returned to the drivers who pay. Additional
questions to consider include: (i) how to distribute the burdens of congestion pricing, (ii) how to
use the revenue, (iii) how to cope with the synergetic effects (management of mobility), (iv) how
is the natural environment affected, (v) how to overcome technical problems, and (vi) how to
manage the political risks. These important issues need to be addressed before a scheme is
introduced.
Some critics neglect to consider the benefits gained by other areas of the transportation
sector with congestion pricing and that it is usually implemented as part of a package of
measures. Others believe there will be an emigration from areas that are priced to areas that are
not. Most of these concerns are overstated and can be dispelled with land-use controls.
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Congestion pricing may actually make the city center (if implemented in the form of area-wide
pricing) a more attractive place to live for residents that work within the cordon.
2.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter examined the economic foundations and principles of road pricing. There
are two primary functions of pricing in transportation: (i) financing infrastructure and (ii)
rationing and allocating the use of infrastructure. Much of the focus was on marginal-cost
pricing and congestion pricing, which are techniques for achieving the latter function, but these
methods can also be used to generate revenue. Many regions stand to benefit by aligning
transportation prices more closely to the marginal cost of travel, which would discourage
excessive consumption of transportation resources in an economy. Ramsey pricing is another
economic strategy used to increase revenue, which is an integral part of some road pricing
strategies.
The following chapter categorizes road pricing strategies into six different types and
examines the impacts. Real-world examples of the different scheme types are also presented.
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3 ROAD PRICING STRATEGIES
3.1 Chapter Purpose and Organization
This chapter defines the different types of road pricing and examines the impacts each
may have on areas of concern to decision makers. Individual strategies have different capacities
to achieve various policy objectives (e.g., mobility improvement, revenue generation, and
environmental improvement), which are also presented in this chapter.
Six types of road pricing strategies are presented first, followed by assessments of how
well each strategy can achieve the different policy objectives.
3.2 Introduction
As established in Chapter 1, road pricing refers to when particular road trips, at well-
specified places and/or times, are subjected to well-defined charges. The amount of the charge
depends directly on the location, time, and/or amount of road travel.
There are several types of road pricing, which include conventional tolling, facility
pricing, express lanes (e.g., HOT lanes), area-wide pricing, cordon pricing, network pricing, and
distance-based charging; each of these forms will be discussed in the following sections. Road
pricing strategies (excluding conventional tolling and distance-based charging) have traditionally
been considered for congestion management purposes; however, these innovative forms of road
pricing are being evaluated increasingly often for their ability to generate revenue. These
strategies also have impacts on other areas of concern to decision makers, which will be detailed
in the latter half of this chapter.
3.3 Types of Road Pricing
3.3.1 Conventional (Flat-Rate) Tolling
In what is defined to be conventional tolling in this thesis, all vehicles are charged a flat
fee to traverse a transportation facility, which is most commonly a road segment, bridge, or
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tunnel. All or a portion of the infrastructure costs are assessed to the facility users rather than to
the general tax base-a simple example of the user pays principle. With a flat fee structure, the
scarcity of the resource during periods of greater demand is not reflected in the level of the fee,
i.e., there is a fixed supply but prices cannot reflect changes in the level of congestion.
Conventional tolling is widespread and exists all over the world. In practice, it is the
dominant application of road pricing today. Infrastructure providers have historically used this
type of road pricing to finance additional high-speed limited access roads, tunnels, or bridges,
which are particularly expensive to provide. Flat-rate tolling can be used for other purposes,
however, such as discouraging auto travel. It is a less precise technique for reducing congestion
than facility congestion pricing (discussed in Section 3.3.2) because the level of the toll does not
change with demand, but the measure can be attractive for its simplicity. If the operating agency
does not desire to shift demand to other times of the day, conventional tolling might meet the
operator's goals. A major disadvantage of flat-rate tolling (versus other road pricing measures)
is that it is a relatively inflexible policy lever.
3.3.2 Facility Congestion Pricing
This thesis defines facility (congestion) pricing to be the strategy where a toll charge is
congestion- or time-dependent (i.e., dynamic or variable) and applicable to all lanes of a
particular transportation facility. 3 The fee is usually highest during congested periods, reflecting
the scarcity of the resource when demand is high. Similar to conventional tolling, there is no
free alternative within the facility; drivers must use alternative routes or modes (if available) to
avoid the toll. Because this tolling technique uses congestion pricing principles (outlined in
Section 2.4), drivers have the option to adjust their time of travel to take advantage of lower tolls
than those assessed during the peak period. Facility pricing strives to reduce the fluctuation in
facility demand (i.e., spread out the peak period), eliminate unnecessary trips, and/or encourage
drivers to change modes.
Facility pricing is most applicable to expressways, tunnels, bridges, or other limited-
access transportation facilities. Similar to other forms of road pricing, exemptions and discounts
3 While conventional tolling on an expressway is a form of pricing on a facility,facility pricing is defined here to
refer to tolling where the amount of the charge varies according to one or more time-of-day or congestion-related
criteria.
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can be targeted toward vehicle groups like HOVs using ITS. One of the benefits of facility
pricing is that it provides the facility operator with more flexibility to meet objectives than
conventional tolling. While it can be more controversial and it is slightly more complex from a
user perspective, facility pricing can outperform conventional tolling in economic and
transportation efficiency criteria. It is more attractive from the operator's standpoint because it
can generate more revenue and create better utilization of the facility, i.e., it supports an optimal
level of investment, by reducing demand fluctuations throughout the day.
3.3.2.1 International Examples
A private toll road company (SANEF) in France introduced facility pricing on an
intercity expressway (the A-1) from Lille to Paris in 1992. There are three lanes in each
direction and the A-1 is one of the most heavily traveled in France. The variable toll rates
increase during peak hours, which occur during Sunday afternoons and evenings when Parisians
return home from weekend and holiday vacations. Toll charges are reduced in the off-peak to
32
compensate, making the scheme revenue-neutral relative to the base case. Tolls are
approximately 25 percent higher than the normal toll rate for longer trips and as much as 56
percent higher for shorter trips from 4:30 to 8:30 p.m. on Sundays. Before (2:30 to 4:30 p.m.)
and after (8:30 to 11:30 p.m.) the peak period, the toll is 25 to 56 percent lower than the normal
tariff. The scheme is viewed favorably by the majority of the public and government officials
(NCHRP 44).
Other examples of facility-pricing projects can be found in Lee County, Florida; Toronto,
Canada; New York/New Jersey; and Seoul, Korea. Lee County gives electronic toll collection
users discounts for traveling just before and after the peak period on two bridges, Toronto uses
variable pricing on the 407ETR expressway, The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
uses variable pricing on multiple bridges and tunnels, and Seoul uses peak pricing on two
tunnels. The author is not aware of any facility pricing examples where the tolls vary
dynamically.
32 The primary objective of the entity was to improve traffic management and not to increase revenue; revenue-
neutrality was viewed as a key in achieving public and government acceptance.
33 For more information on the A-I scheme, see: NCHRP, Road Pricing for Congestion Management: A Survey of
International Practice (Washington: National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP), 1994).
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3.3.3 Express Lanes (e.g., HOT lanes)
Express lanes charge certain vehicles for the use of dedicated (managed) lanes on an
expressway that have a premium level-of-service (LOS). The toll charges are often higher
during peak periods for demand management purposes, although the pricing structure can be flat,
variable, or dynamic. Charges and regulations often differ between vehicle types. The defining
characteristic of express lanes is the availability of a free alternative on the general purpose lanes
immediately adjacent to the managed lanes, which all drivers have the option to choose. Express
lanes are often separated from the general purpose lanes by a barrier, although some HOT lanes
in planning phases (e.g., the SR 167 HOT lane project near Seattle, Washington) do not plan to
incorporate barrier separation.
The most widely known form of express lanes is referred to as high-occupancy/toll lanes.
HOT lanes allow high-occupancy vehicles to travel on the managed lanes of an expressway at a
discount or no charge; vehicles that do not meet the HOV criteria, which are low-occupancy
vehicles (LOVs), can travel on the managed lanes for a toll. LOVs allowed on HOT lanes
typically-but not always-include Single-Occupancy Vehicles (SOVs).3 In some cases,
"preferred" LOVs, such as hybrid fuel vehicles, may be allowed to travel on the lanes at no
charge or a discounted fare. Trucks are not given access to the managed lanes, presumably
because they cause more congestion and road damage than other vehicles. 36
HOT lanes are most often considered where existing HOV lanes are underutilized or
planned HOV lanes are not expected to utilize all of the lane capacity. From a transportation
efficiency perspective, HOT lanes can preserve the benefits of HOV lanes while allowing more
vehicles to pass through the same amount of road space.
In an express lane that is not a HOT lane, all vehicles pay tolls (buses may be exempt)
and there may or may not be vehicle class restrictions on the lanes. Express lanes with no HOV
preferential treatment segment the entire traveling population by willingness to pay, while HOT
3 Managed lanes are those on which the vehicles allowed to use the lanes are controlled according to some rules.
HOV, HOT, and express lanes are considered managed lanes. Lanes that are not managed are referred to as general-
purpose lanes.
3 The Katy and Northwest freeways in the Houston (Texas) metropolitan area allow two-person carpools to use the
HOT lane for USD 2.00 per trip during peak periods while HOVs with 3+ passengers and buses can travel at no
charge. SOVs are restricted from using the facility.
36 Truck toll lanes, a form of managed lanes advocated by the Reason Foundation, are a form of express lanes but
are excluded from this discussion.
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lanes offer the premium service to preferred vehicles at no charge and segment the LOV
population according to willingness to pay.
Because HOV lanes and HOT lanes are both types of managed lanes, the two are often
compared. HOT lanes can outperform HOV lanes by many criteria. A comparison between the
two types of managed lanes is presented in Table 3.1.37
Table 3.1: Comparison between HOV and HOT Lanes
HOV HOT
Speed Maintain free-flow conditions or Maintain free-flow conditions or flow is
flow is limited by the number of limited by the number of HOVs using
HOVs using the lanes the lanes. LOVs will not be permitted
to use the lanes if near free-flow
conditions are not maintained
Capacity Capacity not used by HOVs is not Allow some LOVs to use capacity not
used used by HOVs
Level-of-Service (LOS) Determined by the number of Required to maintain a minimum LOS
on managed lanes HOVs using the lanes
Level-of-Service (LOS) Base case Generally an improvement to the base
on general purpose case due to HOT lanes removing a few
lanes vehicles from the general purpose lanes.
The incentive to carpool can be
reduced, however, which could increase
the number of vehicles on the road and
potentially increase traffic on the
general purpose lanes. Net effect can be
mixed or positive
Premium service No Yes
available to LOVs?
Reliable travel time is HOVs only HOVs and LOVs
available for:
Revenue No revenue Revenue generated by LOVs, which can
be used to improve other parts of the
transportation system
As noted in Table 3.1, HOT lanes generally retain the transit and HOV benefits
associated with HOV lanes, but allow LOVs to use the capacity not utilized by the HOVs,
creating numerous benefits. Restrictions on LOV travel and the use of congestion pricing can be
placed on the HOT lanes to ensure HOVs do not receive any disbenefits from allowing LOVs to
use the managed lanes. In other words, HOVs are not affected negatively by converting HOV
lanes to HOT lanes as long as LOV demand on the HOT lanes is controlled such that free-
37 Any spillover effects of the managed lanes are ignored.
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flowing conditions persist-controlling demand is the role of pricing. Tolls are either adjusted
dynamically, variably, or set at a high-enough level such that delays do not occur on the
managed lanes.
When considering a single facility in isolation, the benefit of HOT lanes over HOV lanes
is reduced as congestion grows. HOV lanes may actually reduce traffic volumes more than HOT
lanes when congestion is heavy because HOT lanes create fewer incentives to carpool.
Similarly, the inferiority of an express lane (with no preferential treatment for HOVs) relative to
HOT lanes increases with the level of congestion. The key question is how many drivers will not
carpool if an express lane is available, but would carpool if there were merely HOV lanes.38
Assuming some drivers are willing to carpool in order to receive preferential service, Figure 3.1
illustrates the economic superiority of the different types of managed lanes.
Superiority
HOV
HOT
Express
Congestion
Figure 3.1: Superiority of Different Managed Lanes
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38 The extent of any impact is unknown.
Currently, the network effects of HOT and other express lanes are unknown and there are
not any HOT lane networks in place, although this concept is advocated strongly by the Reason
Foundation. 39
Although several HOT lane schemes have been implemented, which will be discussed in
Section 3.3.3.1, and many more are being planned, HOT lanes have not been adopted on a larger
scale in the U.S. primarily due to political opposition resulting from the perception of HOT lanes
as "Lexus lanes" used only by the wealthy. The common argument against HOT lanes is that the
majority of the benefits go to the people with the highest values of time (usually perceived as
wealthy individuals), while people with lowest values of time are forced to sit in congestion on
the general purpose lanes. Despite these arguments, HOT lanes are growing in popularity
because:
" HOT lanes are believed to improve traffic flow for all users
because they transfer vehicles off the general-purpose lanes and
into the unused capacity of the HOV lanes; and
" Strained budgets have recognized HOT lanes as an additional
source of revenue that can be used to finance additional capacity
and transportation services.
The second point likely has been a greater impetus for increasing the number of planned HOT
lanes, while the distribution of the benefits noted in the first point is still being debated as to
whether the lanes are indeed equitable. Studies based on the SR91 facility in California have
shown that drivers from all income groups use the lanes, but higher-income drivers use the
priced lanes more often. Nearly half of the SR91 toll lane users, however, drove the lanes once
per week or less (Sullivan, cited in TCRP 23). The large number of drivers who use the priced
lanes infrequently implies that many drivers only use the lanes for certain high-value trips; these
drivers value having an option for high quality and reliable service.
The segmentation of the market into two distinct groups-those willing to pay for a
premium level-of-service during a particular trip and those who are not willing to pay-is both
an asset and a liability for public support of HOT lanes. Some travelers view it as a way to
ensure reliable travel times, while others are opposed to HOT lanes on ideological grounds. The
latter group believes public agencies should strive to increase capacity and improve travel times
for all travelers.
39 For more information, the reader is referred to: http://www.rppi.org
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There are a number of challenges for HOT lanes-especially in developing countries.
Enforcement can be an issue in any country and may be more difficult if a physical barrier does
not exist between the managed lanes and the general-purpose lanes. Additionally, developing
countries have a high level of paratransit services, which may create excessive demand for HOV
lanes.
3.3.3.1 International Examples
Thus far, HOT lanes are strictly a U.S. phenomenon. This may be because the United
States seems to suffer from a different type of congestion than that which ails the majority of the
world. The U.S. has a large urban freeway system that is frequently congested in many large-
and medium-sized metropolitan areas, while congestion in other parts of the world is often
characterized as "urban gridlock," where city streets are the most congested.
Express lanes exist on San Diego's 1-15 freeway, Houston's Katy Freeway, and Orange
County's (California) SR91 Freeway. The 1-15 project, denoted as FasTrak, converted two 8-
mile underutilized reversible HOV lanes to HOT lanes in December 1996. The lanes originally
sold monthly passes to SOVs on a first-come, first-serve basis, but converted the scheme to
dynamic pricing in March 1998. The toll rate can be adjusted in real-time as often as every six
minutes and depends on the level of congestion in the general-purpose lanes. Tolls range
between $0.50 and $4.00 under normal traffic conditions, but can be as high as $8.00 during
severe traffic congestion (TCRP 14-54). Toll rates are communicated to drivers through variable
message signs before the entrance to the separated HOT lanes.
The goals of the 1-15 project were to maximize use of the existing HOV lanes, fund new
1-15 corridor transit and HOV improvements, test whether allowing priced SOVs to use the HOV
lanes can help reduce freeway main line congestion, and set tolls on the basis of a market-based
approach (TCRP).4 The project appears to have met its goal of maximizing use of the existing
HOV lanes:
0 The number of vehicles using the managed lanes increased by 46
percent from October 1996 to April 1999 (from 9,200 to 13,500
average daily vehicles);
40 According to the Phase II Year Three Overall Report.
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* In the a.m. peak hour, the HOT lanes carried 2,300 - 2,400 vehicles
per hour at free-flow speeds in late April 1999, compared to 1,600
vehicles per hour in October 1996; and
* As of April 2000, FasTrak use of the Express Lanes comprises
about 21 percent of total vehicles on the lanes. (FHWA)
1-15 has had the greatest success of all HOT lane projects in promoting transit patronage
(FHWA). A new express bus service, the Inland Breeze, was funded with revenues from the
project. The Inland Breeze connects the San Diego light rail transit to a transit center and has
30-minute and 60-minute service headways during peak- and off-peak periods, respectively. In
April 1999, ridership averaged 525 passengers per day, short of the goal of 750 daily riders
(FHWA). The new bus service attracted more reverse commute riders than riders traveling to
San Diego, to the surprise of the HOT lane planners.4' The Inland Breeze has improved bus
service for existing transit users, but it has not attracted peak-direction travelers from the
general-purpose lanes (FHWA). 1-15 corridor bus ridership grew nine percent between fall 1996
and fall 1999, compared to a 23 percent growth for the entire San Diego Region (TCRP 14-56).
While FasTrak improved bus service in the corridor, the results indicate few transit ridership
impacts materialized with the express bus service.
No major changes in travel speed or travel time were recorded on either the HOT lanes or
the general-purpose lanes (TCRP), which suggests any potential benefits for the general-purpose
lanes were indistinguishable.
The majority of the increase in HOT lane traffic was from carpools, which grew by 30
percent from October 1996 to April 1999 (from 7,685 to 9,970 average daily HOVs). Carpools
increased primarily during the monthly pass phase of the program and peaked during the first
month of FasTrak operation at about 10,500 average daily vehicles. Several reasons have been
suggested for the increased carpool usage on the facility. First, pricing provides a more tangible
sense of the cost savings from carpooling, since carpools travel free and solo drivers must pay to
use the HOT lanes. Second, increased enforcement by the California Highway Patrol encourages
solo driver violators to become carpoolers (avoiding the risk of a high fine for a modest
payment). Third, it has been speculated that HOT lanes allow more flexible carpooling
4 The a.m. peak-period bus ridership in March 1998 was 59 and 99 bus boardings southbound (toward San Diego)
and northbound (reverse commute direction), respectively. TCRP, Road Value Pricing (Washington: Transportation
Research Board, Transit Cooperation Research Program (TCRP), 2003).
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arrangements, with commuters increasing their willingness to commit to becoming carpool
members because they know the same time-savings will still be available, for a fee, on days
when carpool members are not available (FHWA).
Most FasTrak customers do not travel on the HOT lanes on a daily basis. From April
through September 1998, 53 percent of people with FasTrak transponders used the lanes one to
five times a month, 18 percent used them six to ten times, 11 percent used them 11-15 times, and
19 percent used them 16 to 40 times (TCRP 14-55).
Support for the 1-15 HOT lanes is high. A public opinion survey conducted in late 2001
revealed overwhelming support for the HOT lanes including operating policies, toll rates, use of
revenues, and proposals for facility extension. These results were relevant across user and non-
user, and socio-economic groups (TCRP 14-57). The lanes are being extended to create a 20-
mile facility, and "when completed, there will be a four-lane facility in the median with a
moveable barrier, multiple access points from the regular highway lanes, and direct access ramps
connected to five bus rapid transit (BRT) centers. An overhauled high frequency BRT system
will be operated in the managed lanes, taking advantage of the travel time savings offered by the
[l]anes" (Highway Communication Exchange).
The SR91 project essentially added a pair of HOT lanes in each direction along a 10-mile
stretch of the freeway, but the variably-priced lanes are technically an express roadway built in
the median of an existing eight-lane freeway that offers discounts to select vehicles. For the
purposes of this thesis, the SR91 lanes will be referred to as HOT lanes. The HOT lanes were
opened in December 1995; the facility has a pre-determined toll schedule, which varies by time-
of-day and day-of-the-week. In 1996, tolls ranged from $0.25 (off-peak) to $2.50 (peak) and
gave toll incentives to HOV-3s (TCRP). In 2005, tolls range between $1.05 and $7.00; HOV-
3s, zero emission vehicles, motorcycles, disabled plates, and disabled veterans are permitted to
drive free of charge on the 91 Express Lanes during most hours, but must pay 50 percent of the
toll during the most congested hours of the week (OCTA, 91 Express Lanes Homepage).
4 The 91 Express Lanes were originally owned and operated by a private company, but were expropriated by the
Orange County Transportation Authority because of public complaints regarding a no-competition clause in the
agreement. The project was expected to cover all capital and operating costs by the sixth year.
43 According to OCTA (91 Express Lanes Homepage), "The exception that these users pay 50 percent remains in
effect until such time as the Debt Service Coverage Ratio-inclusive of senior and subordinated debt-is projected
to be 1.2 or greater for a six month period."
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SR91 was one of the most congested freeway sections in California before the express
lanes were constructed with typical peak period delays of 20 to 40 minutes (OCTA, 91 Express
Lanes Homepage). The lanes have reduced delays for all users in the corridor, although
continued traffic growth is reducing some of the delay savings on the general-purpose lanes that
was created with the construction of the SR91 express lanes. The HOT lanes carry 40 percent of
the freeway's traffic at three to four times the speed of non-toll lanes during peak periods
(Wylie).
Nearly half the SR91 customers use the express lanes once a week or less. Only 25
percent of those in the lowest income group (less than $25,000 annual household income)
indicate that they frequently use the express lanes (FHWA). Female commuters are significantly
more likely than male commuters to be frequent users of the express lanes, which may be due in
part to having more child-care responsibilities.
The Houston HOT lane project, entitled QuickRide, allows HOV-2s to travel on the Katy
Freeway and Northwest Freeway HOV lanes, which have an HOV-3 requirement, during peak
periods for a $2 toll. 44 Both the Katy Freeway and the Northwest Freeway have a single HOV
lane in the median of the roadway. Before QuickRide began in 1998, the HOV criterion was
increased from HOV-2 to HOV-3 due to excessive demand, but there was much unused capacity
during the peak period with the new HOV-3 occupancy requirements. The HOT lanes sell this
excess capacity to HOV-2s, maintaining the high level-of-service associated with HOV lanes and
allowing more vehicles to use the managed lane capacity.
As with other HOT lane projects, the vast majority of QuickRide users are occasional
users, with about one in four transponders being used in a given week, and about one in 20
transponders being used five or more times per week (FHWA). HOV utilization increases
modestly during the peak, and the most common source of QuickRide participants are persons
who formerly traveled in SOVs on the general-purpose lanes (FHWA).
The goals of the Katy Freeway portion of QuickRide are "[t]o use the HOV lane to help
manage congestion during multi-year construction and prepare the public for the transition to
toll-managed lanes in the future" (TTI 1). Daily use of the HOT lanes is small-between 150
and 200 vehicles use QuickRide for both peak periods combined (FHWA)-so if the intent of
the HOT lane is to manage congestion, that is not occurring. The explicit statement of the
44 The Katy HOV lane is 13 miles in length.
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objective to "prepare the public for the transition to toll-managed lanes in the future" may
actually be the highest priority of its advocates. While some HOT lane promoters are hesitant to
make this statement, the author believes this is one of the principle reasons, if not the principle
reason, why many agencies and transportation analysts are pursuing HOT lane plans. Despite
their inferiority from traffic management and revenue generation perspectives, HOT lanes are a
more incremental approach to tolling existing capacity than other forms of road pricing, making
them less controversial. This wider implication of HOT lanes, i.e., as a step toward increased
tolling, may be responsible for some opposition to HOT lanes by special-interest groups.
3.3.4 Area-Wide and Cordon Pricing
Area-wide pricing charges vehicles a fee for crossing a cordon surrounding a defined
area, driving within the area, parking on public roads inside the area, or a combination of these
measures. It can essentially be a form of network pricing (discussed in Section 3.3.5) operated
on a sub-geographic road network of the metropolitan area, although the fee assessment can be
structured in different ways. Vehicles can be charged a single fee for traveling in a geographic
area within a given time period (e.g., $5 per day), the toll can vary by time-of-day (e.g., $4
between 8:00-9:00 a.m. and $3 between 9:00-10:00 a.m.), or the toll can vary in real-time with
the level of congestion. Area-wide pricing allows transportation managers to target congestion
in a specific geographic area. It is typically best suited for the central business district (CBD) of a
city or other major activity centers that have difficulty accommodating large numbers of trips
during peak periods, which is why this form was chosen for use in Singapore and London.
Cordon pricing is a form of area-wide pricing-it is probably the most practical and
understandable congestion pricing scheme. Depending on the objectives of the agency, charges
can be levied each time a vehicle crosses a cordon, each time a vehicle enters a cordoned area, or
once for unlimited crossings within a set time interval. Using this definition, all cordon pricing
schemes are also area-wide pricing, but some area-wide pricing schemes involve more than just
pricing a cordon. Cordon gantries can also be placed on heavily congested transportation
facilities; however, for the purpose of this thesis, transportation cordons located on expressways
are defined to be facility pricing. An exception is made when the cordons are arranged in a
polyhedron around a geographic area, in which case the term cordon pricing would still be
applicable.
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3.3.4.1 International Examples
The Singapore Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) scheme is a form of cordon pricing that
was introduced in September 1998. It replaced the paper-based Area Licensing Scheme (ALS),
which was initiated in 1975 and the Road Pricing System that began in the 1990s. The ERP is a
cordon scheme (covering about 720 ha) inside the ring road of the city. It uses a 2.54 GHz
dedicated short-range radio communication system consisting of an In-vehicle transponder Unit
(IU), ERP gantries, and a control center. Vehicles are equipped with an IU that accepts
smartcards and each IU number correlates to an individual vehicle registration number. As of
2000, 97 percent of the total vehicle population was equipped with the $120 IUs, which were
given to existing vehicle owners free of charge by the Singapore government (Menon).
Each time the vehicle passes under one of 29 overhead gantries at entry points to the
Restricted Zone (RZ) between 7:30 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. on weekdays, the vehicle is charged a fee
(ranging from S$0.50 to S$2.50 for cars with other fare structures for different vehicles) based
on the time of day. There are also twelve additional gantries along congested expressways and
other main roads, which are a form of facility pricing; these gantries are in operation only during
the morning peak period (7:30 a.m. to 9:30 a.m.) on weekdays. The ERP fee is pre-determined
for each half-hour interval during the day and charges increase during the peak periods. Digital
images of the rear license plate are recorded for vehicles not possessing an IU, smartcard, or
sufficient funds. This information is then sent to the control center where the information is
stored for violation reference.
The London CC scheme introduced in February 2003 is an area-wide pricing scheme.
The Central CC zone encompasses the 22 square kilometers inside the London Inner Ring Road
commonly referred to as central London. Drivers are required to self-report (through various
payment options) one E5 fee for unlimited entries, exits, travel within, and on-street parking for
the charging period, which is 7:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, excluding
holidays. As shown in Table 3.2, Transport for London estimates the scheme produces E50
million in net annual benefits.
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Table 3.2: Estimates of Benefits and Costs of London CC Scheme 45
ANNUAL COSTS (f millions)
TfL administrative and other costs 5
Scheme operation 90
Additional bus costs 20
Charge-payer compliance costs (telephone calls, etc.) 15
TOTAL 130
ANNUAL BENEFITS
Time savings to car and taxi occupants, business use 75
Time savings to car and taxi occupants, private use 40
Time savings to commercial vehicle occupants 20
Time savings to bus passenger 20
Reliability benefits to car, taxi, and commercial vehicle
occupants 10
Reliability benefits to bus passengers 10
Vehicle fuel and operating savings 10
Accident savings 15
Disbenefit to car occupants transferring to public transport, etc. -20
TOTAL 180
NET ANNUAL BENEFIT 50
The London scheme will be modified beginning July 4, 2005. Several changes are planned to
take effect, which are outlined in Box 3.
Both London and Singapore had a relatively low share of trips using personal
automobiles for traveling to the CBD before the schemes were implemented. As a result, public
support was higher because the group of individuals driving in the congestion priced zone, which
is typically in opposition before a scheme is implemented, was small and composed of wealthier
individuals. In fact, 90 percent of those driving into central London before the scheme was
implemented were from the wealthiest half of society (EFTE).
As with other congestion charging schemes, area-wide pricing cannot solve long-term
traffic problems by itself-it must be part of an integrated strategy to alleviate congestion and
improve travel alternatives. London is spending all of the net revenues on local transportation
improvements; additional buses have been added to the CC zone, improvements are being made
to the Underground subway, and traffic flow improvements have been made on roads
surrounding the CC zone in order to accommodate the additional traffic (Transport for London,
4 Source: Transport for London, Central London Congestion Charging Scheme - Impacts Monitoring, Second
Annual Report (London: Transport for London (TfL), 2004). Payment of the charge is not included in the
benefit/cost analysis because transactions are economic transfers.
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Central London Congestion Charging Scheme - Impacts Monitoring, First Annual Report).
Marketing the idea of using CC revenues to improve other transportation facilities and services
has been credited with contributing to the public relations success of the scheme. The scheme
has been viewed so positively that a western extension to cover most of Kensington & Chelsea
and Westminster has been proposed.
Box 3: Changes to the London Congestion Charging Scheme
Ken Livingston, the Mayor of London, announced several changes to the
London CC scheme in an April 1, 2005 press release (Transport for London,
"Press Release - Congestion Charge to Increase to £8; Fleet and Regular Users to
Receive Discounts") to take effect July 4, 2005. With these changes, the
congestion charge will increase from E5 to E8, the charge for vehicles on the fleet
scheme will increase from £5.50 to E7, three charge-free days will be given for a
monthly payment (i.e., 20 days for the price of 17 days), and 40 charge-free days
will be credited for an annual payment (i.e., 252 days for the price of 212 days) of
the congestion charge. According to the Mayor:
"The charge increase will maintain the benefits currently witnessed in the
zone and build upon its success, cutting congestion even further, and raising more
revenue to be invested in London's transport system... This will build on what has
already been achieved in terms of extended bus provision, and in due course by
providing additional underground capacity. At the same time, a number of
measures will reduce the hassle of paying the charge....large discounts on
monthly and annual payments will make the charge easier to pay for regular
users and should lead to fewer penalty charge notices being incurred by drivers
who forget to pay the charge."
3.3.5 Network Pricing
Network pricing is the purest form of congestion or marginal-cost pricing, i.e., it is first-
best pricing. With network pricing, individual vehicle movements are tracked through the entire
road network in the region and charged based on the congestion of the traveled links or the time
of travel. The charges could be predetermined based on a formula for the road and/or time-of-
day but they could also be assessed based on real-time conditions. Other externalities could also
be incorporated into the toll charge, if desired.
Technology could be adapted to implement network-pricing measures, which would most
likely occur with a form of Global Positioning Systems (GPS). Political obstacles, some
remaining technological challenges, and the complexity of network pricing are likely to be
overwhelming, however, without more real-world road pricing experiences for people to become
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comfortable with the concept of paying for road use based on time-of-day and location. If one
considers the criteria of a good congestion pricing scheme listed in Section 2.3.5.1, it is not
surprising that network pricing has yet to be implemented. When technology improves and if
public perception becomes more favorable toward pricing, network pricing may be considered a
realistic alternative.
If network pricing were analyzed by a region, political economy considerations would
suggest that it be implemented in conjunction with other measures. There would not be a free
alternative route for autos in network pricing; if travelers believed they could not afford the
charge, they would be forced to take public transportation, use non-motorized alternatives, or not
make the trip.
3.3.6 Distance-Based Pricing
As one might anticipate from the term, distance-based pricing requires vehicles to pay
charges that are based on the number of miles traveled. Distance-based pricing, or vehicle-
miles-traveled (VMT) charging, is primarily a revenue-generation mechanism because the fees
do not vary spatially or temporally; therefore, distance-based pricing does not address urban
congestion directly. It is similar to network pricing in that all roads are priced, but it differs in
that the amount levied does not depend on when or where travel occurs. If distance-based
pricing were used in conjunction with congestion pricing, the scheme would be network pricing.
VMT charging is most often considered as a means for agencies to charge motorists using
their infrastructure, but whose fuel (and licensing) tax revenues do not contribute sufficiently to
the region. Some government entities in the United States, such as the state of Oregon, are
considering a distance-based charging policy to replace the state fuel tax.
While distance-based charging may be used to generate large sums of revenue, it would
be expensive to administer on a large-scale for passenger vehicles. Means for charging every
vehicle traveling in the region would have to be in place, which could be difficult to enforce and
would require an exhaustive billing system.
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3.3.6.1 International Examples
The only known examples of distance-based charging to date are located in Europe and
are applicable to only intercity heavy goods vehicles. Switzerland introduced a scheme in 2001
as did Austria in 2004, but the largest and most sophisticated system is in Germany. Germany
introduced a distanced-based truck charging system, Toll Collect, in January 2005. Germany is
located in the geographic center of Europe and has experienced a rapid growth in the volume of
freight traffic on its motorways. There are approximately 22.7 billion vehicle-kilometers per
year subject to tolls on the federal road system, 35 percent of which are made by foreign vehicles
(Ruidisch). Due to the maintenance and capacity costs associated with increased traffic-
particularly road damage due to heavy vehicles-the federal government decided to implement a
distance-based charging scheme applicable to all heavy commercial vehicles and vehicle
combinations with a permissible total weight of 12 tons or more (Toll Collect). The public-
private partnership contract was awarded to the Toll Collect consortium, which is made up of
carmaker DaimlerChrysler, Deutsche Telekom AG (Germany's largest network operator), and
the French motorway operator Cofiroute. The scheme is expected to generate more than $4
billion annually. The government plans to reinvest a large portion in the nation's road, rail, and
waterway transportation infrastructure (Blau).
The Toll Collect system uses a combination of GPS and mobile communications
technologies. A computerized on-board unit (OBU) installed on a truck locates the vehicle,
tracks its route, calculates the toll fee, and transmits the data to a billing center. One of the major
points touted by Toll Collect is that it does not disrupt traffic flow.
The toll charge per unit distance is based on the route traveled, the number of axles on the
vehicle, and the pollution class of the vehicle or vehicle combination. This is important to note
as it shows that the German government has adopted multiple criteria for this project; notably (i)
cost-recovery for financial impacts associated with road use and (ii) protection of the
46
environment. Toll rates range between E0.09 and CO.14 per kilometer.
Enforcement is handled by the Federal Office for Goods Transport (BAG). BAG has the
ability to determine if a vehicle has an obligation to pay the toll and if that vehicle has met this
obligation fully, partially, or not at all. "The control system distinguishes between automatic
46 Toll rates can be found at http://www.toll-
collect.de/pdf/en/mauthoeheverordnung.pdf;jsessionid=F27DB 1064AB IE3893FEECC3EAE49990F.
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enforcement through control bridges, enforcement by stationary and mobile teams, and
company-level enforcement. This combination guarantees comprehensive, continuous
enforcement of the requirement to pay toll[s] and allows the control system to be constantly
adjusted to meet prevailing circumstances" (Toll Collect). There are approximately 300 control
vehicles nationwide for mobile enforcement, which use infrared technology to determine
whether passing trucks are logged onto the automatic system and if their vehicle information has
been entered properly.
Until the deployment of Toll Collect, GPS was not considered mature enough to be a
realistic toll collection option. Toll Collect had many difficulties deploying the system; in fact,
DaimlerChrysler and Deutsche Telekom each lost a large sum of money due to delays in
delivering the technology. At the time, Deutsche Well referred to Toll Collect as "Germanys
biggest embarrassment" (Samuel). Once it was in place however, general trials of the system
achieved a 99.3 percent accuracy rate (Samuel). The resulting technology advances are likely to
benefit many regions around the world in the future.
3.3.7 Section Summary
This section defined several forms of road pricing and cited international examples of
each form (if applicable). It also explained some of the principle impacts and common goals
associated with each road pricing scheme. The following sections will further discuss the
capacity of road pricing strategies to achieve policy goals, such as mobility improvement,
revenue generation, air quality improvement, etc.
3.4 Capacity to Achieve Policy Objectives
Each road pricing measure has a different capacity to achieve policy objectives; for
example, distance-based charging may be able to generate large sums of revenue, however, it
might not be the most effective tool for improving mobility. This section describes the relative
strengths of each road pricing measure.
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3.4.1 Finance
As G6mez-Ib6fiez states, the general public's primary interest in road pricing is for its
potential to finance additional highway capacity. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, virtually all
new tolling cases in the U.S. were sold to the public as a means to finance the construction of a
new highway, bridge, or tunnel (G6mez-Ibfiez, "The Political Economy of Highway Tolls and
Congestion Pricing"). Suburbs and population growth areas, such as the Sun Belt region of the
United States, are especially more likely to view road pricing as a financing mechanism rather
than a tool for achieving other means. Because many users want to feel like they are receiving
something for the tolls they pay, the hypothecation of revenues for transportation (discussed in
Appendix A2) is often viewed as necessary for public support. The potential for a pricing
scheme to generate net revenues, therefore, is an important criterion for many entities that are
considering road pricing.
3.4.1.1 Revenue Generation Potential
The level of the charge, quality of alternative routes and modes, socio-economic
characteristics of potential users, and method of levying tolls are major factors in the gross
revenue equation of road pricing schemes. As will be discussed in Section 4.3.3, the amount of
revenue generated is highly site-specific and dependent on the specific design characteristics of
the scheme.
Generally speaking, network pricing would generate the most gross revenues for a
congested metropolitan area. Depending on the amount and type of traffic traveling within and
across a cordon zone, area-wide and cordon pricing could also generate substantial revenues. If
a large percentage of all traffic traveling within a cordon zone does not cross the cordon line, an
area-wide scheme may generate more revenue than a cordon scheme. Whether the area-wide toll
is a single daily charge or if it is assessed each instance a vehicle enters and/or leaves the
charging zone may also greatly influence the results.
Conventional tolling can be used to generate revenue, but facility pricing can generate
more revenue if travel demand is relatively inelastic, which it is in most instances.
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With staunch public opposition to raising the fuel tax at the federal and state levels, some
state DOTs are considering express lanes as a means to generate additional revenue, which can
be used to either finance additional capacity or subsidize transit.
Anecdotal evidence suggests some transportation professionals believe express lanes,
most often in the context of HOT lanes, can be fully or mostly self-financing; however, revenue
calculations might suggest otherwise for many metropolitan areas. The Reason Public Policy
Institute (RPPI), one of the original advocates of HOT lanes, performed an order-of-magnitude
estimate of the financial feasibility of HOT lanes for the Los Angeles County area. In one
scenario of this study, it was assumed that congestion lasts six hours per day, five days per week,
and 52 weeks per year. The study also assumed that LOVs (in this case, all vehicles with less
than three persons) pay 20 cents per mile (1993 dollars) to use a HOT lane, the lane carries 1,750
vehicles per hour per mile, and 70 percent of the vehicles are LOVs subject to the charge. In this
case, annual revenue per lane-mile were estimated to be $382,200 (Fielding and Klein).
Assuming the capital costs of HOT lanes were $5 million per lane-mile (in 1993 dollars), gross
revenues would return only 7.6 percent of the construction costs per year to investors. "This is
not a sufficient return to attract debt or equity investment, nor does it account for operating (e.g.,
electronic toll-collection) and maintenance expenses" (Fielding and Klein). This study's authors
believed conditions in some corridors of Los Angeles County would be more favorable than the
congestion level assumed in this scenario, but it could be argued that traffic is less severe for
many potential HOT lanes in the U.S., which would imply that only a few could be financially
self-supporting, if any.
Express lanes with bus rapid transit (BRT) should generate more revenue than HOT
lanes. The HOT lanes revenue paradox is that as congestion increases demand for the lanes
increases, creating a toll charge raising effect (i.e., with fixed supply, increases in demand raise
prices). A counteracting effect, however, is that drivers have more incentive to form HOVs,
which fill-up the lane and decrease the number of toll-paying customers. Without guarantees on
the percent of traffic that will be subjected to tolls, financial institutions are not likely to provide
capital for HOT lanes. Express lanes with BRT are more likely to be financially viable than
HOT lanes.
As discussed in Section 3.3.6.1, perhaps the primary objective of Germany's distanced-
based truck charging system, Toll Collect, is revenue generation. Thirty-five percent of the
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vehicle-kilometers subject to tolls on the federal road system are foreign trucks. Much of the
revenue that would be received from traditional funding sources, such as vehicle licensing fees
and fuel taxes, is lost because these are not German-licensed vehicles. The scheme, which
collects tolls from domestic and foreign vehicles alike, is expected to generate more than $4
billion annually, of which the government plans to reinvest a large portion in the nation's road,
rail, and waterway transportation infrastructure (Blau).
3.4.2 Mobility
Congestion pricing strategies are often used to reduce congestion, which increases
mobility of the priced facilities or geographic area. These measures can reduce travel time
delays and potentially increase the reliability of travel times.
3.4.2.1 Travel Time
Road pricing measures that target congestion specifically, such as network pricing, area-
wide pricing, facility pricing, and HOT lanes, decrease travel times for the users that pay the
toll.47 Measures that affect a larger percent of metropolitan-area trips, such as network pricing,
will decrease travel times more than measures that are limited to a specific corridor or area
because they encourage fewer and shorter trips.
If a high percentage of trips on an expressway are traveling to the CBD, area-wide or
cordon pricing in the CBD may also be able to reduce congestion on the expressway. Although
the results of these measures will likely be less dramatic than what would occur with
implementing facility pricing or conventional tolling, these measures should be considered as
policy levers for achieving the same effect. Similarly, facility pricing and conventional tolling
on existing capacity can also reduce travel times in the CBD, but not to the extent that should
occur with area-wide or cordon pricing.
Assuming a similar toll structure, area-wide pricing will reduce CBD congestion more
than a cordon scheme if a non-negligible percent of vehicle trips using the CBD are internal
trips. In other words, if drivers are only charged for crossing a cordon and there are many
4 Road pricing strategies that do not target congestion directly but may discourage some trips, such as distance-
based charging, may also reduce travel delays because of fewer vehicles on the road.
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vehicle trips that can drive within the cordon that would not be subjected to a toll, cordon pricing
may be a less effective congestion management tool than area-wide pricing because it does not
charge travelers to operate a vehicle within the zone.
Pricing can also cause negative effects on substitute facilities. If an expressway is priced
and there are less expensive alternative travel routes, diversion may increase travel times on the
alternative roads. Similarly, area-wide or cordon schemes may increase travel times on ring
roads if traffic that otherwise would travel through the area is diverted around it. If implemented
on a large scale, a network of HOT lanes could also increase travel times within the downtown if
they increase the mobility of the CBD and encourage more trips.
3.4.2.2 Reliability
As will be discussed further in Chapter 4, reliability of travel times is an increasingly
important transportation variable. With some indications suggesting that travelers are willing to
tolerate increasing congestion, perhaps transportation providers should focus more attention on
increasing the reliability of the road system.
It is clear that travelers value travel time reliability. One study found that individuals
value travel time reliability more than twice as much as travel time savings (Small et al. 3). On
the SR91 HOT lanes, a recent econometrics study estimated travel time accounts for two-thirds
and reliability one-third of the service quality differential between the free and priced SR91 lanes
(Brownstone and Small).
While pricing can increase reliability on a priced facility, it can also decrease reliability
on alternative facilities if it causes diversion. Similar to the effects mentioned in Section 3.4.2.1,
implementing road pricing on some facilities could decrease the reliability of travel times on
less-expensive substitute facilities. Diverted vehicles increase congestion non-linearly, which
may cause travel times to fluctuate more day-to-day.
3.4.2.3 Reliable (and Lower) Travel Time Option
HOT lanes create a reliable travel time option (with lower average travel times as well)
for expressway travelers. When an individual is behind schedule and has strict penalties for
arriving late-such as in a trip to the airport-he/she may have a high value of time and/or high
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value of reliability.48 Orski and Small refer to this as "travel insurance," and claim that other
users would also gain because the general-purpose lanes would become less congested as some
of the traffic switches to the express lanes.
As noted in Section 3.3.3, many HOT lane travelers are infrequent users that only use the
lanes for special circumstances. Similarly, most businesses in the service industry, such as a
plumber that can charge $30/hour, also have high values of time. These transportation customers
are likely to choose HOT lanes because they value the higher quality service that express lanes
offer. A two-tiered transportation system-offering standard-quality yet free services and
premium for-payment services-recognizes that travelers are customers and different customers
have different travel needs.
If one defined the system to be the corridor rather than the expressway, facility pricing
would also be a more reliable and faster travel time option. Arterials would be the standard
level-of-service and the priced expressway would be the premium option.
3.4.3 Natural Environment
The main impact of congestion pricing on vehicle emissions is expected to be effects on
vehicle operating speeds, speed variations, and VMT (TCRP). Vehicle speeds should increase
for a facility if congestion pricing measures are implemented. The extent of the increase in
average speed will be site-specific and dependent in part on the level of the tolls, price elasticity
of demand, design speed of the facility, and average speed before tolls were added or changed.49
3.4.3.1 Air Quality
There are six criteria pollutants for air quality, of which motor vehicles contribute to four.
Motor vehicles emit nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs), which
combine in sunlight to form ozone; carbon monoxide (CO); nitrogen dioxide (NO 2); and
particulate matter (PM-10). The health effects of these pollutants include headache, eye
48 These concepts are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
4 The price elasticity of demand represents the sensitivity of consumers to price changes. In the case of road
pricing, it represents the sensitivity of drivers to change in perceived out-of-pocket cost. A price elasticity <-1
represents elastic behavior, meaning that for a 1 percent increase in price there will be a >1 percent decrease in
traffic. For inelastic behavior, which occurs if the price elasticity is >-1 and <0, there will be a <1 percent decrease
in traffic for a 1 percent increase in price. Demand for automobile travel is often considered inelastic.
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irritation, reduced lung function, lung damage, respiratory disease, and cancer. According to the
American Lung Association (cited in ICF Incorporated 4), the health effects of air pollution in
the United States alone are estimated to cost $50 billion per year.
The pricing structure of a scheme could theoretically be linked to the air quality of a
metropolitan area, but air quality emissions more closely correlate to the number of cold starts
and vehicle hours than the level of congestion. While congestion pricing can create incentives to
decrease the number of cold starts and the number of vehicle hours, it generally does not
discourage off-peak travel, which is when a large fraction of auto trips occur (G6mez-Ibafiez,
"The Political Economy of Highway Tolls and Congestion Pricing" 346). In general,
environmentalists are in favor of tolling and road user charges and are less concerned with the
specific form of road pricing. If the only objective is to improve air quality, there might be fewer
additional benefits associated with congestion pricing relative to conventional tolling or distance-
based charging. With the latter option, charges could be linked to the pollution class of the
vehicle relatively easily. Alternatively, toll charges could be linked to the air quality index of a
metropolitan area, with higher tolls assessed on bad air quality days.
Individual vehicle emissions in the United States have improved dramatically since
1970-today's cars are 70-90 percent cleaner. However, vehicle-miles-traveled have more than
doubled since that time (ICF Incorporated 3). Vehicle emissions are decreasing between five to
fifteen percent per year while driving is increasing at less than two percent per year. Trends and
current regulations suggest vehicle emissions will be about 80 percent below current levels in 20
years, despite large increases in driving (Poole). Therefore, the effect of pricing on air quality
should be minimal in most U.S. cities since improvements are already occurring due to other
measures.
Similar to other policy questions, there is very little empirical evidence with which to
validate theories on the long-term environmental effects of congestion pricing. Overall, the
environmental effects of congestion pricing range from neutral to positive (TCRP).
3.4.3.2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Carbon dioxide (CO2), which is a greenhouse gas, is released into the atmosphere when
fossil fuels are burned. The combustion of fossil fuels by mobile sources represents
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approximately one-third of energy-related greenhouse gas emissions, which account for more
than three-quarters of greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. (U.S. EPA).
CO 2 emissions correlate well with fuel consumption, so consuming more fuel implies the
discharge of more greenhouse gasses. Fuel consumption is discussed in Section 3.4.4.
3.4.4 Fuel Consumption/Dependence
During his term, U.S. President Jimmy Carter said, "With the exception of preventing
war, [energy demand and supply] is the greatest challenge our country will face during our
lifetimes". Transportation accounts for two-thirds of the total petroleum needs of the U.S.,
indicating the country's dependence on oil and its effect upon the nation's economy and security.
The oil price shocks and price manipulation by OPEC from 1979 to 2000 cost the U.S. economy
about $7 trillion, almost as much as the nation spent on national defense over the same time
period and more than the interest payments on the national debt (U.S. EPA and U.S. DOE).
The ideal fuel consumption speed varies by vehicle and travel conditions, but fuel
consumption is generally most efficient in the 40-50 mph range.5 0 Figure 3.2 shows fuel
economy versus vehicle speed data for the U.S. vehicle fleet (Oak Ridge National Laboratory).5 I
50 This is an average value across the vehicle fleet. Some vehicles have better fuel economy at higher speeds and
others at lower speeds. The 40-50 mph range can be considered the most efficient speed for the fleet.
s' The data is from the most recent study (1997) cited in Table 4.24 of the report.
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Fuel Economy vs. Vehicle Speed of U.S. Fleet
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Figure 3.2: Fuel Economy vs. Speed
Road pricing policies' effect on fuel consumption can be mixed; the net impact will
depend on the specific characteristics of the road network as well as the origin-destination
patterns of trips in the region. Several qualitative effects can be assessed, however, which are
outlined in the following paragraphs.
Idle and slow moving vehicles burn fuel less efficiently and operate for a longer period
than vehicles moving at free-flow arterial speeds. Alleviating urban gridlock and stop-and-go
traffic should have positive air quality impacts because increased vehicular speeds (in this
portion of the fuel economy versus speed curve) and reduced speed variation will reduce fuel
consumption.5 Pricing on urban streets is therefore expected to reduce fuel consumption, unless
significant diversion occurs. Diversion around a priced area could increase VMT, which would
increase fuel consumption. The net effect could be mixed in this case.
All forms of road pricing imposed on existing capacity-except express lanes-should
have reduction effects on the number of vehicle trips, which reduces fuel consumption. By
52 Congestion would decrease, but not necessarily eliminated, with pure marginal cost pricing in some urban areas
where the cost of road capacity is extremely high. Some travelers would be willing to pay more than their own
direct costs for the benefits they receive from making that trip, without the benefits of eliminating congestion being
great enough to justify the high cost of additional capacity. World Bank, Cities on the Move: A World Bank Urban
Transport Strategy Review (Washington: The World Bank Group, 2002).
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increasing the cost of travel, travelers are less likely to make a trip.- Road pricing on new
capacity, however, is likely to generate additional trips assuming the "induced demand"
phenomenon exists.54
If vehicle speeds increase too much, road pricing measures could actually increase fuel
consumption. This could only occur on roads that have design speeds greater than 50 miles per
hour, e.g., expressways. If pre-pricing vehicle speeds are below fifty miles per hour, however,
the net effect could be mixed or positive for fuel consumption reduction. The most likely factor
for increasing fuel consumption with pricing on existing capacity would be traffic diversion,
which could occur if vehicles are redirected to less expensive-but more congested-routes. 55
Network pricing should have the greatest impact in reducing fuel consumption, whereas
adding express lanes will most likely increase fuel consumption. The effects of other measures
lie between these two extremes.
3.4.5 Transit
As explained in Section 2.3.2, roads are often subsidized-especially when they are
congested-if they are not congestion-priced; this makes it difficult for transit operators to attract
sufficient riders to cover their costs. Second-best pricing rules would suggest that transit should
be priced below the marginal cost of provision because transit and personal auto are substitutes
and the latter is priced below the marginal cost.56 Cross elasticity estimates of auto use with
respect to transit price, however, are practically zero in many medium-size metropolitan areas in
the United States and Europe. This implies transit fares should not be reduced to compensate for
auto mispricing (G6mez-Ib65ez, "Pricing"). From an economic perspective, a better strategy for
increasing transit use would be to improve transit services. Road pricing could not only generate
revenues for transit subsidy, but could also have several other positive effects, which are detailed
in this section.
Reducing or eliminating the peak-period auto subsidy with road pricing may provide
more incentives for travelers to choose transit. Fewer delays (resulting from fewer autos on the
5 Assuming road pricing increases the cost of travel.
5 The induced demand hypothesis suggests that latent demand for travel exists in the presence of congestion, and
when additional capacity is built to improve travel speeds, new and longer trips will be generated.
5 Assuming there are alternative routes.
56 For more on second-best pricing see Appendix Al. All transit in the United States is subsidized.
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road) could improve bus transit frequencies and reliability, increasing the attractiveness of these
services. Decreased route travel times allow the operator to either increase bus frequencies or
decrease the number of buses that are required to serve the route with the same frequencies,
which would provide capital and operating savings. If service improvements increased ridership,
transit operators might add service, which could foster transit ridership even more. This effect
could allow transit providers to capitalize on some of the economies of scale associated with
transit provision, which would improve their financial health.
One might argue that transit subsidies are ineffective and that the benefits of subsidies are
overstated because the revenues would not be used efficiently. Raising taxes to subsidize transit
creates distortions and efficiency losses in the economy, and most of the subsidies are absorbed
in higher wages for transit workers and reduced productivity rather than passed on to riders in the
form of lower fares or improved service (G6mez-Ibfiez, "Pricing" 118). If road pricing
revenues dedicated to transit could be used effectively, however, the transit gains might be
substantial.
3.4.5.1 BRT and Pricing
Synergies exist between bus rapid transit and value pricing concepts. The two ideas have
many similar objectives and could complement each other to deploy more systems than if they
act independently. BRT offers a premium service for travel time on congested roadways, but
requires a special right of way for that service. Inexpensive land is sparse in many urban areas
where BRT could be desirable, however, making the land opportunity cost expensive for these
BRT lanes. In addition, there is not sufficient demand for BRT in the U.S. to utilize all of the
BRT right of way, resulting in extra capacity that could be sold to automobiles that have a high
value of time for a particular trip. This involves the combination of BRT and value pricing
concepts, which can work toward the greater goals of improving transit, raising revenue to
improve transportation services, and creating a better and more reliable transportation option for
automobile drivers. Robert Poole Jr. ("Hot Networks: A New Plan for Congestion Relief and
Better Transit") of the Reason Foundation has been one of the biggest advocates of merging BRT
and HOT lane concepts.
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3.4.5.2 Effects of HOT Lane Projects
Thus far, the effects of HOT lane pilot projects on transit ridership in the United States
have been limited (FHWA). As noted in Section 3.3.3.1, the 1-15 project has had the greatest
success in promoting bus usage, with ridership on the new express bus line averaging 525 daily
passengers in April 1999. It has not attracted peak-direction travelers from the 1-15 general-
purpose lanes. Other HOT lane projects have had "no perceptible effect on either bus or
commuter rail traffic in the corridor," (FHWA), but if HOT lanes were implemented on a wider
scale, one might expect to see more transit benefits created by HOT lanes projects.
3.4.6 Auto Ownership
As noted in Chapter 1, the demand for auto travel in industrial economies has grown over
time. As many developing economies transition to a developed status, they often experience
rapid rates of motorization and auto travel. With limited ability to expand infrastructure capacity
in urban areas, some entities could consider road pricing strategies as a means to decrease auto
ownership.
Road pricing that increases the cost of travel should have retarding effects on vehicle
ownership; the exception, however, may be HOT lanes. Because they increase capacity, the
creation of HOT lanes (relative to a "do nothing" case) may encourage auto ownership. The
preceding statement would be false if HOT lanes made improvements to transit such that it
persuaded some travelers to use mass transportation that might otherwise drive, but empirical
evidence suggests that HOT lanes have yet to increase transit ridership (see Section 3.3.3.1).
3.4.7 Road Safety
There is a trade-off between the number of vehicle accidents and the severity of fatal
vehicle accidents. Higher levels of congestion usually increase the number of accidents, but
often these are at lower speeds; reducing congestion tends to increase vehicle speeds, and
incidents that occur at higher speeds are more likely to be severe or fatal.
Road pricing schemes that decrease congestion should reduce the number of accidents.
Transport for London estimated their Congestion Charging scheme produced E15 million per
year in accident savings (Transport for London, Central London Congestion Charging Scheme -
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Impacts Monitoring, Second Annual Report). If pricing results in increased expressway speeds,
there could be an increase in the number of fatalities, although the author is not aware of any
documented study that has reported an increase in the number of traffic fatalities attributable to
road pricing.
3.4.8 Pedestrian-Friendliness and Public Health
There are several reasons why a city might encourage its citizens to walk more
frequently. The medical costs of physical inactivity in the U.S. are estimated at $76 billion per
year (STPP). From a transportation perspective, less road and parking capacity would need to be
provided if there were fewer vehicles using the roadways.
Myriad factors influence whether a person will choose to walk for a trip: climate,
weather, air quality, convenience, the quality of pedestrian facilities, and the cost of alternative
modes of travel are just some of the variables potential walkers may consider. If traffic
congestion is very severe, the number of automobiles on the roads may also be a deterrent to
walking; in this case, it is believed that fewer automobiles on the streets would make the facility
more attractive for walking. When higher auto charges are combined with a community
commitment to increase pedestrian activities, people are also encouraged to walk more often.
All things being equal, higher costs for driving could encourage more people to walk for
some trips. Improved air quality from pricing could also increase the attractiveness of walking,
assuming other factors are conducive to walking as well (i.e., if the climate is such that it is
always hot and humid, people may avoid walking regardless of the number of vehicles on the
streets).
Conventional tolling and facility pricing could also contribute to improving walking
conditions of a severely congested downtown if either decreased the number of -vehicles
traveling to the CBD. This type of pricing, however, could divert traffic off expressways and
onto parallel surface streets, which may discourage walking on these facilities.
Road pricing schemes that increase reliability or decrease travel time will improve access
to health care and emergency facilities. While the author has found no empirical evidence, there
is theoretically potential for road pricing to have a positive effect on this aspect of public health.
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3.4.9 Social Equity
"Transportation is not as central to ensuring equality of opportunity as are other services,
notably education and health. But transportation provides access to those services, as well as to
jobs and information" (G6mez-Ibfiez, "Pricing" 101). Transportation is approximately 19
percent of consumer expenditure in the United States (Bureau of Labor Statistics), so it also has
importance because it is a major expenditure for most households.
Economists often argue it is more beneficial to give low-income or disadvantaged people
a cash equivalent rather than reducing the cost of a good. They "are painfully aware of the
limitations of pricing as a mechanism for redistribution" (G6mez-Ibiiez, "Pricing" 117). In the
context of road pricing, this suggests it is more efficient to compensate individuals that are
worse-off from a road pricing scheme with cash or credits rather than subsidizing travel for all
users. While this approach may be appealing in theory, it is seldom (or never) done in
transportation for at least two reasons. First, it may be difficult to implement such a scheme and
it would likely be cumbersome or expensive to manage. A second reason is that there is often
insufficient political will for such policies because the cash benefits are too targeted to a small
population that is not well-connected politically. Low income individuals vote in far smaller
proportions than higher-income individuals; consequently, their voice and policy priorities are
often unheard (Lijphart).
"[I]n the largest and densest U.S. metropolitan areas, the average household income of
urban public transit users is similar to the average household income of all metropolitan residents
because transit patronage is dominated by commuters to the central business district, many of
whom are highly paid. In the smaller and lower-density metropolitan areas, by contrast, most
public transit riders are poor" (G6mez-Ibfiez, "Pricing" 117). Because of the relationship
between metropolitan area size/density and the income of public transportation users, city center
pricing is an inefficient tool for achieving income redistributions in these metropolitan areas.
Conversely, where improvements to the public transit system in the smaller and lower density
metropolitan areas would provide a larger share of the benefits to the poor, there is less likely to
be sufficient congestion to warrant a congestion pricing scheme.
Despite the economists' arguments that equity should not be a major road pricing issue,
equity concerns may be the most difficult obstacle for implementing road pricing schemes in
most industrialized nations. These concerns, however, are less applicable to most developing
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economies. Automobiles are typically a luxury and the poorest segments of the population in
developing cities typically use transit, paratransit, motorcycles, or non-motorized modes such as
walking and bicycling. The costs of the congestion charge are typically borne by individuals
who are not low-income. 57
Road pricing is likely to have positive impacts on poverty reduction for many cities in the
developing world. Lowering the transportation costs for the low-income population enhances
their employment and social opportunities, which could ultimately promote the elimination of
poverty. Transit improvements, which planners argue should occur in conjunction with road
pricing measures, would directly improve service for the poor and expand employment
opportunities with shorter travel times, higher reliability, and potentially less expensive fares.
Peak-period road pricing could have mixed effects on education, which is a social
concern. Children need to travel to school during the morning peak period, which will have the
highest congestion charge. If they are driven to school, it would increase costs and some people
(notably the poor) may feel they cannot afford the financial cost if there are not good transit
alternatives and parents may not be willing to drive their children to the better school that is
farther away. On the other hand, for families that value travel time and reliability highly on
average, which are more likely to be high-income households, the increased mobility may
outweigh the financial costs. At this time, any potential effect on education is indistinguishable,
but may be worth exploring with future research.
3.4.9.1 Opportunities to Internalize External Costs
As noted in Chapter 2, auto travelers seldom pay for the marginal cost of travel, which
implies they are not internalizing some of the external costs associated with their travel choices.
Policymakers may wish to internalize external costs to minimize distortions in the economy and
discourage perverse travel decisions. Interest groups seeking to justify low prices, cross-
subsidies, and other policies have incentives to exaggerate the difficulties in allocating costs or
the degree to which marginal costs fall short of average costs; however, "[m]arginal cost
pricing-or a reasonably accurate approximation of it-is often practical to implement and
consistent with cost recovery" (G6mez-Ibfiez, "Pricing" 101).
57 If freight charges are passed on to consumers, however, additional tolls could raise the cost of basic goods such as
food.
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Figure 3.3 presents a rough qualitative analysis of the marginal-cost pricing
approximation of different road pricing measures, taxes, and vehicle costs. Some road taxes and
vehicle costs are also included in this diagram to indicate how road pricing measures compare
against other costs drivers may incur. Implementation choices and site characteristics will have a
large effect on the degree of marginal-cost approximation, but this diagram provides a rough
assessment.
No Road Marginal-Cost Pricing Effects
Initial Vehicle Purchase Costs
Monthly Insurance
Vehicle Ownership Taxes
Fixed-Rate Parking
Transit - Single Rate Fares
Pay-by-the-Mile Insurance
Mileage Depreciation
Area-Wide Pricing - London
Partial-Facility Pricing
(e.g., HOT Lanes)
Facility Congestion Pricing
Network Pricing -
Vehicle Quotas
Yearly Depreciation
Open Toll System
Cheap Fuel Taxes
Closed Toll System
VMT Charging
Variable-Rate Parking
- Transit - Distance-Based Fares
Car Sharing
- Cordon Pricing - Singapore
True Road Marginal-Cost Pricing
(Diagram not to scale)
Figure 3.3: Marginal-Cost Pricing Diagram
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3.4.10 Land Use
As incomes rise, households typically prefer to move away from the central business
district and into low-density housing in the suburbs-especially in the United States. Housing is
typically less expensive farther away from the central business district. Residential location
theory predicts that commuters will evaluate the rent gradient, trading off transportation costs to
gain location rent savings; it does not predict that commuters minimize travel time (Ingram
1026).
Many businesses are also lured to the urban fringe where rents are less expensive and
more mobility is available. As cities evolve, residential units and businesses usually relocate,
often to locations further from the central area. "Both theory and empirics indicate that
household residential locations are systematically determined relative to the household's
workplaces. The direction of causation is not clear" (Ingram 1029).
Since commuters consider transportation costs, and since road pricing on existing
capacity increases costs, forms of road pricing on existing capacity should discourage
development further away from the central business district. Road pricing on new capacity,
however, could encourage some households or businesses with high values of time to move
further away from existing development because they can traverse longer distances in the same
amount of time.
The overall effect of road pricing on land use will depend on the specific characteristics
of the region as well as the details of the individual pricing scheme.
3.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter examined the different types of road pricing and the impacts that they have
on other policy variables. Each road pricing measure has a unique combination of strengths and
weaknesses, making it better suited to achieve some policy objectives than others are. Therefore,
the definition of the "best" road pricing strategy depends on what policy objectives a decision
maker is trying to achieve. Chapter 5 will present a new tool, the Road Pricing Decision
Analysis Tool (RPDAT), which demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of each strategy for
particular metropolitan areas.
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The following chapter identifies the most-often used techniques for estimating the
impacts of road pricing and the difficulties associated with modeling road pricing with
conventional models.
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4 MODELING ROAD PRICING
4.1 Chapter Purpose and Organization
The objectives of this chapter are three-fold: first, it identifies many travel factors, such
as travel time, cost, travel time-of-day, and reliability that are believed to influence driver
behavior. Road pricing targets many of these factors and it is important to understand which
factors these different scheme types influence in order to model road pricing well and create
accurate estimates of the impacts.
The second objective is to provide an overview of the current practice of road pricing
modeling in the United States. The models most commonly used to forecast the effects of road
pricing strategies are discussed and several methodological issues that make it difficult to capture
the effects of road pricing with these models are identified. Transportation analysts, demand
modelers, and econometricians need to address these issues in order to improve forecasts. It is
argued that existing models do not provide decision makers with accurate estimates of
information about pricing policies; these models are critiqued in order to highlight their
inadequacies. Chapter 5 will present an alternative evaluation methodology. 58
A third objective of this chapter is to identify some major issues that need to be addressed
in order to improve road pricing modeling. Addressing these issues could lead to either
improvements being made to existing models or as a basis for the development of new models.
This section of the chapter further demonstrates the need for alternative methods to assist in the
decision-making process for road pricing strategies. One modeling technique that is more
capable of capturing the characteristics of road pricing is also presented in brief.
Most of this chapter relates to HOT lanes or congestion pricing on a single facility.
Many of the concepts also apply to network pricing, although this strategy is discussed to a lesser
extent. Statements made about the effects of pricing in this chapter assume that measures will
add or increase the user fee for driving on a priced facility. Different road pricing strategies-
despite using a common economic theory-have different effects on individuals' travel behavior
58 The proposed analysis tool, denoted as the Road Pricing Decision Analysis Tool (RPDAT), is primarily intended
for sketch-planning purposes but may also be used for detailed analysis. A thorough discussion of this tool and its
methodology is presented in Chapter 5.
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and choices; thus, they have different requirements for how they need to be analytically modeled.
Similarly, different objectives (i.e., traffic demand management vs. revenue generation) will
produce different suggested toll rates.5 9 It should also be noted that different clients (i.e., public
agencies vs. investment banks) make different assumptions and take different approaches to
evaluate pricing strategies, thus making the results of one study not immediately transferable to
another.60
4.2 Limitations of Current Methodologies to Model Pricing
While modeling transportation demand can be difficult, modeling urban transportation
pricing policies presents an even greater challenge. This section discusses the characteristics
particular to road pricing that make it so difficult to estimate its impacts.
4.2.1 Effects of Road Pricing Strategies
Many forms of road pricing have the potential to decrease congestion, encourage trips to
shift to HOV and transit, and increase economic efficiency. These aggregate effects can occur
because pricing influences driver behavior. However, each strategy influences a unique set of
factors that drivers and businesses consider when making a trip, which means that each has a
unique set of characteristics that must be captured by a model for it to produce adequate traffic
and revenue estimates.6 l Effects resulting from the following strategies must be considered in
the model for it to be a useful tool for decision makers:
4.2.1.1 Express lanes (e.g., HOT Lanes)
0 Certain high-value trips (not just high-income drivers) will choose
HOT lanes when they need to be somewhere quickly (e.g., trips to
the airport);
5 A study with revenue curves from sensitivity analysis can make it easy to identify the optimal tolls for both
maximizing revenue and maximizing the volume of traffic using the facility during a given timeframe.
6 Techniques to analyze distance-based pricing are not discussed in this chapter. Many of the modeling problems
identified in this chapter are less acute with distance-based charging because diversion and equity impacts are
expected to be less than with other types of pricing policies. Area-wide and cordon pricing schemes are only
discussed in brief.
61 For more on the different types if pricing strategies, see Chapter 3.
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" People value the consistency of day-to-day travel times associated
with uncongested travel on HOT lanes, which is reflected in the
value of reliability (VOR);
" Business and service industry jobs (e.g., plumbers)-whose hourly
rate is higher than the equivalent hourly toll rate-may choose
HOT lanes; and
* HOT lanes may encourage more trips in the long-term because
they improve the level-of-service and add capacity;62
4.2.1.2 Facility Pricing
" Business and service industry jobs-whose hourly rate is higher
than the equivalent hourly toll rate-may choose the tolled
alternative;
" Some vehicle trips will shift from the peak period to less-congested
periods of the day;
* Diversion to alternative (less expensive) roadways will occur, but
the extent of which depends on the specific characteristics of the
corridor;
* Some discretionary trips will be eliminated if there are not
attractive alternative roadways or destinations; and
" Some motorists may change their trip destination.
4.2.1.3 Area-Wide and Cordon Pricing
" Some vehicle trips will shift from the peak period to less-congested
periods of the day;
* Diversion around the priced zone may occur, but the extent of
which depends on the specific characteristics of the area and how
many trips were previously traveling through the zone;
" Some discretionary trips will be eliminated if there are not
attractive alternative roadways; and
* Some motorists may change their trip destination.
4.2.1.4 Network Pricing
" Some vehicle trips will shift from the peak period to less-congested
periods of the day;
" Diversion may occur on some facilities;
* Some discretionary trips will be eliminated; and
* Some motorists may change their trip destinations.
62 The long-term effects of HOT lanes are not known at this time due to a lack of empirical data.
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These aggregate traffic effects occur because pricing policies change the variables
individuals consider when they decide when, where, how, and how many trips they will make.
The reasoning behind individuals' choices is discussed in the following section.
4.2.2 Pricing Factors that Influence Driver Behavior
There are several factors influencing the choices travelers make when deciding whether,
when, how, and why to use a priced facility. Small and Winston claim that "researchers are still
a long way from being able to derive the demand for transport from its first principles" (48).
However, it is necessary to identify and include known factors if a model is to produce accurate
estimates. This section attempts to identify the salient choice factors particular to road pricing
based on current theories and experience-to-date in the United States.
Researchers and analysts who specialize in modeling road pricing use the value of time,
vehicle operating cost, and toll charges as the three main elements in their models to determine
how a trip is made. Vehicle operating costs can be estimated satisfactorily with existing
techniques, and toll charges are specified in the model, so the main input to critique in
determining how trips are made is the quality of the value of time estimates and assumptions.
More specifically, one needs to determine if the estimates are based on the most important
variables travelers consider when making a trip.
Small and Brownstone show the value of reliability to be quite an important factor for
why people choose HOT lanes. The VOR measures travelers' willingness to pay for reductions
in day-to-day variability of travel times on a particular roadway (Brownstone and Small). For
example, a positive (utility) change in the VOR would be obtained by decreasing the daily
commute variation of 15-45 minutes to a commute that only varied between 25 and 35 minutes.
The average travel time in this example could remain the same, but the driver would benefit from
not having to plan around the potential of being much later than expected. Small and
Brownstone found travel time to account for two-thirds and reliability one-third of the service
quality differential between the free and priced SR91 lanes (Brownstone and Small).
The VOR is difficult to measure, but Small and Brownstone have made progress toward
quantifying it for the variably-priced SR91 lanes. They have not been able to identify the VOR
coefficient for the dynamically-priced 1-15 lanes because dynamic pricing also acts as a signal to
the driver regarding the level of congestion on the unpriced lanes.
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Despite being an important factor individuals use when deciding to use a HOT lane, the
VOR is not accounted for in any well-known forecasting models. This implies models are
(unintentionally) biased in favor of under-predicting HOT lane demand because the benefit of
added travel time reliability is ignored.
It is likely the VOR is not included in forecasting models because the data necessary for
estimating the VOR is difficult to collect and therefore has not been analyzed. The VOR is
particular to each facility and it takes many observations of the speed on the facility across days
and by time-of-day to create the distribution of travel times (Brownstone and Small). Small and
Brownstone appropriately suggest using the upper tail of the travel time distribution (i.e.,
difference between the 50th and 9 0 th percentiles) to measure unreliability. Using the upper tail
captures excessive delays, which is more likely to be related to the decision-making mechanism
used by drivers when deciding to use priced lanes than the standard deviation. People tend to
value travel time higher when they are late as opposed to being early, so they would not be
willing to pay as much for travel time savings if they believe they can arrive on time. 63 Another
potential reason for excluding reliability in forecasting models is that it was much less of an issue
in the 1950s and 1960s when the four-step model was developed. If congestion continues to
increase as many professionals predict, the VOR may become an even more important factor for
travelers and businesses.
The value of time (VOT) is the decision-making factor that receives the most attention in
the modeling analysis and is perhaps the input most scrutinized by traffic analysts. Traffic and
revenue estimates are quite sensitive to the VOT value(s) used in the analysis, so it is very
important to have estimates that closely mirror reality in a model.
The decision to use priced lanes for a particular trip is in part based on the individual's
value of time for that particular trip. This implies that an individual's VOT is different for each
day, time of day, and trip purpose. The change in individuals' VOT is logically intuitive, but
data explaining the variation of individuals' travel time is not yet available. Nevertheless, it may
be possible to create rough VOT "rules of thumb" for particular trip purposes after more real-
world experiences are available. For example, a few studies suggest congested travel time is
63 Additionally, the VOR for women is roughly twice that of men on SR91. Therefore, gender is an important factor
in choosing to use priced lanes. K. Small, C. Winston and J. Yan, Uncovering the Distribution of Motorists'
Preferences for Travel Time and Reliability: Implications for Road Pricing (University of California Transportation
Center, 2002).
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valued about twice as highly per minute as uncongested travel time (Brownstone and Small).
This implies models should be using at least a different VOT for peak and off-peak periods, but
different VOTs according to the trip time-of-day or purpose are often not used in practice.
The VOT is not only determined by the trip purpose but also influenced by the socio-
economic characteristics of the traveling population in a region. The traditional technique is to
use either (i) a single VOT for all drivers, or (ii) a single VOT for each income market segment
(with usually 2-3 market segments). This VOT is typically assumed to be 40-70 percent of the
hourly wage rate and is derived from household income.
One method that has been used by road pricing consultants derives a VOT from median
household income for each traffic analysis zone (TAZ) in the four-step model (4SM). A TAZ is
a small geographic unit within the region assumed to have homogeneous characteristics. The
VOT cost/minute for each zone is calculated using the median household income and average
household worker hours. Multiplying factors are then applied to the zonal VOT to account for
different trip purposes and for peak and off-peak periods. The VOT specific to each TAZ is then
used in the assignment process of the 4SM to create a more disaggregate and consequently more
realistic representation than traditional methods.64 This is one of the best 4SM methodologies
used in practice for modeling the heterogeneity of socio-economic characteristics. An alternative
approach, bi-criterion equilibrium traffic assignment, has a better theoretical foundation;
however, this approach is not being used in practice at this time. This modeling technique is
discussed further in Section 4.3.1.2.4.
Work-hour flexibility of individuals may also be an important characteristic in
determining whether pricing will affect their travel choices, but it is unclear how to model the
trade-off of pricing versus time-of-day travel. In other words, it is not known what percentage of
the traveling population has the option of traveling earlier to avoid paying a toll or whether
congestion exists because everyone believes they have no choice but to travel during the peak
periods.
Experience-to-date with pricing projects suggests the aforementioned factors are
important variables influencing which and how many trips will use a priced facility. However,
the dearth of empirical pricing data and analysis makes it difficult to identify the factors
64 The VOT is used to convert the toll amount into a travel time penalty in the assignment step of the 4SM.
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individuals are actually using; more real-world experience and research are necessary to develop
a better understanding.
4.3 Description of the Current Methodologies and their Shortfalls
4.3.1 Tools
Multiple tools are available to evaluate road pricing strategies and policies. This section
describes some of the assumptions and methodologies associated with the tools that are available
and those that are being used to evaluate road pricing in the United States.65
4.3.1.1 Sketch Planning
Sketch-planning refers to analysis that is more sophisticated than "back-of-the-envelope"
planning yet can still be performed quickly, although it is less detailed than an in-depth analysis.
Sketch planning is often used to produce an indication of whether particular policies or projects
are worthy of further consideration.
The 4SM is the principal tool used to evaluate road pricing for sketch planning purposes.
Other tools such as SMITE-ML and SPRUCE (discussed in Section 4.3.1.1.2) have been
developed with the intent to provide agencies with tools that can produce quick estimates of the
major effects of HOT lane projects, but these tools are not being utilized by planning agencies.
4.3.1.1.1 Four-Step Model (4SM)
The four-step model is the regional model used by MPOs.66 Most MPOs use the 4SM as
a detailed analysis tool and a sketch-planning tool to estimate the traffic and revenue impacts of
pricing. When the 4SM is used for sketch-planning purposes, a common practice is to make
more simplifying assumptions than would be performed in a detailed study. This sketch
planning usually only affects the mode choice and consequently the route choice steps of the
4SM and assumes more homogeneous characteristics of the driver population than would be
65 Studies in the U.K. have used the APRIL and AREAL models (developed in the U.K.) to estimate the effects of
the London Congestion Charging scheme. A review of these models is not included but is suggested if a region
wishes to create detailed estimates of the impacts associated with an area-wide or cordon pricing scheme.
66 A brief overview of the four-step model is presented in Appendix A3.
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performed in a detailed analysis. Therefore, sketch-planning with the 4SM assumes that the
number of trips, trip time-of-day, and trip destination are not affected by road pricing measures.67
This can be a poor assumption, especially since congestion is only captured during the route
choice step unless feedback loops are incorporated into the model.6 8 However, feedback loops
are often not included due to financial and organizational capacity constraints.
4.3.1.1.2 SMITE-ML and SPRUCE
Two relatively new models, SMITE-ML and SPRUCE, are analytical tools that can be
used to screen managed lane alternatives.69 These quick-response tools are relatively simple
spreadsheet models capable of producing estimates of traffic impacts, environmental costs, and
revenue; performance measures are also included in the model output. SMITE-ML is intended
to assist policymakers in evaluating proposals for specific additions to highway capacity
involving either general-purpose or managed lanes. It can be used to refine the alternative
groups of transit, carpool, and toll policies under consideration for managed lane projects; these
refined alternatives can then be analyzed with the 4SM for more detailed analysis.
One of the main advantages of these models is that they have relatively limited data
requirements. Many inputs for the models assume "typical" values, but the model allows the
user to replace these values with better estimates from region-specific data. The aggregate
nature of these models allows the user to produce estimates and make changes to the policy
assumptions relatively quickly.
4.3.1.1.2.1 Model Methodology and Assumptions
SMITE-ML uses traffic estimates from the MPO's 4SM as the base case. Therefore, it is
necessary to have a good original 4SM and realistic estimates of socio-economic characteristics
and growth factors within the MPO model to have meaningful results produced from SMITE-
67 Network pricing and area-wide pricing studies may assume the number of trips will be reduced, but this
phenomenon is commonly accounted for outside the model.
68 The validity of assuming these values are constant is lessened considerably when a large part of the network is
priced, such as the case with network pricing or VMT charging.
69 These models were developed by Patrick DeCorla-Souza, who is the Team Leader for the Value Pricing Pilot
Program at the FHWA in the U.S. DOT. Mr. DeCorla-Souza developed these models in his personal time (i.e., they
are not U.S. DOT models) and FHWA has not commented on the models. For more information on the models, see:
P. DeCorla-Souza, Using Smite-ML 2.2 to Evaluate Road Pricing Alternatives (Washington: Federal Highway
Administration, 2005).
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ML. This is important to note because unrealistic MPO traffic estimates are possible due to the
4SM's tendency to assign more traffic to a link than the road can actually carry.70 For example,
the 4SM might assign 4000 vehicles per hour per lane to a road during the analysis period, but
the maximum flow rate is less under optimal conditions and is even less when the road is
congested.
SMITE-ML makes several simplifying assumptions that include:
* A single VOT is used for all travelers;
* The toll rate is calculated based a simple relationship with the
assumed VOT;
* The different characteristics of CVs from passenger automobiles
are not accounted for in the model;
* A "demand elasticity with respect to travel time" is used to
estimate induced travel;
* Aggregate point elasticities are used;
* The model requires the user to either input or assume a demand
elasticity estimate, for which good estimates are not always
available;
* Induced demand is estimated for the general-purpose lanes only;
* There is no road network in the model, so realistic diversion
estimates for specific alternative routes cannot be produced; and
* Geometric characteristics of the facility (i.e., whether it is a radial
or beltway road) in question are not considered in the model; the
user must try to account for these characteristics with means
outside of the model framework.
SPRUCE is another sketch-planning spreadsheet model intended to provide policy
analysts with benefits and revenue estimates from HOT lanes (DeCorla-Souza, An Evaluation of
"High Occupancy Toll" and "Fast and Intertwined Regular" Networks). SPRUCE also uses a
pivot point mode choice model, but has a different methodology and produces fewer types of
output than SMITE-ML. Details of the SPRUCE model are not discussed in this thesis, but
could be considered as being in the same classification as SMITE-ML.
70 This is because the 4SM does not take into account congestion or delay unless feedback loops are used and the
model is not well-suited to evaluate changes in policy, such as pricing.
71 Aggregate point elasticities are valid for small changes. Ideally, disaggregate forecasting (sample enumeration)
should be performed, but aggregate point elasticities should produce acceptable estimates for sketch-planning
purposes. For more on aggregate elasticities, see: M. Ben-Akiva and S. Lerman, Discrete Choice Analysis
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985).
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4.3.1.1.2.2 Where the Models Stand at this Time
Based on an informal survey, most planning agencies that have considered pricing are not
12familiar with SMITE-ML or SPRUCE. Neither model has been applied in practice by a state
DOT or MPO in the United States and there is no evidence of their use outside the U.S. SMITE-
ML produces quick estimates for many of the factors decision makers wish to know when they
are considering a policy, but the model makes a lot of simplifying assumptions. SMITE-ML
could be quite attractive to planning agencies if its model validation were presented.
SMITE-ML should be applied to existing HOT lane facilities to determine if the model
produces valid results. Its model outputs should also be compared against best practice methods
used by pricing consultants to determine if it can consistently produce results similar to those
that are generally accepted. Further sensitivity analysis should be performed to develop a better
idea of what changes in the model's assumptions creates the greatest change in the outputs.
4.3.1.2 Detailed Analysis Tools
Three detailed analysis tools are discussed in this section: the four-step model,
microsimulation, and the STEP model. Bi-criterion traffic assignment is also presented as a
potential improvement for existing models.
4.3.1.2.1 Four-Step Model
The 4SM is used for both sketch-planning and detailed analysis. In fact, the 4SM or its
sub-models are used to evaluate virtually all pricing projects in the U.S. Formal documentation
for the state of the practice of transportation modeling that compares the abilities of MPOs and
consultants in the United States does not exist, but strong anecdotal evidence suggests that there
is a wide range of modeling capabilities between individual MPOs and with consulting firms
who specialize in pricing. Some models and assumptions are noticeably better than others are.
The models used by pricing consultants that were reviewed for this research can be thought of as
the state of the art for four-step models because they typically make fewer simplifying
72 This informal survey was performed by the author while working at the U.S. DOT Office of the Secretary of
Transportation (OST) in July 2004. The survey results were not published, but were used as a reference for an
unpublished OST Policy report.
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assumptions and take more factors into account than most analyses performed by public agencies
in the United States.
Most efforts to incorporate pricing focus on the mode choice step and also affect the trip
assignment (route choice) step of the 4SM. In contrast, consultants who specialize in modeling
pricing use proprietary mode choice and diversion models that are claimed to produce more
realistic estimates than one could expect from the traditional mode choice models. Trip
generation and trip distribution steps have been modified by these consultants to look at pricing
in some instances when they are analyzing area-wide, distance-based, or network pricing. The
level of sophistication consultants employ in their studies varies and generally depends upon the
amount of funding available as well as the quality of the base models they are provided with
from the MPOs. These consultants often take existing MPO models or trip tables and
disaggregate them with data obtained from roadside surveys they perform for the pricing study.
The better surveys and traffic data account for a large part of the improved estimates consultants
can provide.
It is very important to note that consultant studies for finance purposes focus on revenue
generation and not demand management. Modifications to the investment banking studies
should be made if the objective is to manage demand because the maximum revenue toll is most
likely not equal to the optimal demand management toll.
4.3.1.2.1.1 General Problems with the 4SM
The 4SM has been used for the last 40 years as the principal urban transportation
planning tool. Although some changes have been made, it can be argued that there have been
few substantial modifications. The needs of the transportation system have changed during that
time and the 4SM is no longer capable of supporting decision makers facing contemporary
transportation issues. This is because the model was originally designed to help size and locate
large infrastructure projects and to estimate the locations and amounts of traffic congestion likely
to occur (Replogle and Reinke). Simply stated, the 4SM is not well-suited to look at policies or
operational changes.
Some of the general problems with the 4SM are as follows:
* The 4SM is an aggregate model. This means it cannot model the
effects of heterogeneity of the traveling population.
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" The 4SM has a very difficult time modeling congestion. It is a
static model, meaning that it can only perform steady-state
evaluation (i.e., the model assumes all demand occurs during one
time interval). A good time-of-day sub-model is needed to
evaluate congestion or delay. The evaluation periods need to be
short time intervals to produce more realistic estimates.
" The 4SM is incapable of evaluating trip scheduling. In other
words, it cannot estimate when a person will choose to make a trip
or the relationship between trip scheduling and other variables
(such as trip cost).
" The 4SM cannot model trip chaining and assumes every trip is
independent of all other trips.
" There is no good sub-model to look at the relationship between trip
generation and congestion. The 4SM can take congestion into
account between the trip distribution, mode choice, and route
choice (trip assignment) steps if there are feedback loops, but these
are not in widespread use because of organizational capacity and
financial resource constraints. Only some regions use feedback
loops, and even then congestion is not accounted for fully.
These general problems make the 4SM a less-than-ideal tool to model traffic or routine
policies. The issues discussed in the following section are either unique to evaluating pricing
policies with the 4SM or are made worse because of the specific characteristics of pricing.
4.3.1.2.1.2 Problems with the 4SM Unique to or Made Worse by Pricing
The aggregate nature of the 4SM makes it very difficult to capture the effects of pricing
because pricing schemes specifically target the heterogeneity of the driver population and trip
purposes. The 4SM cannot assign different VOTs to different drivers (only aggregated
populations).
It is also believed that pricing has an effect on trip scheduling. Pricing changes the
attractiveness of travel during certain times of the day or days, which would make some people
decide to make fewer trips during congested periods. A major problem with the 4SM is that it
cannot model or account for any travelers deciding to shift their time of travel because of a
pricing policy.
The trip generation step of the 4SM is completely independent of the remaining three
steps, so the number of trips that will occur in the model is not influenced by pricing. In reality,
adding a toll will affect the perceived cost to some travelers, which will change the number of
trips generated. Neglecting the reduction in the number of trips generated is more likely to be a
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poor assumption if a toll is added to a road and alternative routes are not very attractive to
travelers. The change to the number of trips generated is often ignored in practice for corridor
pricing projects, but the validity of this assumption is site- and policy-specific. Pricing
consultants have modified trip generation tables in the event they are evaluating area-wide or
VMT pricing strategies because these policies specifically target reducing the number of trips.7 3
Other problems with the 4SM unique to or made worse by pricing include:
" Pricing may encourage people to link more trips, but the 4SM
cannot model trip chaining;
* Pricing should be incorporated into the impedance values of the
trip distribution step of the 4SM; however, this does not always
occur in practice;
* It is not possible to account for any effects of unreliability or the
VOR because of the static analysis period in the 4SM;
* It is not possible to evaluate dynamic pricing using the 4SM
because it is a static model and only evaluates aggregate demand;
and
* Different capacity values should be used for priced and non-priced
lanes in the assignment step of the 4SM.
The 4SM is an inadequate in-depth analysis tool by itself for most pricing strategies
because of the aforementioned problems. For this reason, microsimulation is necessary to create
a better approximation of the delays and tolls on a facility if better traffic and revenue estimates
are desired.
4.3.1.2.2 Microsimulation
Microsimulation explicitly accounts for the time-of-day in the modeling process. It is a
disaggregate approach, making it much more capable of capturing the heterogeneity of drivers
and trip purposes than the 4SM. Disaggregate models have generally been the most successful in
capturing the essential features of travel behavior and are well grounded in a microeconomic
theory of individual or firm behavior (Small and Winston).
Microsimulation is preferable to the 4SM in theory and it is the direction modeling tends
to be heading, although in practice, microsimulation does not produce substantially better
estimates than the 4SM because it relies heavily on the input assumptions. Microsimulation
73 VMT charging is also being considered as a replacement for the gas tax. In this case the goal is revenue
generation, but the change in the number of trips generated is a very important policy variable.
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attempts to derive demand from its first principles, but it remains to be seen whether current
efforts to build such models will have more success than traditional models (Small and Winston).
There is currently no documentation on the ability of public agencies in the U.S. to perform
microsimulation, although informal interviews suggest many public agencies have not adopted
microsimulation and they prefer to continue using the 4SM. The hesitancy to adopt a
substantially different technique might be attributed to the microsimulation results not being a
large enough improvement to encourage the modelers to change; the case for retaining the 4SM
is strengthened when considering the large demands and limited resources of public agencies.
Many of the demand modelers interviewed in the informal study indicated they believe the
United States modeling community is conservative relative to modeling communities in other
parts of the world.
Consultants sometimes use microsimulation to evaluate pricing studies for planning
agencies, but the technique substantially increases the cost of the study so it is not always
performed. Microsimulation is necessary to evaluate dynamic pricing strategies and it is often
used to estimate the effects of managed lanes because this technique can capture delay, which is
the reason travelers opt to use the priced facility.
Several microsimulation techniques for estimating road pricing impacts have been
proposed by different academic researchers around the world in recent years, although there is
not yet a widely accepted approach. Research and academic institutions are one of the most
likely groups to make intellectual advances in modeling road pricing in the future.
4.3.1.2.3 STEP (STEP2)
The STEP model was originally being developed for the Metropolitan Transportation
Commission (MTC) in the San Francisco Bay Area by Greg Harvey. However, when Harvey
suddenly passed away in 1996, much of the work was lost. A private corporation (Caliper Corp.)
has resumed model development for STEP, now called STEP2.
STEP2 performs some advanced procedures and provides a framework for household
travel activity microsimulation to create more sophistication than what is available with the 4SM.
Overall, STEP2 appears to be more scientific and more capable of representing road pricing
7 One consultant informally stated microsimulation doubles the cost of a study.
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policies than the 4SM, but it has not been used in very many cases. There are still some further
model development needs for STEP2; it should model more than just auto trips, i.e., commercial
vehicle modeling will be necessary, if it is going to be useful for many instances of pricing.
STEP2 should undergo a validation procedure to determine how well it models pricing policies.
Many planning agencies, modelers, and decision makers are not familiar with STEP or
STEP2. As the STEP2 model is further developed, refined, and validated, its value as a tool for
estimating the impacts of pricing strategies and policies may increase.
4.3.1.2.4 Bi-Criterion Traffic Assignment
In most road pricing strategies being considered in the United States, many of the
challenges associated with modeling road pricing relate to assigning traffic to travel paths in the
network.7 5 As discussed in Section 4.2.2, the four-step model converts tolls from financial costs
to a travel time penalty using an assumed average value of time. This means that once the
conversion to travel time is completed, drivers are assigned to a travel path based on only one
criterion-travel time.
In reality, each driver has a different average value of time; further, this VOT changes
with trip purpose and time-of-day for each driver. This implies that there is a distribution of
values of time across the vehicle population. If a model assumes an average value of time, it will
invariably produce large estimation errors and inaccurate forecasts (Dial).
Robert Dial presents an alternative traffic assignment model that generalizes classic
traffic assignment. This approach uses a bi-criterion user-optimal equilibrium traffic assignment
model, which relaxes the VOT parameter in the generalized-cost function from a constant to a
random variable with an arbitrary probability density function (PDF). The essential idea of this
bi-criteria traffic assignment approach is that it assumes a trip minimizes its generalized cost
gp(a) and chooses a path p, where:
gp(a) = CP + atp;
CP = the out-of-pocket ("dollar") cost of path p;
a E [O,oo) = value of time, which is a random variable; and
tp = time of path p.
75 A travel path is represented as a link in the network. When trying to estimate whether a vehicles will choose to
pay a toll or choose a free alternative, the 4SM uses toll-free links and the toll link in the network and assigns each
vehicle to the network using a shortest-path algorithm. The shortest-path is based on travel time.
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The probability of a trip choosing a particular path will depend on the particular path's time and
cost relative to the other paths and the trip's particular VOT a. Classic trip assignment models
assume the perceived generalized cost of a path for all trips is identical. As one can note, a bi-
criterion approach assumes different trips perceive the same path as having different generalized
costs-a more plausible assumption. The generalized cost function can be expanded to include
other variables to the cost of a link. For example, a/3dp term could be added to CP + atp to
account for additional factors a driver considers when choosing a link, such as the reliability of
the travel times on the particular path.
Although this technique is an improvement over traditional approaches, it is still a static
model, meaning it is very difficult to incorporate congestion. As Dial notes, bi-criterion traffic
assignment is open to further development that could make the model dynamic and "the
algorithms can be applied with minor modification to a discrete time-staged expanded network"
to develop even more accurate dynamic models (98). While there are some difficulties with
applying this approach in practice-primarily with the algorithms-its foundation and basic idea
are much more apt to capture the effects of road pricing. Research efforts should be made to
adapt such an approach into models that assign traffic onto a road network-especially if
networks have a toll alternative.
4.3.2 Addressing the Equity Issue
Although equity is a very important political issue to decision makers, there are no
modeling techniques at this time that can effectively estimate the impact of a pricing policy on
socio-economic groups. A few models analyze equity by providing estimates by income group,
but these models rely heavily on inputs and the value of time assumptions. In practice, the value
of time is modeled solely as a function of household income; however, real-world HOT lane
experiences have shown this not to be the case. The value of time for a particular trip is more
appropriate and cannot be modeled with available data at this time. A recent Transit Cooperative
Research Program report agrees that "[e]xisting forecasting and accounting methodologies are
often incomplete in addressing [equity] issues" (14-36).
Travel behavior in the context of pricing is not understood well enough to estimate the
effects of pricing on equity. More experience with pricing and research of that data will be
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needed to obtain a better understanding of why people choose to use variably-priced and
dynamically-priced roads.
Another large equity question is how to address mobility for low-income drivers who
might not receive proportional benefits. One of the proposed solutions is to improve public
transportation. If transit services are to be part of the HOT lane equation, then adequate
modeling of transit should be performed to obtain realistic ridership estimates.
4.3.3 Addressing the Revenue Generation Issue
Revenue estimates are closely tied to the traffic estimates and VOT assumptions in the
model. The gross revenue from the pricing scheme is simple to calculate once the toll charge
and number of vehicles for each analysis period are determined, but the number of vehicles is
difficult to calculate.
Consultants who specialize in pricing create revenue estimates by running their models
multiple times with different toll rates to produce revenue curves, which show the revenue-
maximizing toll and make it easy to see the predicted effects on revenue if the amount of traffic
or the toll changes.76 The revenue analysis should be performed for a.m. peak, p.m. peak, off-
peak, and in some cases the weekend time periods. The results of these analysis periods are
summed to produce a gross revenue estimate. These revenue curves are important to determine
the sensitivity of users to changes in the toll rate and provide decision makers with an idea of the
effects on revenue in the event travel demand is less than expected.
Investment banking studies require traffic consultants have independent (i.e., non-MPO)
socio-economic forecasts because the finance community believes MPO forecasts are sometimes
biased upward in terms of future growth or may use inconsistent methodologies. Investment
banking forecasts are likely to make conservative assumptions about when alternative
(competing) roads will be built and about the future growth of the corridor.
Economic growth and socio-economic estimates are perhaps the most important inputs to
the model for investment banking studies. Housing and non-residential land-use estimates-
specifically the type, timing, and location of development-have a large effect on the financial
feasibility estimates.
76 Analyzing approximately five different toll rate scenarios is common.
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Sensitivity analysis for the toll rates is one of the main items investment banks consider
when reviewing traffic and revenue studies for potential toll projects. Toll road studies have a
reputation for being poor predictors of actual revenue; thus, investors often require a higher rate
of return to compensate for the risk. Investment-grade revenue estimates require the consultant
perform microsimulation in addition to running the 4SM.
4.3.4 Addressing the Commercial Vehicle Modeling Issue
Most regions do not have good commercial vehicle (CV) models or data. The difficulties
associated with modeling CVs well are not specific to pricing, but accurate estimates of CV
travel patterns and choices will increase the accuracy of demand forecasts if CVs are expected to
be a non-negligible percentage of the priced facility user population. CVs are likely to choose
priced facilities in many cases because priced facilities reduce travel time and improve
reliability-service business CVs are especially likely to be willing to pay for these benefits.
This vehicle group could easily constitute a large portion of the mid-day traffic on a priced
facility, so accurate estimates of the CVs could be especially important for revenue estimates.
One modeling issue is that some public agency models do not permit CVs to travel on the
HOT lanes, even though 4-tire CVs are allowed to use the HOT lanes in reality. These vehicles
need to be accounted for in the models and should have a higher value of time than most autos in
the model. However, the VOT for CVs and businesses is not known, which is part of the reason
why they are not modeled; this is data public agencies do not have.
It is difficult to estimate the extent to which service businesses will value using a priced
roadway. Increased reliability and travel time savings are likely to benefit this industry, allowing
service businesses to reduce their required amount of capital expenditure (i.e., fewer trucks
because of increased productivity) because they are avoiding congestion. Estimating what
amount this group would be willing to pay to use priced lanes is difficult because it is not known
how to quantify this capital savings in a way that it can be an input for the model.
Another modeling problem for CVs is that their travel patterns are poorly understood.
The travel patterns of households are understood better because of household surveys, but private
companies are less willing to divulge their travel patterns and routes for proprietary reasons.
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4.4 Data Problems and Needs
Various data are needed to evaluate pricing policies. Some of the data is already
available to planning agencies, some may need to be compiled, and some will not be realistically
attainable in the near future.
Household survey data is required for microsimulation, which can be done with sample
enumeration / synthetic population techniques. Much of this data is already available to planning
agencies, but some agencies may need to perform updated surveys. Stated-preference (SP)
household survey data is better than no data, but revealed preference (RP) data is much more
valuable. However, RP data by definition does not exist in regions that do not already have at
least one toll road or HOT lane, so this is not attainable for some agencies. One hindrance is that
the United States has little experience with SP or RP data in the context of road pricing.
SP data tends to be particularly less representative of RP data (and therefore actual
choices) for pricing projects in the U.S., possibly because HOT lanes and congestion pricing are
relatively new and substantially different concepts than what drivers in the U.S. have dealt with
in the past. Experience in Southern California has shown the scale of RP VOT coefficients to be
about twice those of SP coefficients, implying SP data will undervalue travel time savings
benefits by about 50 percent. As a consequence, it is very difficult to forecast how drivers will
react to pricing in areas that have not had any toll roads. The theory of travel behavior in the
context of pricing-particularly dynamic pricing-is not well understood and will probably need
more real-world experiences and research before it is understood better.
Travel diary data from HOT lane projects should provide modelers with an estimate of
what types of drivers are more sensitive to reliability. Obtaining this data should increase the
analytical capability of models to estimate demand for HOT lanes accurately if certain socio-
economic characteristics are revealed to increase a driver's reliability sensitivity.
One major data requirement to evaluate a priced corridor with good free alternatives is a
distribution of the values of travel time. By definition, assigning one (average) value of VOT,
which is frequently done in practice with the 4SM, does not produce a VOT distribution.
Vehicles with a perceived VOT for a particular trip greater than the toll rate being charged will
choose to use the priced lanes; vehicles with a perceived VOT less than the toll will choose the
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free lanes.7 The data issue with creating a VOT distribution for any given point in time is
simply that the necessary data does not exist. However, collecting and analyzing extensive RP
travel diary data from various pricing projects around the country would help researchers better
understand what influences VOT distributions and could lead to the creation of some rules of
thumb that other regions considering HOT lanes could use to help improve their estimating
abilities.
For commercial vehicles, there is simply insufficient data available. A good estimate of
the number of 4-tire CVs that use the priced corridor is an important variable in determining who
will choose to travel on the priced facility. The problem is that this data is usually not available
because private companies do not wish to divulge their proprietary routes. Agencies could
potentially create VOTs for CVs with recent business survey data of their hourly rates, but this
data is unavailable to most agencies. Another CV data issue is the difficulty of quantifying the
value received from capital expenditure savings for these businesses, for which there is little (if
any) discussion in field.
One data need public agencies should address is sample enumeration for businesses.
Currently, surveys in many regions are only performed for households because regional models
focus on estimating household travel behavior. To understand the behavior of CVs better,
regional business surveys must be conducted.
4.5 Chapter Conclusions
There is evidence to support the hypothesis that the analytical tools and data are currently
not available to create accurate estimates of pricing impacts. More reliable estimates of revenue
and traffic diversion might make more roads financially feasible by lowering the required rate of
return from reduced risk. Increasing the accuracy-and consequently the trust-in models used
to look at pricing could mitigate some of the major concerns associated with road pricing
projects.
There are no good tools available to public agencies in the United States for estimating
the traffic impacts and revenue potential of pricing strategies, especially in the case of dynamic
pricing. The most-often used approach is the four-step model, which has fundamental
77 Some vehicles will not choose the tolled alternative for other reasons (e.g., they may not have an electronic toll
tag, they may be infrequent visitors to the system, they may be making a very short trip, etc.).
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difficulties in capturing the most relevant characteristics of pricing. The model is being used for
a purpose different from its original intent, which did not include the evaluation of policies
involving little or no change to the infrastructure supply. Some approaches, such as bi-criterion
traffic assignment, are theoretically more appealing than the traditional traffic assignment models
used in the 4SM but there are still refinements necessary to make these techniques operational.
Despite its faults, the four-step model is not likely to be replaced as the principal modeling tool
for urban areas in the near future-especially in the United States. The 4SM has become a
complex process demanding sizeable effort and data requirements. As a result, many public
agencies do not have the resources to develop new or more sophisticated models, resulting in the
state of the practice trailing the state of the art.
Consultants who specialize in modeling road pricing have developed more advanced
techniques for creating heterogeneity in the traveler population than those traditionally used, but
they are still using the four-step model. These consultants also use microsimulation for either
investment banking studies or public agency studies with a large budget. Microsimulation is
preferable to the 4SM in theory, but its estimates are only as good as the input assumptions.
Nevertheless, many academic researchers are developing more advanced microsimulation
techniques, which may prove to be the most appropriate for modeling road pricing.
Consultants' revenue bond estimates for investment banking studies are more likely to
under-predict traffic demand than MPO estimates because they make more conservative growth
estimates and assumptions. Independent economic growth and socio-economic estimates and
sensitivity analysis are the main items reviewed by investment bankers, who do not have
confidence in MPO estimates and assumptions. Investment banking studies should not be
viewed as the most likely outcome for planning purposes and are not immediately transferable to
a demand management strategy unless demand management is specifically examined in the
study.
There are several models that may prove valuable tools to evaluate pricing policies if they
are further developed and validated. STEP2 is an incremental approach that might be accepted
by the modeling community in the United States, although this is not known. SMITE-ML and
SPRUCE would be helpful sketch-planning tools if the models were validated against existing
HOT lane projects and the validation results were presented to planning agencies and state
DOTs. A new analysis tool, RPDAT, is presented in Chapter 5 as an alternative methodology
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for evaluating potential road pricing policies. While RPDAT does not provide specific estimates
of the impact of road pricing strategies, the decision-making tool can (i) help narrow the set of
alternatives to be analyzed in-depth and (ii) incorporate criteria into the decision-making process
that are omitted from traditional transportation models.
The influence of pricing on driver behavior is not well understood and thus poses
challenges for modeling. Significantly more accurate modeling estimates cannot be made until
additional empirical data and research from new pricing projects are available. Current research
from the HOT lanes in California indicates two of the main variables considered by drivers when
deciding to use a HOT lane are the value of reliability and the value of time for that particular
trip (i.e., the value of time changes by day, time-of-day, trip purpose, etc.). It should be possible
to estimate the value of reliability for variably-priced HOT lanes; however, the data does not
exist to quantify the value of time for each individual's trips. Further, it could prove to be
difficult to build an analytical tool capable of modeling the variation of individuals' value of
time. The collection and analysis of empirical data from more pricing projects will be necessary
to understand what factors are used as decision variables better. This should advance the theory
of driver behavior, which could lead to improved models and help address equity issues of
concern to decision makers.
Finally, there are several data insufficiencies that need to be resolved to develop more
accurate pricing models. The travel characteristics and behavior of commercial vehicles are not
understood well and better data is needed to estimate how this group will react to pricing
policies. Commercial vehicles are likely to benefit greatly from priced facilities if they can
increase productivity, but it is very difficult to estimate how many commercial vehicles will use
a priced facility or what they would be willing to pay for the improved service. Other major data
problems include the lack of empirical data from pricing projects, the poor quality of stated
preference data, and little available data to see who is sensitive to reliability.
This chapter raised several issues that need to be addressed if transportation models'
abilities to estimate the effects of road pricing are to be improved. It did not attempt to provide
specific solutions, but rather simply established groundwork for further research in this area and
demonstrated the need for alternative modeling techniques. There are clearly many opportunities
to advance the state of the art and develop models whose results will be trusted more by decision
makers.
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The next chapter presents an analytical tool that allows decision makers to consider
multiple criteria for determining which type(s) of road pricing strategies might be most
appropriate for their region. It is argued that such an approach is quite suitable for evaluating
road pricing issues facing decision makers at this time.
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5 RPDAT: THE MULTI-CRITERIA ROAD
PRICING DECISION ANALYSIS TOOL
5.1 Chapter Purpose and Organization
This chapter introduces a new tool, the Road Pricing Decision Analysis Tool (RPDAT),
designed to help decision makers assess which forms of road pricing might be most regionally-
appropriate and consistent with policy priorities. This tool was developed in response to the
discovery, during the course of a literature review, that no similar model or multi-criteria
framework for evaluating road pricing strategies exists. As will be discussed and demonstrated
in this and subsequent chapters, the RPDAT framework is a useful tool for deciding which road
pricing measures merit further consideration.
RPDAT uses multi-criteria analysis (MCA), an economic evaluation technique, to derive
index scores for each road pricing alternative.78 The index score for each alternative indicates its
overall rank among several options as an appropriate pricing strategy for the region. This
technique is useful when a decision maker (DM) is confronted with a multitude of objectives.
Prior to the presentation of RPDAT, Section 5.2 provides background information on the
theory of multi-criteria analysis and uses it to analyze a simple auto purchase problem. Section
5.3 outlines the decision-making context for the RPDAT evaluation and Section 5.4 presents the
model framework and logic. Section 5.5 provides the reader with visual images of the RPDAT
user interface and applies the tool to a hypothetical metropolitan area.
5.2 Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA)
While benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is a common technique used to evaluate public sector
projects, it has its flaws. This method reduces all the impacts of a proposed alternative to a
common monetary unit, which allows the impacts to be aggregated using a discount rate. The
net benefit and/or the benefit/cost ratio are calculated for each alternative and then the results are
compared to determine which, if any, alternative should be selected. While BCA is very helpful
78 Multi-criteria analysis is sometimes referred to as multi-attribute analysis.
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in some situations, it is often criticized for lack of capacity to assess intangibles.7 It is very
difficult, if not unreasonable or even unethical, to monetize social, environmental, aesthetic,
health, and security benefits or costs. Because of the difficulties inherent in quantifying these
factors in monetary units, they are often either incorporated into analysis in faulty ways or
omitted entirely. Not accounting for these factors is problematic, however, because the public
sector is responsible for promoting the "overall good," which should include consideration of
these parameters.
An alternative analysis approach, multi-criteria analysis, allows the impacts of
alternatives to be compared without converting all variables into monetary terms, although a
MCA could use the results of a BCA to score some criteria in an analysis. When there are
multiple objectives, which is often the case, MCA is an especially useful process for choosing
among alternatives. Multi-criteria analysis "is based on the fundamental idea that deliberate
decision making generally requires that the decision maker takes into consideration various
points of view. Thus, when evaluating the set of possible actions, the decision maker should try
to do justice to a multiplicity of objectives or options" (Rietveld 1).
One of the advantages of MCA is that it defines objectives clearly. If a DM does not
define all objectives explicitly, he/she may not realize that some of the goals probably conflict.
One alternative is not usually the best means for achieving every objective, so gains and losses in
criteria performance usually need to be traded-off among alternatives. For example, if a
consumer were to consider purchasing an automobile, he/she would likely consider the comfort,
size, safety, horsepower, and price of each vehicle option. However, it is not likely that one
could find a vehicle that had the best comfort, size, safety, horsepower, and price. Thus, the
buyer will have to make trade-offs among the different attributes. Clearly, the choice the
consumer will make must depend on the relative values he/she places on the different criteria.
The MCA process, defined subsequently, provides a framework to capture these types of
necessary trade-offs among objectives and determine how well each alternative meets the DM's
criteria.
7 For a more-detailed critique of monetary analysis methods, see: P. Nijkamp and A. Delft, Multi-Criteria Analysis
and Regional Decision-Making, Studies in Applied Regional Science, P. Nijkamp, vol. 8 (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
Social Sciences Division, 1977).
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5.2.1 Basic MCA Process
There are many different MCA techniques, but the basic principles and processes are
simple. First, a DM assigns numerical weights to several criteria to identify and quantify policy
priorities. To illustrate, assume the decision maker in the auto example above is a customer who
now has only three criteria: size, horsepower, and cost. The DM can assign weights to each
criterion by allocating 100 points among the three criteria. For example, the customer may
assign 50 points to cost, 20 points to size, and 30 points to power. This set of weights implies
the customer places the highest value on cost, the customer values power at 60 percent (30/50) of
cost, and the customer values size at 40 percent (20/50) of cost.
In the next step, each alternative receives a score with respect to the criteria and the
scores are documented in a performance matrix. These scores are independent of the weights
assigned to each criterion in the previous step. In the auto example, assume the DM is
considering the purchase of three cars: a Honda Accord, a Porsche 911 turbo, and a Ford
Windstar minivan. The Honda is inexpensive, however, it is small and lacks power. The
Porsche has considerably more power, but it is still small and it is very expensive. The Ford
costs more than the Honda but significantly less than the Porsche, it is much larger than both of
the other vehicles, and it has more power than the Honda but significantly less than the Porsche.
If the alternatives were scored from one to four for each criterion, with four being the best, the
performance matrix might be similar to the one shown in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Auto Example Performance Matrix
Porsche Honda Ford Windstar
Cost 1 4 3
Size 2 2 4
Power 4 1 2
According to the MCA technique used in this thesis, the scores and weights are then
aggregated with a simple linear additive model to produce the index scores, creating an overall
preference ordering of the alternatives. In mathematical notation, the index score for each
alternative is simply:
80 Note that this process is independent of the assigning weights. The results of the two steps are combined in step
4.
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nSi = Yw so where,
j=I
Si the overall index score for alternative i;
wj= the weight assigned to criterion j; and
si the score of alternative i for criterion j.
For the automotive purchase exampje, the index score for each alternative would be:
SPorsche = 50*1 + 20*2 + 30*4 = 210
SHonda = 50*4 + 20*2 + 30*1 = 270
Spord = 50*3 + 20*4 + 30*2 = 290
These index scores imply the Ford Windstar minivan is the best vehicle for the customer, the
Honda is the second best, and the Porsche is the worst choice. Assuming that a linear rating
scale is appropriate to capture the differences between the alternatives, one can infer the
preference difference between the Porsche and the Honda is greater than the preference
difference between the Ford and the Honda.
The use of a linear additive model implies the use of a compensatory approach. This
assumes the effect of a high score on one criterion may be counteracted, or compensated for, by
a lower score on another criterion. Where this is a poor assumption, non-compensatory
techniques, which are outlined in Box 4, should be used to perform a multi-criteria analysis.
Box 4: Non-Compensatory Techniques
Non-compensatory techniques are used for multi-criteria analysis where it is not
appropriate to make trade-offs. Security performance is an example of a criterion
that some believe should not be substituted for by other measures, i.e., a weak
security performance cannot be compensated for by a strong performance in
travel time on an urban rail system, no matter what the weight assigned to these
criteria. Non-compensatory techniques are less helpful for decision-making in
practice as they often provide little distinction between alternatives, so informal
judgment may be more helpful for determining a proper course of action.
The use of compensatory techniques assumes a mutual independence of preferences
(MIP). Scores assigned to alternatives under one criterion cannot be affected by the scores
assigned to another criterion for MIP to exist (ODPM DTLR). Mutual independence is weaker
than statistical independence; it can hold even when options are correlated as long as the criteria
express separate aspects of the value.
There are several other assumptions associated with using multi-criteria analysis as a
decision-making tool that should be noted briefly before proceeding. These include:
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* There is a single decision maker and the DM is undecided about
the course of action. Even if there is a team of DMs who work
together, this is still an assumption.
* Reason exists and functions in human behavior. If decision
makers are not concerned with or capable of making rational
decisions, they may have little interest in the results of an MCA.
* Formal analysis is appropriate for complex policy problems.
Although there is subjectivity associated with quantifying weights
and scores, this may not be more problematic than the
quantification used in other evaluation techniques. One could
argue that subjectivity is inherent in virtually all decision-making
processes and is thus not specific to MCA.
5.2.2 Other MCA Techniques
Thus far, this chapter has dealt with linear additive multi-criteria analysis models, which
are the traditional MCA method of combining scores and weights to produce overall preference
scores for alternatives and will be used as the basis for RPDAT. Other methods for combining
scores and weights that do not use linear-additive models are mentioned in this section to present
alternative MCA techniques that could be used in subsequent versions of RPDAT. Some of
these techniques are rather complex and take uncertainty and risk into account in the model,
while others are very simple in application and in mathematical terms.
Outranking methods are sometimes credited with being more capable of capturing
political realities and the effects of lobbying than other MCA models. As an example, the
ELECTRE method tries to establish dominance relationships amongst alternatives using
concordance and discordance indices to narrow the set of alternatives.8' This methodology
makes fewer assumptions about the process of creating preferences than linear-additive models,
but the procedure is less transparent. Fuzzy set methods have also been developed in response to
the idea that natural language is imprecise; however, this process is also less transparent.
Of all the MCA methodologies, Multi-Attribute Utility Models have the fewest critics,
possibly as a result of their strong theoretical foundation. Keeney and Raiffa developed a set of
procedures to generate a performance matrix, determine whether criteria are independent of each
other, and estimate the utility of a DM's overall preference for an alternative. This approach
81 The dominance approach has its roots in graph theory. For additional information on the ELECTRE method, see:
Nijkamp and Delft, Multi-Criteria Analysis and Regional Decision-Making.
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formally considers uncertainty and allows criteria to interact with each other in relationships that
are more complex than with linear-additive models. Although multi-attribute utility models have
been applied in practice to a wide range of problems, their application may not be the most
attractive for many decision-making problems because it is rather complex, resource-intensive,
and less transparent than traditional MCA models.
Despite the analytical appeal of some of the models outlined in this section, the RPDAT
framework uses a linear additive model to perform MCA because it is simple for decision
makers to understand and the process is the most transparent.
There are strengths and weaknesses associated with all MCA methods, which are
outlined in the following section.
5.2.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of MCA
There are several strengths and weaknesses inherent in multi-criteria analysis. One of the
primary strengths associated with MCA is that it forces the DM to think about and clearly set
forth the criteria that he/she will use to judge alternatives. This may lead to the inclusion of
criteria that would otherwise be omitted from an evaluation. Additionally, documenting weights
and scores shows why particular alternatives are chosen and allows for weights to be openly
disputed, providing an important forum for discussion among stakeholders.
Linear-additive models in particular are attractive because they are very transparent. The
algorithm used to combine weights and scores is very simple and there is little room for
intentional bias to be hidden within the model. More complex MCA methods, such as the
outranking method, fuzzy set method, and multi-attribute utility models, are less transparent and
may be more difficult for stakeholders and analysts to understand, thus making them less
attractive for many applications.
One notable weakness of MCA techniques is that there is no means to ensure there are
net welfare gains from the action. BCA can ascertain whether benefits/costs > 1, while MCA
cannot prove (in economic terms) that "no action" is not the best alternative.
In addition to this problem, the principal criticism and weakness of MCA is the
subjectivity associated with weighting objectives. This weakness is far from unique to MCA,
however, as there is subjectivity involved with most other economic evaluation methods as well.
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In benefit/cost analysis, economists often dispute the choice of what constitutes a benefit or a
cost as well as the magnitudes of these values.
The strengths of MCA warrant its use-especially if it can be performed quickly-for
screening alternatives or as an evaluation technique to be used in additional to more detailed
models. The following sections will discuss a tool (RPDAT) that performs MCA for road
pricing strategies.
5.2.4 Section Summary
This section defines the basic processes and terminology associated with multi-criteria
analysis. It explains the computational process and provides a sample application of MCA to an
auto purchase problem.
The RPDAT framework, presented in Section 5.4, uses the linear-additive model form of
multi-criteria analysis to evaluate road pricing strategies. Before the model framework is
discussed, the decision-making context for the evaluation is presented in the following section.
5.3 The Decision-Making Context
The decision-making context for the RPDAT evaluation is regional planning, performed
by an organization or group of DMs. Here, a region is defined as a metropolitan area.
Metropolitan areas are the basic geographic unit for economic competition, economic growth,
and environmental issues (Sussman, Perspectives on Intelligent Transportation Systems). Thus,
this scale is appropriate for evaluating many transportation policies and measures.
Planning refers to the process of considering and making decisions to achieve objectives
for the future. Therefore, regional planning is the process of identifying and then striving to
achieve goals for a metropolitan area. The regional planning goals will, at minimum, depend on
the region's political priorities and stage of development (Rietveld). Rietveld states that regional
planning aims to integrate the following policies:
" Economic (income, wealth, differentiation of economic structure);
" Social (quantitative and qualitative aspects of the labor market);
" Spatial (location patterns, occupation rates, transport networks);
" Services (education, health, cultural); and
" Environmental (ecological quality, pollution, noise, quantity of
natural areas).
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Planning for these policies often occurs in a series of steps. Faludi (cited in Rietveld) states that
planning theory consists of four phases:
1. The recognition of a problem
2. The generation of alternatives to meet the problem
3. The choice of an alternative
4. The implementation of the alternative chosen
Using Faludi's four planning phases, the initial problem that RPDAT addresses is deciding
which, if any, form(s) of road pricing a region should pursue. In accordance with Faludi's
second phase, RPDAT evaluates nine road pricing alternatives. The tool considers only road
pricing alternatives and in fact, only a subset of all road pricing measures. The specific pricing
measures evaluated by RPDAT are discussed in Section 5.4.
The primary objective of RPDAT is to assist DMs with Faludi's third phase of
planning-the choice of alternatives. The tool is primarily intended for sketch-planning analysis,
which is used to produce an indication of whether particular policies or strategies are worthy of
further and more detailed consideration.82 For sketch-planning, RPDAT can be used as a
screening tool to decide which road pricing strategies should be evaluated further for a
metropolitan area. This tool allows the user to trade-off several criteria, some of which may not
be considered in classical transportation models but can still be important in decision-making
(e.g., impact on the number and severity of traffic accidents). Though it is not intended for
evaluating projects and it does not provide specific estimates of the impacts, RPDAT produces
an index score for each indicating how well it compares with the other options, given the
region's priorities.
Implementation, Faludi's fourth and final phase of planning, is not addressed with the
model. Guidelines and experience, rather than a "black box tool," are more appropriate for
assisting with the implementation process, which is situation-specific and arguably too
complicated for quantitative analysis.
5.4 RPDAT Framework
The Road Pricing Decision Analysis Tool (RPDAT) performs MCA for road pricing
strategies. It is a decision-making program intended to identify which road pricing alternatives
82 Sketch-planning refers to analysis that is more sophisticated than "back-of-the-envelope" planning yet can still be
performed quickly, although it is less detailed than an in-depth analysis.
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are the most appropriate, or worthy of further consideration, for a metropolitan area. Version 1.1
evaluates up to nine pricing strategies, depending on whether HOV lanes currently exist or not in
the metropolitan area.83 Network pricing, area-wide pricing, cordon pricing, facility pricing,
conversion of HOV lanes to HOT lanes, adding HOT lanes, distance-based pricing, conventional
tolling, and a "no pricing" alternative are considered in the model. The tool analyzes the
alternatives as overall strategies rather than as they apply to specific projects.
RPDAT makes several assumptions about the characteristics of the metropolitan area to
reduce the amount of information the user is required to input. These assumptions should be
reasonable in most scenarios, especially for sketch-planning purposes. The assumptions of the
tool are outlined below:
I. RPDAT can calculate the scores in the performance matrix on an
interval from negative four to positive four using only the regional
characteristics input by the user and the model's algorithms. It is
also assumed that a scale ranging from negative four to positive
four is appropriate for comparing alternatives.
2. The metropolitan area has an activity center, termed the
"downtown/CBD," although other activity centers may also be
evaluated.
3. Except in the case where the evaluation area is a particular
corridor, the model evaluates the road pricing alternatives as if
they were widely deployed throughout the metropolitan area. For
example, a network of HOT lanes (one in each direction for all
expressways) is evaluated rather than HOT lanes on several
corridors. If the evaluation area is a single expressway corridor,
the model assumes pricing will be deployed on that corridor only.
4. Demand will be induced when new capacity is added. In other
words, capacity expansion will increase both the number of trips
and vehicle miles traveled.
5. Increasing highway capacity encourages sprawl and increasing the
financial cost of travel encourages "smart growth." These
assumptions are used primarily to determine how the measures
affect housing location decisions.
6. Road pricing policies have no effect on the number of traffic
fatalities on city streets. Increasing vehicle speeds on
expressways, however, is assumed to increase fatalities.
7. The scoring of the alternatives in the performance matrix is based
on what the author defines as "theoretical best" values. RPDAT
does not assume specific toll charges, but rather assesses how well
a strategy could achieve objectives under a typical implementation.
83 RPDAT will evaluate eight alternatives if there are no HOV lanes in the region.
111
It makes inferences about the differences between toll rates and toll
structures of the alternatives to calculate the scores of the
alternatives in the performance matrix. Network pricing is
assumed to have the highest toll charge of all the alternatives and
facility pricing is assumed to have higher tolls than conventional
tolling in the peak period but lower than or similar charges in the
off-peak. The distance-based pricing toll is assumed to be high
enough that it discourages some potential travel; however these
charges are lower than network pricing tolls because they do not
include congestion costs.
The following section identifies the basic RPDAT process. Each of these steps will be
discussed in greater detail in the sections that follow Section 5.4.1.
5.4.1 RPDAT Basic Steps
RPDAT has four steps as well as an introduction step (step 0), which are outlined in Box 5. The
model assumes there is a decision maker and an analyst who work together to perform the
evaluation and that the DM is familiar with the policy objectives and the analyst is aware of the
traffic/regional characteristics of the metropolitan area.84 The DM and the analyst typically will
be two different people, but they could be the same individual if that person is familiar with both
sets of information. The DM performs the first two RPDAT steps and the analyst performs the
third step. The fourth step is an output page, which presents the results and requires no
information by the user.
84 The analyst inputs regional characteristic data into the model in step 3. This process and its role are described in
greater detail in Section 5.4.4.
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Box 5: RPDAT Steps
Step 0: Instructions. This page provides a brief description of the tool.
Step 1: Begin. The DM identifies the scope of the evaluation (i.e., the entire
metropolitan area, downtown, or a specific corridor) and whether HOV lanes exist
in the region.
Step 2: Weights. The DM identifies and weighs the policy objectives by
assigning weights to the criteria.
Step 3: Regional Characteristics. The analyst inputs the regional data, which the
model uses to calculate the scores for the criteria in the performance matrix.85
Step 4: Output. This page ranks the alternatives and displays the performance
matrix.
Figure 5.1 shows the user paths and information flows within the model. Each of these
steps will be explained in the following sections.
85 An example of a regional characteristic is the "peak-period average speed on the expressways." The value the
user inputs into step 3 is used in conjunction with the "off-peak average speed on the expressways" value to
determine how well each alternative "decreases average travel time for all peak-period trips on expressways," which
is one of the criteria. As an example of how the performance matrix is calculated, the model uses these two values
to calculate a score for how well facility pricing-one of the alternatives-meets the "decrease average travel time
for all peak-period trips on expressways" criterion. The scores are documented in the performance matrix and the
scoring system is described in Section 5.4.4.
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5.4.2 Identify the Decision-Making Problem and Evaluation Scope
Before the decision maker uses RPDAT, he/she should identify the decision-making
context and problem he/she wishes to analyze. It is necessary to have clarity at the beginning
stage; otherwise, unclear or improper objectives may be used in the analysis. The roles of the
DM and the analyst must be identified, along with the role of the organization within the overall
planning context. Identifying the current situation and who will be involved in the MCA should
be performed before using RPDAT.
It is also necessary to identify the purpose of the appraisal. In other words, the DM
should state the purpose of the evaluation and the problem to be solved. Because the topic of
this particular MCA application is road pricing, RPDAT assumes the context is decision-making
for road pricing strategies in a metropolitan area. Greater specificity in the context will likely
differ between regions and agencies; however, some potential decisions may include:
e Which forms of road pricing are best for our metropolitan area, if
any?
" How can road pricing strategies help support our metropolitan
area's objectives?
" What are the strengths of a particular road pricing strategy
relative to others?
e Is there a better road pricing strategy than the existing one(s) used
in our metropolitan area?
In step I of RPDAT, the decision maker must identify the evaluation scope of the
analysis. If the user is primarily interested in considering the impacts of road pricing measures
in the downtown or an expressway corridor, he/she should select "downtown/CBD" and "an
expressway corridor" evaluation scopes, respectively, in step 1. If the user wishes to consider
the effects of road pricing at the metropolitan area-level, the user should select "entire
metropolitan area" in this step. As will be discussed in Section 5.4.3 and Section 5.4.4, the
choice of the evaluation scope affects which criteria the DM may consider in the analysis and the
score of the alternatives in the performance matrix.
5.4.3 Identify Objectives and Assign Weights
After completing step 1, the DM should determine the objectives of the organization.
This mental exercise will prepare the DM to assign weights to the criteria in step 2. If the DM is
115
directly involved with the MCA, he/she may identify, or work with others to identify, the
objectives as they relate to the entity's overall mission and policies. If the DM is not involved,
surveys or policy statements may be useful for this. Experts, or a panel of experts, could also
perform this step. Care should be taken to ensure that the objectives are not defined too
narrowly.
If a stakeholder outside the transportation organization is performing the evaluation, a
vision for the future of the transportation system could also be identified to help determine policy
priorities. A future vision could be compared with existing conditions or system projections if
no measures are enacted, and the differences could be compared to provide insight regarding
what needs to be achieved. A goal-oriented mindset helps DMs remember that strategies should
be undertaken for the sake of reaching particular goals rather than merely implementing projects.
In step 2 of the model, the DM assigns weights to criteria in order to quantify the
objectives. RPDAT has 29 criteria built into the model that reflect potential objectives
associated with road pricing schemes. Because it is difficult for a DM to compare and assign
weights to 29 criteria at the same time, RPDAT separates the process of assigning weights into
two steps-part A and part B. Part A organizes many criteria under what are called high-level
objectives. Here, similar criteria are grouped together, which reduces the number of criteria the
DM must consider at one time. Points are allocated among criteria grouped under high-level
objectives in part B. The high-level objectives are shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: RPDAT High-Level Objectives
Reduce travel times (i.e., increase vehicle speeds)
Improve reliability of travel times
Improve road safety
Improve public transportation services
Enhance the natural environment
Gross revenue generation
Influence housing and business location choices
Reduce energy consumption and dependence
Influence auto ownership
Improve pedestrian-friendliness
Consider equity
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Because some criteria do not group well with the other criteria, they are listed with the
86high-level objectives. Gross revenue generation, reduce energy consumption and dependence,
and improve pedestrian-friendliness are criteria that are listed with the high-level objectives.
An example of criteria grouping, "Reducing the number of fatalities" and "Reducing the
number of accidents" are two different criteria that are grouped together under "Improving road
safety" in part A. In part B, the user allocates "Improving road safety" points between
"Reducing the number of fatalities" and "Reducing the number of accidents." Figure 5.2 shows
all of the high-level objectives and criteria in the model; high-level objectives are on the left and
the criteria grouped under them are on the right.
86 It should be noted that identifying a criterion as a high-level objective does not define any level of importance for
that criterion (i.e., there could be a criterion listed with the high-level objectives that receives less weight that criteria
listed under the high-level objectives).
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Reduce travel times (i.e., increase
vehicle speeds)
Improve reliability of travel times
Improve road safety
Improve public transportation services I
Enhance the natural environment
Reduce energy consumption and
dependence
Gross revenue generation
Influence housing and business
location choices
Influence auto ownership
Improve pedestrian-friendliness
Consider equity
Figure 5.2: RPDAT
Decrease average travel time for all peak-period trips on
expressway(s)
Decrease average travel time for all mid-day trips on expressway(s)
Decrease average travel time on city streets within CBD
Create a lower travel time option for autos on expressway(s)
Improve reliability for all peak-period trips on expressway(s)
Improve reliability for all mid-day trips on expressway(s)
Improve reliability on city streets within the CBD
Improve reliability for peak-period trips on arterial(s)
Create a reliable travel time option for autos on expressway(s)
Reduce traffic fatality rate
Reduce number of traffic accidents
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on the expressway(s)
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets in the
CBD
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets
outside the CBD
Improve reliability of bus services operating on expressway(s)
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets in the
CBD
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets outside
the CBD
Improve air quality
Reduce greenhouse gas production
Reduce energy consumption and dependence
Gross revenue generation potential
Promote new housing developments on suburban or undeveloped
land
Promote "Smart Growth"
Promote automobile ownership
Reduce vehicle ownership growth rate
Improve pedestrian-friendliness
Availability of free or low-cost alternatives
Internalize external costs (i.e., implement the "user-pay" principle)
High-Level Objectives and Criteria
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I Improve public transportation 
services
Decrease average travel time for peak-period arterial trips
Table 5.3 lists the full set of criteria and notes whether the model analyzes them for each
evaluation scope. The number of criteria evaluated by the tool depends on the scope of the
evaluation that the user selects. If the decision maker chooses to evaluate pricing for "the entire
metropolitan area," all 29 criteria are applicable. If the user selects the "downtown/CBD" or "an
expressway corridor" evaluation scopes in step 1, only some criteria are applicable and those that
are not applicable are hidden from the user. For example, if a decision maker only wishes to
evaluate the impacts of pricing on the downtown, he/she will not be concerned with "Decreasing
average travel times for all peak-period trips on expressways," so in this case, this criterion will
be omitted. In Table 5.3, the R column denotes "the entire metropolitan area" evaluation scope,
the D column indicates "the downtown/CBD" evaluation scope, and the E column represents "an
expressway corridor."
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Table 5.3: RPDAT Criteria
Criteria R D E
Decrease average travel time for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) X X
Decrease average travel time for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) X X
Decrease average travel time on city streets within CBD X X
Decrease average travel time for peak-period arterial trips X X
Create a lower travel time option for autos on expressway(s) X X
Improve reliability for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) X X
Improve reliability for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) X X
Improve reliability on city streets within the CBD X X
Improve reliability for peak-period trips on arterial(s) X X
Create a reliable travel time option for autos on expressway(s) X X
Reduce traffic fatality rate X X X
Reduce number of traffic accidents X XX
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on the expressway(s) X X
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD X X
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets outside the X
CBD
Improve reliability of bus services operating on expressway(s) X X X
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD X X
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets outside the X
CBD
Improve air quality X X X
Reduce greenhouse gas production X X X
Reduce energy consumption and dependence X X X
Gross revenue generation potential X X X
Promote new housing developments on suburban or undeveloped land X X X
Promote "Smart Growth" X X X
Promote automobile ownership X X X
Reduce vehicle ownership growth rate X X X
Improve pedestrian-friendliness X X
Availability of free or low-cost alternatives X X X
Internalize external costs (i.e., implement the "user-pays" principle) X X X
Public acceptability X X X
The DM quantifies his/her objectives in two parts: first, the DM allocates 100 points
among the high-level objectives in step 2 part A. Then, if the DM assigned any points to high-
level objectives that have criteria grouped under them, the DM is prompted to allocate 100 points
among each set of criteria that were grouped together under a high-level objective. RPDAT
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performs the arithmetic to determine the actual weight for each criterion.87 When finished with
part B, the user is directed to a page where he/she can review the weights calculated by the
model. If the DM agrees with the weights, then he/she will proceed to step 3, but if he/she
decides different weights should be used, the DM has the option to return to step 2 part A and re-
enter the weights.
If the actual decision maker has limited participation in the analysis, the DM can be
interviewed to derive weights. Techniques discussed up to this point produce the stated
preference of the DM. If the relevant DM does not participate in the analysis, his/her revealed
preference can be used to make inferences about future behavior and preferences, which is done
by examining past actions. While such an implicit approach can be quite useful in some
scenarios, it may be less useful in others. Many situations are unique; thus perfect examples of
past behavior are not available. If neither technique can be performed, policy documents can be
examined to derive the set of weights.
5.4.4 Score the Alternatives
After the DM completes step 2, he/she will presumably turn the model over to an analyst
to input regional characteristics into the model in step 3. In this step, RPDAT calculates each
alternative's score for each criterion using the model's algorithms based purely on the regional
characteristics input into the model. The role of the regional characteristics will be explained
further in the latter half of this section.
RPDAT calculates 783 scores for a given set of regional characteristics, but the user
will view no more than 261. To avoid unnecessary confusion, the user will only view the
scores that are applicable for the evaluation area selected in step 1. The arrays of scores are
documented in the performance matrix.
87 Using the road safety example cited above, if the DM allocated 10 points to Improve road safety in part A, the
DM would then need to allocate 100 points between Reduce traffic fatalities and Reduce the number of traffic
accidents. Assuming the DM assigned 30 points to the first criteria and 70 points for the second, the weight for
criterion Reduce traffic fatalities would be 10*30/100 = 3 points, and the weight for criterion Reduce the number of
traffic accidents would be 10*70/100 = 7 points.
88 783 scores = (9 alternatives)*(29 criteria)*(3 evaluation scopes).
89 261 scores = (9 alternatives)*(29 criteria).
121
The performance matrix in RPDAT Version 1.1 has 29 rows (one for each criterion) and
nine columns (one for each alternative). RPDAT is a spreadsheet model, and the logic used to
calculate each of the 783 scores is stored within the 261 cells.90 Each cell contains the logic that
determines the score for each of the three evaluation scopes.
In an MCA application, alternatives are scored according to a common rating scale. A
description of potential rating scales is outlined in Appendix A4.
RPDAT uses a ratio scale with a maximum value of positive four and a minimum value
of negative four for each score. The terminology used to describe how well each alternative
meets the criteria is listed in Table 5.4. A scale with a fixed origin was chosen to allow positive
and negative impacts to be represented in the model. For example, facility pricing may meet the
"Decrease average travel time for all peak-period expressway trips" criterion well, which would
give the alternative a positive score in the model. Under certain circumstances, however, it may
meet the "Decrease average travel time for peak-period arterial trips" criterion poorly, implying
it actually increases average travel times for peak-period arterial trips. In this case, facility
pricing would receive a negative score for this latter criterion.
Table 5.4: RPDAT Performance Matrix Scoring Legend
4 Extremely well
3 Very well
2 Well
I Somewhat well
0 Neutral or mixed
-1 Somewhat poor
-2 Poor
-3 Very poor
-4 Extremely poor
The limited scale with a magnitude of four was selected because a scale from 0-100
would imply the model is able to estimate the scores with more precision than what is possible.
Implying such a precise scale would be misleading because a lack of data points makes it
impossible for this model to be calibrated against real-world examples. On the other hand, a
magnitude four scale allows more differences to be represented than a scale with extreme values
0 Microsoft Excel is the spreadsheet application. Each cell stores three scores, one for each evaluation area.
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of two or three. The author's judgment is that +4 to -4 is a reasonable balance between
representational precision and ability to capture the differences among alternatives.
As mentioned earlier in this section, the values input by the analyst on the regional
characteristics page are used in conjunction with the model's algorithms to calculate the scores in
the performance matrix. The model automatically calculates the scores and the user does not
input any information directly into the performance matrix. All of these values are numerical
inputs except "Rate the availability of alternatives to the expressway(s)." To input this
characteristic, the user selects either "No alternative routes," "Some alternative routes," or "Very
good alternative routes" from a drop-down list. A list of the regional characteristics required by
RPDAT is shown in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: RPDAT Regional Characteristic Data Requirements
Peak-period average speed on expressway(s) (miles per hour)
Mid-day average speed on expressway(s) (miles per hour)
Off-peak average speed on expressway(s) (miles per hour)
Travel time safety margin index value for expressway(s) (reliability measure) 9'
Peak-period average speed in CBD (miles per hour)
Off-peak average speed in CBD (miles per hour)
Percent of air pollution derived from local transportation
Percent of metropolitan-area VMT that is on expressways
Size of the metropolitan area (hectares)
Size of the CBD or potential cordon area (hectares)
Percent of peak-period vehicle trips within the cordon that do not cross the cordon line (i.e., internal trips)
Percent of peak-period vehicle trips in the metropolitan area that cross the cordon, but neither originate nor
terminate within the cordon area (i.e., through trips)
Percent of peak-period vehicle trips in the metropolitan area with origin or destination in the CBD
Percent of peak-period person trips in the metropolitan area crossing the cordon line that use public
transportation
Percent of peak-period expressway corridor trips that are auto
Percent of HOV lane capacity utilized during peak-period
Rate the availability of alternatives to the expressway(s):
Number of expressway lanes in the peak direction
The number of scores calculated by RPDAT (783) prohibits enumerating all of the
calculations in this section. A simple example, however, is presented for educational purposes.
91 This measures the extra travel time most travelers include when planning peak-period trips. For example, a value
of 1.46 indicates travelers plan an additional 46 percent travel time than for off-peak travel times to ensure 95
percent on-time arrival.
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The following Microsoft Excel formula represents the facility pricing scores that RPDAT
calculates for the "Decrease average travel time for peak-period arterial trips" criterion:92
=IF(TargetLocationlD=3,0,IF(AvailabilityOfAlternativesID=2,0,
IF(AvailabilityOfAlternativeslD=3,IF(OffPeakToPeakExpressway
>=1.5,-3,IF(OffPeakToPeakExpressway>=1.3,-2,IF(
OffPeakToPeakExpressway>=1.05,-1,0))),IF(
AvailabilityOfAlternativeslD=4,IF(OffPeakToPeakExpressway>=
1.75 ,-4,IF(OffPeakToPeakExpressway>= 1.4,-3,IF(
OffPeakToPeakExpressway>= 1.2,-2,IF(
OffPeakToPeakExpressway >= 1.05,-1,0))))))))
Box 6 defines the variables used in the formula. To explain the formula above, a value of
TargetLocationID = 3 signifies the evaluation scope is the downtown. Because this criterion is
not applicable for a downtown evaluation, the value of the cell is equal to zero if that scope is
selected by the user. The criterion is applicable to evaluations of the entire metropolitan area and
an expressway corTidor, so the rest of the formula logic applies to those cases.
Box 6: RPDAT Formula Example Variables
TargetLocationID = the scope of the evaluation area (selected by the user in step
1). A value of 2 implies the scope is the "entire metropolitan area," 3 implies the
scope is the "downtown/CBD," and 4 implies the scope is "an expressway
corridor."
AvailabilityOfAlternativesID = the quality of routes that are alternatives to the
expressway. A value of 2 implies there are "no alternative routes," 3 implies
there are "some alternative routes" and 4 implies there are "very good
alternatives." The user selects one of these choices on the regional characteristics
page.
OffPeakToPeakExpressway = the "off-peak average speed on expressways"
divided by the "peak-period average speed on expressways," which are both
regional characteristics input by the user.
If the analyst inputs that there are "no alternative routes" on the regional characteristics
page, there will be no impact (i.e., a score of zero) on the average travel time for peak-period
arterial trips because there is not any diversion. If there are "some alternative routes," there may
be negative impacts, which would be represented by negative scores. In this scenario, the score
is determined by the level of congestion on the expressway, which is approximated by the
OffPeakToPeakExpressway variable. Higher congestion before the pricing measure would be
implemented would imply there would be greater diversion after implementation than if there
92 Note that this formula calculates the scores for all three evaluation scopes.
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were little congestion on the expressway, and hence a greater magnitude negative score. If there
are "very good alternative routes" the same logic applies, although the model assumes more
diversion occurs when there are higher-quality alternative routes, explaining why the minimum
threshold values for achieving the same score are lower for the "very good alternative routes"
case than the "some alternative routes" case. This example represents one of the simpler of the
261 RPDAT cells in the performance matrix.
After the user has input all of the regional characteristics into the model, he/she is
directed to the output page where the index scores, weights, and performance matrix are
displayed.93 The calculation and interpretation of the output is described in the following
sections.
5.4.5 Determine Overall Preference of Alternatives
In step 4, the scores and weights are combined to obtain overall preference ratings of the
alternatives, which are represented by index scores. An index score can be interpreted as the
overall attractiveness of each road pricing alternative for the metropolitan area. As noted
previously, RPDAT uses a linear-additive model. The (overall) index score for each alternative
is simply:
Si = w1 S, where,
J=1
Si the index score for alternative i;
wj= the weight assigned to criterion j; and
s= the score of alternative i for criterion j.
A higher index score represents a higher overall preference for an alternative. The user
should review the results and conduct sensitivity analysis after reaching step 4.
5.4.6 Review and Conduct Sensitivity Analysis
The index scores should be compared against one another and reviewed by the user. If
counter-intuitive results are produced by the process, the inputs should be reviewed and checked
for errors.
93 Weights are input by the user, but the performance matrix is generated by the model. Both are presented on the
output page to summarize the inputs and outputs.
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Sensitivity analysis may be helpful to test the robustness of the solutions obtained with
the model. To determine the sensitivity, weights can be varied to determine the effect on the
overall preference order of the alternatives. Individual stakeholders will often have different
views of what the appropriate weights should be, and sensitivity analysis can demonstrate under
what assumptions an outcome is the most preferred.
If used as a screening tool, the DM can use the output to select which alternative(s)
should be pursued or (more likely) analyzed further. Because risk, uncertainty, and public
acceptability are not accounted for in RPDAT Version 1.1, the DM should consider these factors
in conjunction with the RPDAT results when making a final decision.
5.5 RPDAT User Interface
RPDAT uses the Microsoft Excel application with the Visual Basic language as the
platform for the program. Users open an Excel file and RPDAT guides them through a series of
pages. The user is instructed to input information and click a button when each step is
completed, which will direct them to the next step. This section explains the user interface with
a hypothetical example.
The program begins with an Instructions page (step 0), explaining what the program
does, its intended use, what it evaluates, etc. A screenshot of this page is shown in Figure 5.3.
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The road pricing decision analysis tool, or RPDAT. performs a multi-criteria analysis of road pricing
strategies. It is a decision-making program, intended to identify which road pricing alternatives are the
most appropriate for a metropolitan area, or are at least worth further consideration.
What is its intended use?
This program has at least two potential uses. First, it can be used as a screening tool to decide which types
of road pricing strategies should be evaluated further for a metropolitan area. A strength of this tool is that
it allows the user to explicitly trade-off several criteria, some of which cannot be considered with classical
transportation models but are still very important in making a decision (e.g., the impact on the number and
severity of traffic accidents). It does not provide specific estimates of the impacts, but rather an index value
for each alternative indicating how well it compares against the other alternatives.
This tool may also be useful to a decision maker that has already decided upon a particular road pricing
strategy. It can be used to show how much certain criteria must be valued for the selected alternative to be
the best fit for the region.
Who is the intended user?
The intended user of this tool is a decision maker in a metropolitan area. The decision maker will most
likely be assisted by an analyst for the third page where region-specific data is input into the model.
How does it work?
The model performs a multi-criteria analysis of road pricing alternatives and requires two types of data. The
decision taker will input weights on page 2, which indicate the relative preference for criteria. On page 3,
an analyst will input region-specific data, which are used to create scores for the alternatives for each
criterion. There are four pages in the tool plus one page for instructions. The user is referred to Jeffrey D.
Ensor's 2005 MIT thesis, entitled, Multi-Criteria Analysis: An Alternative Approach for the Evaluation of
Road Pricing Strategies" for further explanation of the model logic.
What road pricing options are evatluated in this program?
Network pricing, area-wide pricing, cordon pricing. facilitv pricing, conversion of HOV lanes to HOT lanes.
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Figure 5.3: RPDAT Instructions Page
After the user has read the instructions, he/she will transfer to the first page by clicking
the "Begin" button located in the upper right-hand corner of the page. This takes the user to the
Beginning page, where the geographic scope of the study must be selected from a drop-down
box. The choices are "entire metropolitan area," "downtown/CBD," and "an expressway
corridor." In the second question, the user will input whether any HOV lanes are present in the
metropolitan area. In this hypothetical example, it is assumed the evaluation is being performed
for the entire metropolitan area and that HOV lanes are widely deployed. Figure 5.4 shows a
user selecting these options from the drop-down list.
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Figure 5.4: RPDAT Beginning Page
From this point, the user has the option to return to the instructions page or proceed to
step two (Weights page), which is where the weights are entered into the model. This step is
divided into two parts: A and B. In part A, the user assigns points to the high-level objectives (as
described in Section 5.4.3). When 100 points have been assigned, the user is allowed to proceed
to part B. In the example, it is assumed that the DM assigns values of 20, 25, 5, 30, 10, and 10 to
reduce travel time, improve reliability of travel times, improve safety, improve public
transportation services, enhance the natural environment, and gross revenue generation,
respectively. In this example, zero weight is given to the other five high-level objectives. This
process is presented in Figure 5.5.
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Weights Page (vage 2 of 4)
Instructions:
Palt A
Please assign an integer number of points to the objectives listed below according to their relative iiportance
when iiplenenting a road pricing schene. This should be done by assigning a total of 100 points among the
objectives. All 100 points must be assigned and no more than 100 points can be assigned. A red or yellow color
in the Total Points Assigned box indicatec that 100 points have not yet been allocated or too nanv points have
been allocated. A green color indicates that you msay proceed to the next step. Please click the 'NEXT button
below when you have finished making your selections.
Objectives Points Assigned
I Reduce travel times (i.e., increase vehicle speeds) 20
Improve reliability of travel times 25
3 Improve road safety
4 Improve public transportation services 30
- Enhance the natural environment 10
6 Gross revenue generation 10
7 Influence housing and business location choices
8 Reduce energy consumption and dependence
9 Influence auto ownership
10 Improve pedestrian-friendliness
11 Consider equity
Total points assigned:
Total points that still need to be assigned
EReset Points NEXT -
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Figure 5.5: RPDAT Weights Page - Part A
After completing part A, the user goes to part B where he/she allocates points among
criteria that were grouped under high-level objectives in part A. As discussed in Section 5.4.3,
RPDAT determines which criteria will be displayed depending on the evaluation scope selected
in step 1 and the points assigned in part A.94 In the hypothetical example, assume that the user
has allocated the point values listed in Table 5.6 for part B-high level objectives are shown in
grey and criteria are shown in white. A screenshot of part B is shown in Figure 5.6.
94 Criteria grouped under high-level objectives are not displayed in part B if the high-level criteria they are grouped
under received zero points in part A or if they are not applicable for the evaluation scope.
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Table 5.6: Step 2 Part B Criteria Points for Hypothetical Example
REDUCE TRAVEL TIMES CRITERIA
Decrease average travel time for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) 20
Decrease average travel time for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) 0
Decrease average travel time on city streets within CBD 50
Decrease average travel time for peak-period arterial trips 0
Create a lower travel time option for autos on expressway(s) 30
IMPROVE RELIABILITY OF TRAVEL TIMES CRITERIA
Improve reliability for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) 10
Improve reliability for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) 0
Improve reliability on city streets within the CBD 60
Improve reliability for peak-period trips on arterial(s) 0
Create a reliable travel time option for autos on expressway(s) 30
IMPROVE SAFETY CRITERIA
Reduce traffic fatality rate 0
Reduce number of traffic accidents 100
IMPROVE PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SERVICES CRITERIA
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on the expressway(s) 15
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD 25
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets outside the CBD 5
Improve reliability of bus services operating on expressway(s) 15
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD 30
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets outside the CBD 10
IMPROVE THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT CRITERIA
Improve air quality 70
Reduce greenhouse gas production 30
GROSS REVENUE GENERATION CRITERIA
Gross revenue generation 100
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Instructions: Please assign points to your sub-objectives in a similar manner to that done above--all 100
tPat B points must be assigned within each sub-section. In some cases, there may be only one sub-
objective available, so all 100 points should be assigned to that sub-objective. For questions that
have a yes or no* option, please make youi selection for the first option and the second
option will automatically be answered. You can scroll up and refer to your original scores
Please allocate points between your travel tine reduction objectives:
A Decrease average travel time for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) 20
B Decrease average travel time for all nsid-das trips on expressway(s)
C Decrease average travel time on city streets within CBD 50
D Decrease average travel time for peak-period arterial trips
F Create a lower travel time rptin for autos on expressway(s) 30
Total points assigned for this goal:
Total points that still need to be assigned for this g :
# Please allocate points between your reliability objectives:
A Improve reliabilitv for all peak-period trips on expresswav(s) 10
B Improve reliability for all mid-day trips on expressway(s)
C Ihprove reliability on city streets within the CBD 60
D Improve reliability for peak-period trips on arterial(s)
F Create a reliable travel time opticr for autos on expressway(s) 30
Total points assigned for this goal
Total points that still need to be assigned for this goal
Please allocate points between your safety objectives:
A Reduce traffic fatality rate
B Reduce number of traffic accidents 100
Tota points assigned for this goal: i
Total comts that still need to be azsigned for this goal:
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Figure 5.6: RPDAT Weights Page - Part B
After completing step 2 part B, the user is directed to the Review Weights page (Figure
5.7), which shows a summary of the weights calculated by the model based on the values input
by the user in part A and part B. If the user determines a different set of weights should be used,
he/she can return to step 2 part A and re-allocate points among the high-level objectives. If the
user is satisfied with the weights, he/she then proceeds to the Regional Characteristics page.
131
0 1
Microsoft Excel - RPDAT Version 1. 1
fle Edt Vewv Insert Fgrmat ools Data Window Iep
You allocated the following weights among the criteria:
Criteria Weight
4,0 Re-allocate
Deights, Cl i Points -->
L 4 .ri cora 1 -er- >2-ve tie ci ts/ -rW ' Crceoc / 301 acao,/Set . e fr-oeH~s /37 W~t -Qt
Decreas ~ ~ igur 5.7:ag RPDATl Revie Weiht PageMu atrilt
creatio t is r trave time Obon for autd 1 elpresu b ya l n 0
Inirv bbit iral m Z ib iE t xisw s)5 NEX T->
assume thelvae listed in T tae5 7 r
sresoo the X 1 regiat characteristics pag in 0
DceAe ehr 4tave i~ ofit; .
Dtlrese  of bil 00t 4,;he
Din tme brf to tK0t~o)A&
frn bv fbw 4.n50
fzdomote qhmrtv 3.0t
?iomxoe aiAOM0152e vownership
Impenalte exerai -ss enth
Click "Next" if you are satisfied with these weights and wish to continue. If you wish to revise your
weights, please click "revise points."
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Figure 5.7: RPDA T Review Weights Page
The Regional Characteristics page is the third step of RPDAT. Here, regional-specific
information is input into the model-presumably by an analyst. In the hypothetical example,
assume the values listed in Table 5.7 represent the characteristics of the metropolitan area. A
screenshot of the regional characteristics page is shown in Figure 5.8.
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Table 5.7: Regional Characteristics for Hypothetical Example
Peak-period average speed on expressway(s) (mph) 30
Mid-day average speed on expressway(s) (mph) 55
Off-peak average speed on expressway(s) (mph) 60
Travel time safety margin index value for expressway(s) (reliability measure) 1.6
Peak-period average speed in CBD (mph) 8
Off-peak average speed in CBD (mph) 25
Percent of air pollution derived from local transportation 20
Percent of metropolitan-area VMT that is on expressways 45
Size of the metropolitan area (ha) 100,000
Size of the CBD or potential cordon area (ha) 4,000
Percent of peak-period vehicle trips within the cordon that do not cross the cordon
line (i.e., internal trips) I1
Percent of peak-period vehicle trips in the metropolitan area that cross the cordon, but
neither originate nor terminate within the cordon area (i.e., through trips) 16
Percent of peak-period vehicle trips in the metropolitan area with origin or destination
in the CBD 21
Percent of peak-period person trips in the metropolitan area crossing the cordon line
that use public transportation I1
Percent of peak-period expressway corridor trips that are auto 90
Percent of HOV lane capacity utilized during peak-period 65
Some alternative
Please rate the availability of alternatives to the expressway(s): routes
Number of peak-direction expressway lanes 3
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Rezional Characteristics Page (pg. 3 of 4)
Instructions: Please enter the information requested below in the Value column. This data will be used to determine
Part 3 hoss well each alternative meets the criteria you selected in the previous 
step. Click the "Next button
after vou have input all of the information to be directed to the output page.
Value
Peak-period average speed on expressway(s) (mnph) 30
Mid-ds; average speed on expressway(s) imph 5
Off-peak average speed on expressway(s) (mph) 60
Tiavel tine safet: margin index value lot expresswvavs (reliability measure) 1.6
Peak-period average speed in CBD (nph) 8
Mid-day average speed us CBD (mph)
Off-peak average speed in CBD (mph) 25
Percent of air psollution derived frons local transportation 20
Percent of metropolitan-area VMT that is on expressways 45
aize of the netropolitan area (ha) 100,000
Size of the CBD or potential cordon area (ha) 4,000
Percent of peak-period vehicle trips within the cordon that do not cross the cordon line Ii.e.,
iternal trips) 8
Percent of peak-period vehicle trips in the osetropolitan area that cross the cordon, but
neither originate nor terniiate within tie cordon area (i.e, through trips) 16
Percent of peak-period vehicle trips in the osetropolitan area with origin or destination in the
CBD 21
Percent of peak-period peeson trips in the metropolitan area crossing the cordon line that use
public tiansportahons 
11
Percent of peak-period expressway corridor trips that are auto 90
Peicent of HOV lane capacity atilized during peak-perod 6-
Ple se rate the ava abilty of alternatives to the expressway(s): Some alternative route(s)
a-niher of peak-direchon express a hnes 3
<- Return to beginning page I oe = ae on this pag" NXT-
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Figure 5.8: RPDAT Regional Characteristics Page
Figure 5.9 shows the Output page where the index scores, performance matrix, and
weight values are presented to the user.
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This page presents 4Ld scnes for each alternative, the v:eights associated with each criterion, and the ve'ftrmance m . The index scores
suggest the attiactiveness of each road pricing alternative; higher index scores implv the strategy is relatively more favorable than
alternatives with lower index scores. When comparing index scores, the use must keep in mind that models make assumptions and hence
strong inferences should not be drawn from small differences in the index score values. For example, it conventional tolling, area-wide
pricing, and network pricing have index scores of 52, 123, and 125 respectively, the model suggests area-wide pricing and network pricing
are more attractive than conventional tolling, however, one should not infer network pricing is necessarily better than area-wide pricing.
The performance natrix rates how well each alternative meets each of the criteria; higher scores imply alternatives meet the criteria better,
with a maximum score of +4 and a minimum score of -4. The weights column displays how much the user values each criterion; these
weights reflect values input by the user in step 2. The performance matrix and weights are combined to calculate index scores for each
alternative, thus demonstrating how the index scores were derived.
Strategy hidex Scores
Network Pricing 301 r Return to begintng
Area-Wide Pricng 22 page
Cordon Pricing 213
Facility Pricing 84
Distance-Based Pricing 74 Return to weights page
Convert HON' to HOT Lane 67
Conventional Toiling 63
Add New HOT Lane 29
\o Pricing 0
PERFORMANCE MATRIXE
Criteria
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
4 4 4 1 -1 -2 1 1'
_ 0 - 2 3 1 -340 0 i
Improve telability for allmird-day trips on expresswdy(V 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Improve reliabihity on city streets withm the CBD 4 4 4 0 -1 0 0
Improve reliabilit- for peak-period trips on arterial(s 4L 0 0 -3 0 1 0 -3
Create a reliable travel time otion for autos on expressway.0s) 0 01 0 0 4 4 0 0
-1 01 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -
Decrease travel time of bus services operatmg on the expressway(s) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets i the CBD 4 4 4 1 0 -2 1 1
Dectease travel time of bus services operating on city streets outisde the CBD 4 0 0 - 0 1 -2
Improve tehability of bus services operating on expresswayvW 4 0 0 4 Q 4 01 1
Improve reliability ot bus services operating on citv streets in the CBD 4 4 3 o 0 -2 0 0
Improve re iabi o bsservie-o ating on city streets outside theCBD 4 0-
I 1 1 G 0 -1 1 0
Reduce eneigy onupto and deedne2 2 2 -1 -1 -1 2
Promote new housing developments on suburban or undeveloped land -1 0 0 -1 1 2 -1 -1
Promote Smart G.owth" 1 0 0 1, -1 -2 1 1
31001 -1 l
3 11 1 0-1 21
Sum
Figure 5.9: RPDAT Output Page
The index scores, which are listed in Table 5.8, indicate that network pricing, area-wide
pricing, and cordon pricing are the top three alternatives (in that order) for this particular
hypothetical combination of regional characteristics and weights.
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Table 5.8: Index Scores for Hypothetical Example
Network Pricing 301
Area-Wide Pricing 222
Cordon Pricing 213
Facility Pricing 84
Distance-Based Pricing 74
Convert HOV to HOT Lane 67
Conventional Tolling 63
Add New HOT Lane 29
No Pricing 0
At the bottom of the output page, the user is able to see the values RPDAT calculated for the
performance matrix, which are listed in Table 5.9. Table 5.10 lists the weights that were
combined with the performance matrix to calculate the index scores.
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Table 5.9: Performance Matrix for Hypothetical Example
CRITERIA
0
0
0
0
~0
0
ci
0
I-
0
EL
Ht
0
0 H0
z
-o
-o as
~L)
0
H
0
0C~~)
U
Decrease average travel time for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) 4 2 2 4 2 3 3 4 0
Decrease average travel time for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Decrease average travel time on city streets within CBD 4 4 4 1 -1 -2 1 1 0
Decrease average travel time for peak-period arterial trips 4 2 0 -3 2 3 1 -3 0
Create a lower travel time option for autos on expressway(s) 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 0
Improve reliability for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) 4 0 0 4 2 3 0 1 0
Improve reliability for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Improve reliability on city streets within the CBD 4 4 4 0 0 -1 0 0 0
Improve reliability for peak-period trips on arterial(s) 4 0 0 -3 0 1 0 -3 0
Create a reliable travel time option for autos on expressway(s) 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 0
Reduce traffic fatality rate -1 0 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -2 0
Reduce number of traffic accidents 4 3 3 1 0 1 0 1 0
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on the expressway(s) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD 4 4 4 1 0 -2 1 1 0
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets outside the CBD 4 0 0 -2 0 2 1 -2 0
Improve reliability of bus services operating on expressway(s) 4 0 0 4 0 4 0 1 0
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD 4 4 3 0 0 -2 0 0 0
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets outside the CBD 4 0 0 -2 1 0 0 -2 0
Improve air quality 1 1 1 0 0 -1 1 0 0
Reduce greenhouse gas production 2 2 2 2 -1 -2 2 2 0
Reduce energy consumption and dependence 2 2 2 2 -1 -2 2 2 0
Gross revenue generation potential 4 2 2 2 1 1 3 2 0
Promote new housing developments on suburban or undeveloped land -1 0 0 -1 1 2 -1 -1 1
Promote "Smart Growth" 1 0 0 1 -1 -2 1 1 0
Promote automobile ownership -3 -1 -1 -1 0 1 -2 -1 0
Reduce vehicle ownership growth rate 3 1 1 1 0 -1 2 1 0
[mprove pedestrian-friendliness I 1 1 -1 0 -1 1 -1 0
Availability of free or low-cost alternatives -4 0 0 -4 4 4 -4 -4 4
[nternalize external costs (i.e., implement the "user-pays" principle) 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1
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Table 5.10: Weights for Hypothetical Example
CRITERIA WEIGHTS
Decrease average travel time for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) 4
Decrease average travel time for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) 0
Decrease average travel time on city streets within CBD 10
Decrease average travel time for peak-period arterial trips 0
Create a lower travel time option for autos on expressway(s) 6
Improve reliability for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) 2.5
Improve reliability for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) 0
Improve reliability on city streets within the CBD 15
Improve reliability for peak-period trips on arterial(s) 0
Create a reliable travel time option for autos on expressway(s) 7.5
Reduce traffic fatality rate 0
Reduce number of traffic accidents 5
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on the expressway(s) 4.5
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD 7.5
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets outside the CBD 1.5
Improve reliability of bus services operating on expressway(s) 4.5
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD 9
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets outside the CBD 3
Improve air quality 7
Reduce greenhouse gas production 3
Reduce energy consumption and dependence 0
Gross revenue generation potential 10
Promote new housing developments on suburban or undeveloped land 0
Promote "Smart Growth" 0
Promote automobile ownership 0
Reduce vehicle ownership growth rate 0
Improve pedestrian-friendliness 0
Availability of free or low-cost alternatives 0
Internalize external costs (i.e., implement the "user-pays" principle) 0
This hypothetical example has attempted to illustrate the RPDAT user interface and the
model steps. As this example demonstrates, the RPDAT process is quick, simple, and
informative, making it a useful tool in determining which road pricing strategies a decision
maker should pursue for a particular metropolitan area.
5.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented a new tool that can be used to evaluate road pricing alternatives
for a metropolitan area. The Road Pricing Decision Analysis Tool (RPDAT) uses multi-criteria
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analysis and is primarily intended to help decision makers narrow the range of road pricing
alternatives to a set that can be examined in greater detail.
One of the main advantages of this tool is that it explicitly documents the policy priorities
of the user. This method not only makes the decision-making process more transparent, but it
also helps the user understand the trade-offs he/she makes when choosing among alternatives.
Additionally, the RPDAT framework can act as a checklist, bringing to light alternatives or
criteria that the user may not have considered previously.
The following chapter, Chapter 6, provides background information on Kuala Lumpur.
This information is presented to establish the decision-making context for the application of
RPDAT to Kuala Lumpur, which is performed in Chapter 7.
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6 BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON KUALA
LUMPUR
6.1 Chapter Purpose and Organization
This chapter presents an overview of transportation-related topics for the Kuala Lumpur
Metropolitan Area (KLMA). Its purpose is to establish the decision-making context for the
metropolitan area, which will provide the background information necessary to apply the
RPDAT tool (discussed in Chapter 5) to the KLMA in Chapter 7.
The recent development history and socio-economics of Malaysia and the KLMA are
presented first. Then, factors contributing to travel demand and travel demand management
measures used in the metropolitan area are discussed. Next, the transportation infrastructure and
transportation characteristics of the region are discussed, followed by assessments of
transportation criteria (such as air quality and traffic accidents) and the national automobile and
fuel policies. Finally, the state of road pricing in Malaysia is presented.
6.2 Introduction
Malaysia is located in Southeast Asia between Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia.
Kuala Lumpur (KL) is both the federal district and the largest city in Malaysia with a population
of approximately 1.4 million people. The larger KLMA, shown in Figure 6.1, is home to 4.3
million residents, the center of economic activity in Malaysia, and an important economic force
in the region. The KLMA plays a large role in Vision 2020, which is Malaysia's plan for
becoming a developed nation by the year 2020.
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Figure 6.1: Kuala Lumpur Metropolitan Area9 5
6.3 Recent Development History
Economic growth has been one of the major goals of Vision 2020. The Malaysian
government recognizes the role of transportation in economic development and has constructed
significant transportation infrastructure since the 1960s. Despite expanding the highways from
95 Source: City Hall Kuala Lumpur, Draft Structure Plan Kuala Lumpur 2020, First ed. (Kuala Lumpur: City Hall
Kuala Lumpur, 2003).
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15,400 kilometers in 1965 to 64,300 kilometers in 1995 (World Bank, Malaysia--Road Asset
Management Project), the government has noted that infrastructure bottlenecks still exist.
The government made some efforts in the 1990s to address urban transportation
problems, which included the construction of privatized light-rail facilities within the Klang
Valley. Urban transportation infrastructure and policy in the KLMA was neglected in the past
(Mody), which contributed to the poor traffic conditions in the Kuala Lumpur city center that
still exist today. Malaysia has made a commitment to expanding the economy and the highway
system, and has stated that it will "not let growth be retarded by excessive congestion" (EPU,
The Way Forward (Vision 2020) 7). The worsening of congestion despite substantial capacity
expansion highlights the extent of travel demand growth that has occurred in Malaysia.
Road investments were credited as a development catalyst for Malaysia during the 1990s;
this policy continues to receive strong support. The country achieved and sustained an
impressive rate of economic growth before the 1997 Southeast Asia financial crisis. The crisis
created some unfavorable social impacts that threatened to reverse the pre-crisis gains. The
government approached the World Bank to help with a recovery plan. The bank concurred that
in order to continue medium- and long-term growth, Malaysia needed to expand highway
capacity along high priority corridors suffering from high volume to capacity ratios (World
Bank, Malaysia--Road Asset Management Project). Major road construction in new corridors
was deemed a lower priority.
6.4 Socio-Economic Characteristics
6.4.1 Population, Employment, and Urban Structure
The population of Kuala Lumpur increased from 1.26 million in 1991 to 1.42 million in
2000 and is projected to reach 2.20 million by 2020. The KLMA contained 3.37 million
residents in 1991 and more than 4.21 million in 2000. The number of KLMA inhabitants is
projected to be just over seven million by 2020 (City Hall Kuala Lumpur).
Economic activities are concentrated in the Kuala Lumpur city center and follow major
arterials radiating from the central business district (CBD). The total number of jobs in KL is
estimated at 834,400 (City Hall Kuala Lumpur). Currently, a relatively high percentage are
located in the CBD (24 percent) and inner areas of the city (53 percent) (Gakenheimer, Travel
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Demand Drivers: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia). Kuala Lumpur has a relatively high
employment/population ratio with 59 jobs for every 100 residents, compared to 41 jobs for every
100 residents in the greater KLMA (City Hall Kuala Lumpur). Gakenheimer noted the
employment/jobs ratio was 0.69 for the CBD.
The tertiary sector represents 83 percent of employment in KL, compared to 71 percent
of employment in the KLMA. It is estimated that approximately 58 percent of KLMA service
sector jobs are located in Kuala Lumpur. Employment in the manufacturing sector is declining
(16.8 percent of total employment in 1980 and 10.5 percent in 2000), which reduces the range of
employment opportunities (EPU, The Eighth Malaysia Plan).
Urban decentralization is occurring as residential and commercial activities are moving
into the suburbs. A shortage of affordable housing in Kuala Lumpur contributed to the net
emigration of approximately 5,000 per year between 1991 and 1997. The city center population
decreased from 156,980 in 1980 to 128,720 in 2000; during the same time period, the share of
KL's population living within the city center dropped from 17.1 to 9.0 percent (City Hall Kuala
Lumpur). Large-scale residential developments are also occurring in the suburbs, as one might
expect with rising incomes.
One indicator of employment decentralization is the relocation of federal government
administrative offices to Putrajaya, which is one of the two major "smart cities" in the
Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) area of the KLMA. Car-oriented shopping malls and
business parks are developing along major roads in the suburbs, without access to the urban rail
network (Gakenheimer, Travel Demand Drivers: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia).
6.4.2 Income Characteristics and Equity
Vehicle ownership is used by the Malaysian government as an indirect measure of
income. The registered number of vehicles per 1,000 population in Malaysia grew from 339.2 in
1995 to 421.9 in 2000. In Kuala Lumpur, the number of registered cars and motorcycles per
individual jumped 60 percent in just five years; there were 616.3 vehicles per 1,000 population in
1995 and 985.7 in 2000 (EPU, The Eighth Malaysia Plan).
Twenty-five percent of Kuala Lumpur households earn more than RM5,000 per month,
compared to 9.8 percent for all of Malaysia. Approximately 8.1 percent of KL households earn
less than RM1,000 per month, which places them in a category that is unable to afford a low-cost
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house. In 1999, the incidence of poverty in KL was approximately 7.5 percent (City Hall Kuala
Lumpur).
Equity is a concern in Malaysia. The following statement describes the typical feeling of
citizens voiced in the media regarding the equity of KLMA transportation policies:
"[T]he rich and opulent residents of the elite addresses in the city
like Taman Tun, Damansara Heights and Kenny Hills do not have
to pay tolls like their poor cousins in Kepong and Cheras"
(Malaysiakini).
6.5 Travel Demand
While there is a range of estimates for the percentage of households that own vehicles, all
studies suggest the KLMA is an auto-dependent region and appears to be further increasing its
reliance on private vehicles. The Road Transport Department identified the ratio of registered
cars and motorcycles in Kuala Lumpur as 985.7 per 1,000 population in the year 2000. A home
interview survey performed by JICA in 1998 estimated there were 211 automobiles and 164
motorcycles per 1000 population (cited in City Hall Kuala Lumpur). According to Gakenheimer
(Travel Demand Drivers: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia), the motorization rate was 300 autos and 173
motorcycles per 1000 people in 2000, nearly double the 170 autos per 1000 just ten years prior
and five times higher than the 1980 automobile ownership level. Using an average household
size of 4.2 in the KLMA (Department of Statistics) and Gakenheimer's estimate, that averages
out to 1.3 autos/household in addition to 0.7 motorcycles/household.
The Malaysia Highway Planning Unit (HPU, Quality of Roads in Malaysia: Road Safety)
states that between 1970 and 1997, the vehicle population grew from 669,294 to 8,550,469-a
factor of 13. This equates to an average growth rate of about 47 percent per year. Travel
demand growth has been promoted by several factors, including:
" Population growth in the city of Kuala Lumpur itself is expected to
be about two percent per year until 2015 while some of the outer
areas are expected to grow eight percent per year (Gakenheimer,
Travel Demand Drivers: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia).
" Vision 2020 targets real GDP growth of seven percent per year
between 1990 and 2020
" Average incomes are rapidly rising and female participation in the
workforce is increasing. Average wages for Malaysian males and
females increased 40 percent and 63 percent, respectfully, between
1992 and 1997 (United Nations).
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* The Malaysian working age group (between 15 to 64 years)
increased from 59.6 percent in 1991 to 62.8 percent in 2000,
creating more demand during peak hours as drivers commute to
work (Department of Statistics).
* Malaysia's urbanization increased from 50.7 percent in 1991 to 62
percent in 2000. Kuala Lumpur is 100 percent urbanized and
Selangor has reached 87.6 percent urbanization (Department of
Statistics). According to Gakenheimer (Travel Demand Drivers:
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia), the KLMA grew almost three times as
much as KL itself between 1991 and 2000. The state of Selangor,
which surrounds Kuala Lumpur, had the highest growth rate of 6.1
percent per year between 1991 and 2000 (Department of
Statistics).
From 1985 to 1997, person automobile trips increased at an average annual growth rate
of 4.2 percent in the Klang Valley while the population of Kuala Lumpur only grew at 1.1
percent per annum (City Hall Kuala Lumpur). Gakenheimer (Travel Demand Drivers: Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia) estimates the number of person auto trips will double 1997 levels by 2020
based on current trends.
It should also be noted that while the city center accounts for only 3.3 percent of the total
population of the Klang Valley Region, approximately 19 percent of the 8.3 million trips per day
are trips generated within the city center (City Hall Kuala Lumpur).
6.5.1 Travel Demand Management
Malaysia has recognized the need for travel demand management in the Eighth Malaysia
Plan as seen in the following statement:
"The increasing number of motor vehicles in all major urban
centres will require the implementation of public transport priority
measures, car parking control, local area traffic improvement
schemes, restriction on heavy vehicles, greater pedestrianization
and the application of ITS" (EPU, The Way Forward (Vision
2020) 289),
Travel demand management has been considered for Kuala Lumpur and is included in the
Transport Master Plan for Putrajaya (REAM); however, few specific pricing measures are
mentioned other than efforts to regulate car parking.
A carpooling program was attempted by Kuala Lumpur City Hall in the early 1990s but
was deemed unsuccessful (Rahman). A survey of KL residents cited "different before/after work
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schedules" as the number one reason why they felt carpooling would not be effective (Rahman
12). Interestingly, 95 percent of respondents from the same survey agreed traffic congestion in
Kuala Lumpur was bad.
Additional efforts were made during the Seventh Malaysia Plan period to encourage
public transportation and address urban congestion using traffic demand management. It appears
these measures, although having the right idea, had mild effects (if any), and there remains much
room for improvement. A 1997 survey noted travel speeds on most of the major radial roads in
Kuala Lumpur were reduced to ten kilometers per hour or less during the morning peak hours
due to high traffic volumes (EPU, The Eighth Malaysia Plan).
A 1999 study recommended numerous policies, strategies, and measures to alleviate
96
urban congestion and enhance air quality in the KLMA. Some measures implemented at that
time included on-street parking restrictions, differential parking charges, one-way streets,
pedestrianization, road system improvements, bus lanes, contra-flow, and restrictions on heavy
vehicles entering the city center during peak hours (EPU, The Eighth Malaysia Plan). The level
of enforcement for these measures is unknown.
Freight vehicles, often referred to as lorries, are not permitted to travel within Kuala
Lumpur during the morning and evening peak hours (City Hall Kuala Lumpur). Most lorry trips
either originate or terminate in the industrial areas peripheral to the city center, with
concentrations in the south and passing through the region on a north-south axis. Instances of
heavy goods and commercial vehicles parking in residential areas, which is illegal, are blamed
on a lack of enforcement and proper parking facilities (City Hall Kuala Lumpur).
6.6 Transportation Infrastructure and Characteristics
Multiple urban expressways-controlled by different authorities-transport very high
volumes of traffic within a narrow corridor and lack coordination or integration with the adjacent
traffic networks. Urban road networks seem to lack a hierarchal system (e.g., mixture of local
distributors and major arterials) and can have many demands for a single road (e.g., pedestrians,
local traffic, through traffic, freight vehicles, motorcycles, and automobiles) (REAM).
96 The Study on Integrated Urban Transportation Strategies for Environmental Improvement.
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There are no HOV lanes in the KLMA, although there are some bus priority lanes. The
most-likely scenarios for creating HOT lanes include: (i) converting a bus priority lane, (ii) using
existing general-purpose lanes for this purpose, (iii) adapting break-down lanes, or (iv)
constructing additional lanes. It might make more sense to have reversible HOT lanes in
developing countries because of the high peak-directional factors associated with many of their
city centers, although this is a characteristic particular to individual corridors and would need to
be considered on a site-by-site basis.
A Highway Network Development Plan (HNDP) for all of Malaysia was adopted in
1993. The HNDP highlighted three corridors that are "heavily trafficked," (i) the north-south
trunk road on the west coast, (ii) the north-south trunk roads on the east coast, and (iii) the east-
west link from Kuala Lumpur to Kuantan, (REAM). The HNDP also cited heavily concentrated
traffic in Penang, the Klang Valley, and Joror Baru. These travel pattern forecasts are expected
to remain essentially unchanged until 2010.
6.6.1 Public Transportation
The Malaysian government provides few direct references to the role of public
transportation in the Eighth Malaysia Plan. A general theme in KL is that mass transportation
lacks coordination between modes and transit providers. The poor integration of transit services
contributes to its loss of mode share in recent years.
Bus utilization is low, primarily as a consequence of route duplication, unreliable service,
low frequency, overcrowding during peak hours, and poor conditions of the vehicles (City Hall
Kuala Lumpur). There are four major private bus companies in KL, all of whom have large
amounts of debt and difficulty reaching profitability. Bus companies are not efficient feeder
services for the LRT or monorail, limiting the number of suburban commuters who can
realistically use public transportation to reach central Kuala Lumpur. Most bus routes are radial
and terminate at the city center.
Population and commercial growth on the urban fringe is further increasing private
automobile dependency, which is already quite high for a large Asian city. As noted previously,
private transport dominates the KLMA with an 80 percent mode share of all motorized trips,
leaving only 20 percent using mass transportation (Gakenheimer, Travel Demand Drivers: Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia).
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The Malaysian government has recognized that a good public transportation system is
necessary to reduce or discourage auto dependency. The Eighth Malaysia Plan states that
"[e]mphasis will be on the need to have a more efficient, safe, and comfortable public
transportation system to enable a modal shift from private car usage" (The Eighth Malaysia Plan
288). However, significant improvements in the public transportation system appear necessary if
a city center congestion pricing scheme were to be implemented, as public transportation does
not seem to be a realistic option for many households at this time.
6.6.2 Motorcycle Use
Motorcycles account for approximately 23 percent of all trips in Kuala Lumpur. They
are principally used by the young and lower income groups. While many choose two-wheelers
because they are fast and economical, they are quite dangerous; about 52 percent of fatal and
serious accidents in KL involve motorcycles (City Hall Kuala Lumpur).
Motorcycles contribute significantly to noise and air pollution in KL. Noise emissions
from motorcycles in the city center exceeds the permissible noise limits (Malaysia
Environmental Quality Report, cited in City Hall Kuala Lumpur).
6.6.3 Parking
Parking fees are typically subsidized (directly or indirectly) in Kuala Lumpur. Most
companies provide fringe benefits including free or subsidized transportation (MIDA). During
the early 1990s, one carpooling program survey noted that 60 percent of respondents were
provided with a parking space for their personal use (Rahman). Correspondingly, 64 percent of
respondents felt that parking was not a problem. As of December 1999, on-street parking (legal
and illegal) was a common contributor to urban congestion in Malaysia (REAM).
There are approximately 65,200 car parking spaces in the City center of Kuala Lumpur
(City Hall Kuala Lumpur). Utilization of parking spaces is 71 percent for office buildings, 49
percent for retail spaces, and 47 percent for mixed-use locations. CHKL controls the number of
parking spaces for new developments, but does not regulate parking charges. Parking costs in
central Kuala Lumpur currently range from MYR 2 to MYR 5 per hour (USD 0.50 - 1.30)
(Gakenheimer, Travel Demand Drivers: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia). The Malaysian government
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has already introduced differential parking charges (EPU, The Eighth Malaysia Plan).97 It has
also indicated it will take measures to enhance effective car parking control by limiting the
duration of parking hours, reducing parking requirements for new projects, and imposing higher
parking charges in specific areas (EPU, The Eighth Malaysia Plan). The effects of the limited
parking management recently begun in the KLMA have yet to be quantified.
6.7 Air Quality and Noise Levels
According to the Air Pollution Index (API) for Kuala Lumpur, air quality is "good" 38
percent of the time, "moderate" 60 percent of the time, and "unhealthy" two percent of the time.
The primary reason cited for unhealthy air quality in KL was "high levels of ozone," which is
formed when nitrogen oxides (NOx) react with volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in sunlight
and heat. According to one study, vehicular emissions account for more than 70 percent of the
total emissions in the Malaysia urban areas during the non-haze periods (Awang et al.).
Noise levels at schools and hospitals in Kuala Lumpur were found to be between 57.8 dB
and 71.8 dB during the daytime, which exceeds the limit of 55 dB recommended by the World
Health Organization (City Hall Kuala Lumpur).
6.8 Transportation Safety and Accidents
As illustrated in Figure 6.2, the number of vehicle fatalities has steadily increased with
the vehicle growth rate in Malaysia. The fatality rate per 10,000 vehicles during the 1980s and
1990s is comparable to some Southeast Asian countries (Figure 6.3), but road safety is a problem
frequently cited in the media. The national target is 2.0 deaths per 10,000 vehicles by 2020. The
number of accidents, shown in Table 6.1, have also increased in recent years (HPU, Road
Safety).
9 Differential parking charges may have a payment structure that favors short- over long-term use or HOVs over
SOVs.
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Figure 6.3: Malaysia Motor Vehicle Fatality Rate in 1980s and 1990s99
98 Source: HPU, Road Safety, 2004, Ministry of Works Malaysia, Highway Planning Unit (HPU), Available:
http://www.kkr.gov.my/bpj/safety/safetyl.htm.
99 Ibid.
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Table 6.1: Malaysia Traffic Accident and Fatality Rateso
1987 76,882 3,320 5,548 12,931 21,467
1988 73,250 3,335 5,548 13,655 22,538
1989 75,626 3,773 7,249 19,015 30,037
1990 87,999 4,048 8,076 17,690 29,814
1991 96,513 4,331 8,524 17,252 30,107
1992 118,554 4,557 10,634 21,071 36,626
1993 135,995 4,666 11,930 25,090 41,686
1994 148,801 5,159 13,387 29,957 48,503
1995 162,491 5,712 15,313 31,127 52,152
1996 189,109 6,304 14,218 32,953 53,475
1997 195,984 6,302 12,890 32,858 51,495
1998 210,964 5,740 12,036 37,917 55,697
1999 223,116 5,794 10,383 36,886 53,060
2000 250,429 6,029 9,790 34,375 50,194
2001 265,175 5,230 6,942 30,684 42,856
2002 279,641 5,886 8,414 35,149 49,449
Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5 show the allocation of road fatalities in Malaysia according to
road type and user group, respectively. Two-wheelers account for a disproportional share of all
fatal accidents in Malaysia. These vehicles often weave between slow-moving or stationary
vehicles waiting in queues, which likely exacerbates the number of fatalities incurred by this
group.
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6.9 Law Enforcement
The average number of people for every police officer in Malaysia is 1:287, which is
close to Interpol's recommendation of 1:250. In Kuala Lumpur, however, the ratio is 1:649-far
below the recommended level (New Straights Times). The number of law enforcement officers
is one indication of a city's ability to perform traffic enforcement, which can affect congestion
levels and influence the viability of more sophisticated travel restraint measures such as area-
wide pricing. Traffic enforcement is a common challenge for developing countries.
"0 Source: HPU, Quality of Roads in Malaysia: Road Safety (Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Works Malaysia, Highway
Planning Unit (HPU), 1998).
102 Ibid.
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6.10 The National Automobile
Malaysia's national automobile plays a very large role in shaping the country's
manufacturing and transportation policies. The national automobile is an integral part of
Malaysia's economic strategies, making it necessary to understand the extent of its influence and
importance.
Proton Holdings Bhd (Proton)-the national car company-is one of the largest
government-linked companies in Malaysia. In efforts to develop a national car industry, the
government has sheltered Proton with protectionist auto policies to give the national industry
time to develop. Proton's market is primarily domestic-representing 45 percent of sales in
Malaysia in the first half of 2003-but the company has also been trying to develop an export
market with limited success. With recent trade liberalization in Malaysia, the future of Proton
and the government's role in that future are important questions.
It is widely believed the government chose to use Proton as an economic catalyst for
reaching developed nation status. The idea was that a national car industry would require a large
network of supporting industries, such as engineering, research and development, distribution,
and manufacturing, which would support the development of a knowledge-based economy and
eventually result in increased trade exports. The project has succeeded in developing a network
of supporting industries in Malaysia with 24 franchise holders, 350 component makers, and 250
vendor companies. Proton has invested nearly RM8 billion in the domestic market and it
employs 9,500 people directly; it is estimated that almost 100,000 jobs have been created as a
result of the company. Proton has clearly become a central part of the Malaysian economy and
the government has considerable interest in seeing it flourish.
It is questionable whether the supporting industries can survive if Proton ceases to remain
in existence or is not able to compete in the free market. China and Thailand have been able to
develop successful vendor industries without national cars; however, it is not known if Malaysia
can do the same without a national car policy. The international market for Proton has not
developed to the extent many had hoped and the quality of Proton cars remains an issue. Many
Malaysians own Proton cars, but the domestic market share has been decreasing in recent years.
There are several issues and challenges that need to be resolved if Proton is to thrive in
the coming years. First, there are believed to be too many vendors-over 400 in the country-
for each to bring in sufficient revenue. The vendor firms would be stronger financially if their
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numbers were reduced. Second, Proton needs to improve the quality of its cars and vehicle
service. Proton cars are perceived to handle poorly and do not meet international standards for
quality and performance. The company's after-sales service is regarded as expensive and not as
good as many neighborhood mechanics, so customers often lose loyalty after the warranty period
of the car. Industry players have informally referenced an internal survey performed by Proton
finding that less than 25 percent of its existing customers would consider buying another Proton
car. Third, the company should release cars by the promised date to improve its image-the
Gen.2 car that was recently released did not meet its delivery date, which did not help the
company's image. Fourth, Proton needs to increase its export market. Proton sold about 15,000
cars in the UK in 1988 but sold less than 2,000 in the UK in 2003. The company is also
considering exporting cars and technology to the Middle East and China, but it will need to be
successful with increasing revenue from foreign sales for its future to be sustained-especially if
domestic sales decrease. Fifth, Proton needs to find a way to abolish fake Proton parts in order
to increase after-sales revenue; the company needs to offer quality parts at affordable prices.
Sixth, Proton should reduce its costs so it can pass the savings on to consumers. Proton lost its
discount on the excise duty on January 1, 2005 because of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, so
the domestic cost of a new Proton has increased.
Many believe Proton needs to get a strategic foreign partner if it is going to survive in the
long term. The thought is that forming an alliance will maximize Proton's potential and help
ensure its survival. Nonetheless, it is apparent the national car industry has many issues that
need to be resolved if it is to be able to continue to support the economic development of
Malaysia.10 3 Due to its importance to the overall economy, the national automobile is likely to
be a factor shaping Malaysian transportation policies in the near future.
6.11 Fuel Policies
The Malaysian government fixes the price of fuel. Unleaded petrol costs range between
MYR 1.10 to 1.25 (USD 0.29 - 0.33) per liter. Diesel and LPG cost 0.70 and MYR 1.28 per
liter, respectfully (Gakenheimer, Travel Demand Drivers: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia).
103 Primary source for section: L. Barrock, Special Report: Proton under a Microscope, 2004, The Edge Daily,
Available: http://www.theedgedaily.com/cms/content.jsp?id=com.tms.cms.article.Article_236dl89c-cb73cO3a-
23d27800-d25913 10, January 2005.
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The ratio of Malaysia's gasoline price to the world average was 0.46 for 1998-2000
MRYA (World Bank, 2002 Environmental Sustainability Index). The price of petrol is
significantly less expensive in Malaysia than in its neighboring countries, Singapore and
Thailand. Premium gasoline was about 40 percent more expensive in Thailand during this data
period, while the price of petrol in Singapore is typically between 2-2.5 times more than the price
in Malaysia.
The price of 'fuel and light' fell dramatically in relation to other goods during the 1990s
in Malaysia. The consumer price index (CPI) for all items was 139.5 in 1999 (where 1990 =
100) while the CPI for fuel and light was only 102.8 in 1999.1 Comparing these trends with the
export price of crude oil in Malaysia is quite interesting. The export price quotation of crude
petroleum rose from 405 ringgit per metric ton in 1992 to 525 ringgit per metric ton in 1999-a
30 percent increase (United Nations).' 0 5 The CPI illustrates the need for real fuel prices to
realign with previous levels, as fuel has become less expensive relative to other goods during this
timeframe.
Fuel prices in Malaysia have decreased noticeably in absolute terms as well as relative to
the "normal sale price," which is a hypothetical price that gas should be sold to neither raise
revenue nor be subsidized by the national government (Metschies). The price of diesel fell from
26 to 19 U.S. cents per liter while the "normal sale price" climbed from 25 to 31 U.S. cents per
liter. The price of super gasoline fell from 42 to 35 U.S. cents per liter while the "normal sale
price" increased from 26 to 32 U.S. cents per liter. Metschies estimated Malaysia spends USD
390 million (2 percent of its tax revenues) on subsidizing transportation fuel and it could increase
total government tax revenue by USD 868 million (5 percent of tax revenues) if the price of fuel
increased 10 U.S. cents per liter on gasoline and diesel.
There are numerous potential reasons why the Malaysian government regulates fuel
prices. The 1997 Southeast Asia financial crisis motivated the government to isolate itself from
volatility and uncertainty as much as possible (Jaafar and Mohamad). Regulating commodity
prices-such as fuel-reduces volatility and increased predictability. Malaysia has certain
controlled items that have a price ceiling-fuel is one of them. One Malaysian paper justifies the
104 1999 was the most recent consumer price index information available for 'fuel and light' in the reference.
05 It is important to note that a major price increase occurred in the year 2000. The export price in 2000 was 854
ringgit per metric ton, which would create a +211 percent increase compared to the 1992 export price.
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low fuel prices by saying Malaysia is trying to emulate the United States and as long as
PETRONAS (the national petroleum corporation) and other energy companies remain profitable,
this policy is appropriate. The paper also states, "Many developing countries use energy
subsidies to encourage energy consumption to create economies of scale to reduce the unit cost"
(Jaafar and Mohamad 2).
Low and predictable fuel costs encourage auto ownership and use, which may contribute
to the projected increase of 8.7 percent per year for transportation energy demand (EPU, The
Eighth Malaysia Plan). The Malaysian automobile industry has received quite favorable support
from the government, with efforts led by the former Prime Minister (PM) Mahathir Mohamad.
Mohamad supported steel plants, factories, and petrochemical industries in order to facilitate
growth of the domestic automobile industry (Gakenheimer, ITS Deployment in Kuala Lumpur).
The government offers financial incentives to use natural gas as an alternative motor
vehicle fuel. Exemptions on import duties and sales tax keep the price of natural gas vehicles
lower than diesel vehicles. This policy discourages ownership of diesel vehicles, but
inexpensive diesel prices are an opposing force and encourage excessive travel with vehicles
already owned. Road tax reductions are also offered in the amount of 50 percent for mono-gas
vehicles and 25 percent for bi-fuel or dual-fuel vehicles (Gakenheimer, Travel Demand Drivers:
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia).
Box 7: The Malaysian Deficit 06
The Malaysian budget deficit was recently about RM 20.40 billion, or 4.5
percent of GDP in 2004. Petroleum subsidies were RM6.80 billion in 2003,
RM4.30 billion in 2002, RM7.40 billion in 2001, and RM8.4 billion in 2000.
Year 2004 subsidies were expected to be RM9 billion in 2004 due to the sharp
rise in oil prices. Economists are predicting petroleum prices may continue to
increase.
The Malaysian fuel-tax policies appear to be sub-optimal from transportation demand
management and economic efficiency perspectives. Government control of the national car
industry and PETRONAS may be primary or contributing factors relating to the controlled low
fuel prices. The Malaysian government could clearly raise significant revenues if they taxed
106 Source: J. Chin, Budget Likely to Be Prudent, 2004, The Edge Daily [Online], Available:
http://www.theedgedaily.com/cms/content.jsp?id=com.tms.cms.article.Articleb45773ef-cb73cO3a-940b8400-
5dc le6a6, September 2004.
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petroleum at a reasonable level but it has chosen to keep fuel prices low. This may be to
improve the mobility of low-income rural citizens, but future research into the motivation for this
policy would be of value.
6.1].] Road Taxes and Other Indirect Use Costs
The Malaysian government taxes the ownership of automobiles and motorcycles based
on engine size (Gakenheimer, Travel Demand Drivers: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia). Import duties
were recently redesigned, but they have ranged from 42-80 percent for imported car components
and were responsible for up to 300 percent of the purchase price of complete cars before the
policy revisions (The Star Online). With the previous tax structure, imported automobiles were
assessed higher excise taxes in attempt to promote the national car, but the tax differential was
eliminated in January 2005 because of stipulations in the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement.
Purchasers of Proton and Perodua-the national cars-received a 50 percent discount on vehicle
excise taxes under the old structure. The mandatory reduction of certain import duties has led
the government to increase excise taxes.
Gakenheimer (Travel Demand Drivers: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia) states that annual
insurance fees range from USD 260 to 2,000. The insurance pricing and legal framework in
Malaysia is unknown.
There are no vehicle quotas in Malaysia or the KLMA. It is unlikely vehicle quotas
would be adopted in Malaysia, as it would be a direct contradiction with the policy of promoting
the national automobile (discussed in Section 6.10).
6.12 Road Pricing in Malaysia
6.12.1 Overarching Pricing Policies and History
The Malaysian government does not appear to be an advocate of the user-pays principle
or marginal-cost pricing for the transport sector. The Eighth Malaysia Plan states, "the
Government will provide support to projects which have social implications and require large
107 For more information on the former taxation structure, see: J. Ward, "Toll Road Public-Private Partnerships in
Malaysia: Using the Clios Process for Policy Improvements," Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005.
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capital expenditure, in order to reduce tariffs and other charges to consumers" (EPU, The Eighth
Malaysia Plan 183). Further, "the 'user-pay[s] principle,' though reflecting the economic costs
of providing such services, will not be the guiding principle in the determination of tariff rates
and charges. The government will continue to control tariff setting and reviews so as to ensure
that the public will enjoy these services at affordable rates" (The Eighth Malaysia Plan 199).
The true government intent with this statement is unknown, but one might infer that the
government is trying to lower user costs in order to increase consumption and/or economic
growth. Unsurprisingly, economic growth receives considerably more discussion in the Eighth
Malaysia Plan than congestion abatement.
The World Bank strongly supported congestion pricing in its 1976 Urban Transport
Policy paper after Singapore's successful Area Licensing Scheme was implemented. The World
Bank suggested congestion pricing for Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok but it was not put into
operation in either city. The implementation in Kuala Lumpur was deferred because the
government felt improvements to public transportation and the development of the inner ring
road were necessary before a scheme could be implemented (Armstrong-Wright). The scheme
was considered again in the mid-1980s as part of the Master Plan Transportation Study for the
city. A ring road has since been constructed in Kuala Lumpur and mass transportation services
have been expanded, although the mode share of transit has decreased.
In Malaysia, it may be desirable to use urban toll revenue surpluses to cross-subsidize
rural road construction and improve rural accessibility; a large portion of Malaysian poverty
resides in rural areas. Eradicating poverty is one of the goals stated in Vision 2020 and
additional support for rural infrastructure could have great social and economic benefits for low-
income rural citizens. The government is likely to be responsible for financing rural roads
because private companies serve high volume corridors where they can collect enough toll
revenues to produce a profit. If the Malaysian government chooses not to reinvest revenues in
transportation, socially progressive programs such as education and health care could benefit
from the road pricing revenues, which would promote many of the objectives outlined in Vision
2020 and the Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan.
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6.12.2 Road Pricing and Tolling
This section provides some insight as to the history, role, characteristics, and effects of
road pricing in Malaysia. To date, tolling is the only form of road pricing known in Malaysia.
The institutional agreements between the government and the toll concessionaires are a good
indicator of the Malaysian road user charging policy as well as the ability of the Malaysian
government to introduce congestion pricing.
Toll roads are most commonly inter-urban expressways in Malaysia. They are usually
high capacity roads, but can be congested at toll plazas and some interchanges (REAM). There
are approximately 1,230 km of expressways operated under concession in Malaysia as stated by
the Malaysia Highway Authority, the principal regulator of the toll road transportation system
(PLUS). There are about fifteen toll road concessionaires in Kuala Lumpur, but the focus of this
section will be on PLUS Expressways. PLUS Expressways represents approximately 69 percent
of all expressway kilometers operated under concession in Malaysia. It is a private corporation,
but importantly, Khazanah-the investment holding arm of the government-had an aggregate
direct and indirect interest of 86.4 percent in PLUS Expressways as of May 31, 2002 (PLUS).
PLUS Expressways and the government have been criticized for a lack of transparency in
the awarded concessions. Two companies submitted bids that appeared more competitive than
the one submitted by PLUS, but neither were awarded the contract. According to Gomez (cited
in Mody), PLUS was set up by United Engineers Berhad, a company with connections to the
ruling party.
PLUS maintains and operates three interconnected expressways: (i) the 797 km North-
South Expressway, (ii) the 35 km New Klang Valley Expressway, and (iii) a 16 km section of
the Federal Highway Route 2. The North-South Expressway serves all major cities along
Malaysia's west coast and runs from the Singapore border in the south to near the Thailand
border in the north. In 2001, the North-South Expressway accounted for 82 percent of PLUS
Expressways total toll receipts while the New Klang Valley Expressway and Federal Highway
Route 2 produced the remaining 18 percent of total toll receipts (PLUS).
In their prospectus, PLUS Expressways states the following about their facilities:
108 United Engineers Berhad is owned by Danasaham, which is owned by Khazanah, which is owned by the Ministry
of Finance Inc.
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As at 31 May 2002, PLUS operated approximately 128 km of dual
three-lane expressways, representing 15.1% of the [PLUS]
Expressways, and approximately 720 km of dual two-lane
expressways, representing 84.9% of the [PLUS] Expressways as
well as 67 toll plazas, 78 interchanges, and 584 toll lanes.
PLUS declares annual traffic volume on the Expressways increased 4.1 percent per year on
average between 1995 and 2001. An average of 840,790 vehicles used the Expressways each
day in the year 2001. Class I vehicles (autos) are a significant portion of traffic, representing
88.1 percent of all traffic on the PLUS Expressways in 2001 (PLUS).
PLUS uses open and closed systems to collect tolls. In the toll collection context,
motorists pay a fixed toll when they reach a toll plaza-regardless of distance traveled-in open
systems. These systems are used in urban or semi-urban sections of the Expressways that have
numerous intersections, including Federal Highway Route 2 and approximately six percent of the
North-South Expressway. In closed systems, motorists collect a ticket when entering the facility
and pay a toll upon exit based on the distance traveled. PLUS believes this system is best-suited
for roads linking urban centers and uses it on the New Klang Valley Expressway and on 94
percent of the North-South Expressway (PLUS).
PLUS uses the "Touch 'n Go" and "SmartTag" systems for electronic toll collection.
The Touch 'n Go is a contact-less smartcard that motorists can use to pay a toll. The
complimentary SmartTag uses an on-board unit (costing RM 220) installed in the vehicle to
allow drivers to pay the toll without stopping. Touch 'n Go and SmartTag became the Malaysian
standard as of January 1, 2003. Touch 'n Go can now reportedly be used for bus and train fares
(such as Putra LRT), on competing expressways, and in some car parks (PLUS). There were
over 1.1 million Touch 'n Go smartcards in circulation as of April 2001 (Gakenheimer, ITS
Deployment in Kuala Lumpur).
There are five vehicle toll classes, each with a different toll rate. The government sets the
maximum toll rate PLUS can charge for Class 1 vehicles. Each vehicle class is then charged an
amount relative to the Class 1 vehicle charge, which is determined by a toll rate multiplier. The
toll rate multiplier for each vehicle class is listed in Table 6.2.
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Table 6.2: PLUS Expressways Toll Rate Multipliers
Vehicle Toll Rate
Class Description Multiplier
I Vehicle with two axles and three or four wheels (excluding taxis) 1.00
2 Vehicle with two axles and six wheels (excluding buses) 1.50
3 Vehicles with three or more axles 2.00
4 Taxis 0.50
5 Buses 0.75
The government and the expressway operator negotiated allowable toll rates in a
concession agreement. The government guaranteed to meet any shortfalls in forecasted traffic
volume and any losses from adverse movements in the exchange rate or external loan interest
rates for the first seventeen years (Hensley and Edward, cited in Mody). If the government ever
imposes toll rates below those agreed upon in the concession agreement, the government is liable
to compensate PLUS Expressways for the resulting shortfall (PLUS). This occurred during
concession years 1996 to 2000 and the government gave the toll concessionaire cash
compensation. PLUS stated the reason for lower imposed toll rates was the "result of economic
pressure and negative consumer perceptions of high toll rates on the Expressways" (PLUS 103).
A supplemental concession agreement was executed on July 8, 1999, which imposed a
revised toll rate lower than agreed upon in the original concession agreement. The government
provided PLUS Expressways with an interest-free additional support loan for the years ended
1999 through 2001 and extended the concession period twelve years to May 31, 2030 as
compensation. PLUS Expressways a second cash compensation of RM 280 million during this
period (Kulasegaran).
The government again announced lower-than-agreed-upon toll rates for the remainder of
the concession period in December 2001 and made new non-cash compensation agreements. A
protest resulted when a ten percent increase in toll rates for the North-South Expressway was
presented, even though the concessionaire was due a larger increase. New toll rates allowed by
the government (gazetted toll rates) and the previously agreed toll rates are listed in Table 6.3 for
Class 1 vehicles. A new and complicated set of concession agreements were reached in May
2002 to determine the formula for government compensation.
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Table 6.3: Current and Previously Agreed Toll Rates for PLUS Expressways 09
Agreed Toll Gazetted Toll Agreed Toll Gazetted Toll
Year Rates (sen/km) Rates (sen/km) Year Rates (sen/km) Rates (sen/km)
2001 11.24 2016 18.11
2002 2017
2003 12.36 2018 19.92
2004 2019
2005 2020
2006 13.6 2021 21.91
2007 2022
2008 11.91 2023 30.02
2009 14.96 2024 24.1
2010 2025
2011 2026
2012 16.46 2027 26.51
2013 2028
2014 18.11 2029 29.16
2015 2030
Toll rates in Malaysia might be considered inexpensive when one recognizes they are
operated by for-profit companies. It currently costs Class I vehicles RM 4.20 (USD 1.11) to
travel the entire length of the 35 km New Klang Valley Expressway, which begins at Bukit Raja
and ends in Jalan Duta (Kuala Lumpur). Class 1 vehicles can also traverse the entire 797 km
North-South Expressway for RM 97.80 (USD 25.74).
The government abolished toll charges for the Johor Baru-Senai stretch of the North-
South Expressway effective March 1, 2004. According to Works Minister Datuk Seri S. Samy
Vellu, the decision was made after numerous appeals from political parties, ministers,
associations, and the Senai MP Datuk Lim Si Cheng (Lecthumanan). He also said, "The Cabinet
also took note that there was no alternative road for the users other than [the] present highway."
The government compensated the concession holder RM 331.68 million to eliminate the toll.
The World Bank (Malaysia--Road Asset Management Project) also cites public outcry
against new toll roads and toll rate hikes in Malaysia. Two possible explanations are high
concessionaire profits and public fears of corruption. The government essentially guaranteed
high profits for PLUS in the original concessions, regardless of the toll rates. The public may
believe the concessionaires are taking advantage of a near-monopolistic position based on the
109 Source: PLUS, Plus Expressways Company Prospectus (Company No. 570244-T, 2002).
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lack of transparency in the concession awarding process because the terms are not always
disclosed (Kulasegaran)." 0 However, what the government has done by shifting the burden to
taxpayers (with compensation to PLUS) in order to decrease tolls is less economically efficient
than charging users the marginal cost or even something close to that. Lowering the cost of
travel induces traffic demand and VMT. This may spur short-term economic growth with
increased mobility, but creates sustainability and capacity issues for the transportation network-
especially in the long term.
Box 8: Malaysian Toll-Road Subsidies
The Malaysian government paid out RMI.04 billion in compensation to
highway concessionaires as part of efforts to increase toll rates more gradually
than the rates stipulated in the concession agreements over a five-year period from
1999. The companies were further compensated by the government, which
extended their concession period, in the form of RMIO.8 billion in toll charges.
The government justification for this compensation was to "ease the burden of
highway users" (Sennyah, Murugiah and Damis).
It is interesting to note that politicians have conceded to consumer demands to some
extent. Gakenheimer (ITS Deployment in Kuala Lumpur) says the parliament has the ability to
make beneficial-but politically unpopular-decisions because it has a degree of insulation from
public opinion. Despite some public opposition to tolling, new toll roads and concession
agreements continue to appear in Malaysia in efforts to expand and improve infrastructure.
The nature of privately-operated toll road companies increases the complexity of creating
a viable overall transportation strategy that could include congestion pricing in Malaysia. As
discussed in Section 3.4.1, congestion pricing revenues usually need to be transferred to other
parts of the transportation system in order for a scheme to be politically acceptable. Transferring
revenue from one privatized company to the government or to another company can make this
option difficult, if not unviable.
6.13 Concluding Remarks
Urban congestion is a substantial problem in the KLMA and travel demand management
strategies have not been well utilized. Prior surveys and media articles indicate that public
110 In fact, many transport documents in Kuala Lumpur are deemed confidential and are not available to the public.
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support for demand management is likely to be low. Nevertheless, several immediate and long-
term benefits could be realized for the KLMA with appropriate transportation pricing. A
carefully planned, implemented, and operated scheme should have positive impacts on air
quality, travel times, accessibility, land use, income distribution, and revenue.
There are several trends in Malaysia that are troubling from the perspective of travel
demand management, namely the decreasing cost of automobile travel due to subsidies that
distort mode choice. First, the price of fuel in Malaysia is approximately half the world average,
significantly less expensive than its neighbor states, and is becoming less expensive relative to
the cost of other goods. This encourages excessive and wasteful use of petroleum, which raises
economic and environmental concerns. Second, the abundance of free or subsidized parking and
government-subsidized tolls reduces the cost of auto travel, which encourages excessive demand
and distorts mode choice in favor of the private automobile. Third, public transportation is
generally of poor quality and has been losing mode share in Malaysia. Transit cannot attract
riders to the system if it is not a viable option. Fourth, urban decentralization of residential and
economic activities is making public transit even less of a realistic option for many households.
Fifth, the promotion of the national car severely contradicts efforts to make public transportation
a viable option.
The KLMA has become an auto-dependent city in part by policies adopted years ago in
efforts to stimulate economic growth through the automobile manufacturing sector; the
government has made numerous efforts to reduce auto-related costs for consumers in efforts to
stimulate auto sales. Malaysia has chosen not to follow the user-pays principle, which can have
negative transportation (and social) effects in the long term. Unless land use and travel demand
management measures-including pricing-are taken, auto-dependency and congestion seem
likely to increase in the future.
One of the public acceptance challenges associated with road pricing projects and
policies is the use of revenue. Conventional beliefs suggest funds should be hypothecated to
improving local public transportation and non-motorized alternatives. One obstacle with this
approach is that the government does not directly own or operate many of the congested
expressways or the transit systems. A better understanding of the legal and practical issues
relating to this topic in Malaysia should be pursued to determine how revenues could be
earmarked and transferred between transportation systems.
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There are several road pricing strategies that could be implemented to address urban
congestion or achieve other objectives in the KLMA. The following chapter will apply RPDAT
to determine which road pricing strategies might make the most sense for the Kuala Lumpur
Metropolitan Area.
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7 APPLICATION OF RPDAT TO KUALA
LUMPUR
7.1 Introduction
This chapter uses the Road Pricing Decision Analysis Tool (RPDAT) presented in
Chapter 5 to determine which road pricing strategies might be most appropriate for a particular
metropolitan area. The data and decision-making context established in Chapter 6 is used in
conjunction with Kuala Lumpur's transportation policies (listed in Section 7.2) to apply RPDAT
to the Kuala Lumpur Metropolitan Area (KLMA).
This application demonstrates the usefulness of the tool for regional strategic
transportation planning (RSTP) purposes and tests the sensitivity of the tool to different criteria
weights. Four scenarios are analyzed: the first infers objectives from a KLMA policy document
and revealed preferences that were identified in Chapter 6; the second adds environmental
considerations to the first scenario; the third uses a "pro-expressway" policy set of weights,
reflecting policies that encourage expressway use and auto ownership; and the fourth adds
environmental considerations to the third scenario.
7.2 Kuala Lumpur Policies
Because Malaysian decision makers were not available for interview, a policy document
was used to help derive the set of RPDAT weights for the first scenario. Kuala Lumpur City
Hall (CHKL) has outlined several objectives, policies, and proposals in the Draft Structure Plan
Kuala Lumpur 2020, which is the main policy document for the metropolitan area. This section
lists the relevant statements:
* Provide a comprehensive and integrated transportation system
that caters [to] the needs of inter- and intra-urban travel;
* Reverse the decline in public transport usage and to achieve a
targeted public-private transport modal split of 60:40 by the year
2020;
* Optimize the road and rail transportation infrastructure so that it
operates at its full capacity and maximum efficiency;
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* Ensure that the overall configuration of land use is integrated with
road and public transportation networks to optimize the
development of land;
* Ensure that all areas within the City enjoy the same high quality
and standard of provision of public transport services;
* Create a city that is highly accessible for all its occupants and
users, in particular, one that is pedestrian and handicapped
friendly;
* Enhance the working, living, and business environment of the City
Centre; and
* Provide priority and incentives to development in areas around
transit terminals.
Interestingly, there are no policy statements in the environmental section of the Draft
Structure Plan that aim to reduce transportation emissions; therefore, these criteria will be given
weights equal to zero in the first scenario.
7.3 RPDAT Applied to Kuala Lumpur
7.3.1 Inputs
The first scenario applies RPDAT to Kuala Lumpur using the formal policy statements
listed in Section 7.2 and implicit policies discussed in Chapter 6 to derive the set of weights. The
high-level weights listed in Table 7.1 are assumed for this scenario.
Table 7.1: KLMA High-Level Weights
Reduce travel times (i.e., increase vehicle speeds) 20
Improve reliability of travel times 10
Improve safety 0
Improve public transportation services 30
Enhance the natural environment 0
Gross revenue generation 10
Influence housing and business location choices 10
Reduce energy consumption and dependence 0
Influence auto ownership 5
Improve pedestrian-friendliness 10
Consider equity 5
Public acceptability 0
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For each high-level objective that has criteria grouped under it, points are allocated
among the criteria in step 2 part B. Table 7.2 shows the weights used for this step.
Table 7.2: KLMA Weights Among Criteria Under High-Level Objectives
REDUCE TRAVEL TIMES CRITERIA
Decrease average travel time for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) 20
Decrease average travel time for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) 10
Decrease average travel time on city streets within CBD 50
Decrease average travel time for peak-period arterial trips 20
Create a lower travel time option for autos on expressway(s) 0
Improve reliability for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) 20
Improve reliability for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) 10
Improve reliability on city streets within the CBD 50
Improve reliability for peak-period trips on arterial(s) 20
Create a reliable travel time option for autos on expressway(s) 0
IMPROVE PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SERVICES CRITERIA
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on the expressway(s) 20
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD 20
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets outside the CBD 20
Improve reliability of bus services operating on expressway(s) 15
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD 15
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets outside the CBD 10
INFLUENCE HOUSING AND BUSINESS LOCATION CHOICES CRITERIA
Promote new housing developments on suburban or undeveloped land 0
Promote "Smart Growth" 100
INFLUENCE AUTO OWNERSHIP CRITERIA
Promote automobile ownership 100
Reduce vehicle ownership growth rate 0
CONSIDER EQUITY CRITERIA
Availability of free or low-cost alternatives 100
Internalize external costs (i.e., implement the "user-pays" principle) 0
RPDAT uses the values in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 to calculate the actual weights for each
criterion, which are listed in Table 7.3.
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Table 7.3: KLMA Criteria Weights
CRITERIA WEIGHTS
Decrease average travel time for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) 4.0
Decrease average travel time for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) 2.0
Decrease average travel time on city streets within CBD 10.0
Decrease average travel time for peak-period arterial trips 4.0
Create a lower travel time option for autos on expressway(s) 0.0
Improve reliability for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) 2.0
Improve reliability for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) 1.0
Improve reliability on city streets within the CBD 5.0
Improve reliability for peak-period trips on arterial(s) 2.0
Create a reliable travel time option for autos on expressway(s) 0.0
Reduce traffic fatality rate 0.0
Reduce number of traffic accidents 0.0
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on the expressway(s) 6.0
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD 6.0
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets outside the CBD 6.0
Improve reliability of bus services operating on expressway(s) 4.5
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD 4.5
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets outside the CBD 3.0
Improve air quality 0.0
Reduce greenhouse gas production 0.0
Reduce energy consumption and dependence 0.0
Gross revenue generation potential 10.0
Promote new housing developments on suburban or undeveloped land 0.0
Promote "Smart Growth" 10.0
Promote automobile ownership 5.0
Reduce vehicle ownership growth rate 0.0
Improve pedestrian-friendliness 10.0
Availability of free or low-cost alternatives 5.0
Internalize external costs (i.e., implement the "user-pays" principle) 0.0
After the weights were calculated, the regional characteristics were input into the model.
Due to the dearth of publicly-available data, many of the traffic characteristic values were
assumed. If additional data were acquired the analysis could be performed again quickly, but
these assumptions should be reasonable for sketch-planning purposes. Table 7.4 lists the
regional characteristics used for the KLMA.
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Table 7.4: KLMA Regional Characteristics
Peak-period average speed on expressway(s) (mph) 25
Mid-day average speed on expressway(s) (mph) 50
Off-peak average speed on expressway(s) (mph) 65
Travel time safety margin index value for expressway(s) (reliability measure) 3
Peak-period average speed in CBD (mph) 7
Mid-day average speed in CBD (mph) 11
Off-peak average speed in CBD (mph) 18
Percent of air pollution derived from local transportation 70
Percent of metropolitan-area VMT that is on expressways 30
Size of the metropolitan area (ha) 400,000
Size of the CBD or potential cordon area (ha) 1,813
Percent of peak-period vehicle trips within the cordon that do not cross the cordon
line (i.e., internal trips) 15
Percent of peak-period vehicle trips in the metropolitan area that cross the cordon,
but neither originate nor terminate within the cordon area (i.e., through trips) 10
Percent of peak-period vehicle trips in the metropolitan area with origin or
destination in the CBD 20
Percent of peak-period person trips in the metropolitan area crossing the cordon
line that use public transportation 20
Percent of peak-period expressway corridor trips that are auto 80
Rate the availability of alternatives to the expressway(s): Some alternative routes
Number of expressway lanes in the peak direction 3
The scope of this evaluation was "the entire metropolitan area," meaning the model
examined the impacts of pricing measures at the regional scale. There are no HOV lanes in the
KLMA, so the Convert HOV to HOT Lane alternative was not included/analyzed. The
following section presents the results for the first policy scenario.
7.3.2 Outputs
RPDAT calculated the performance matrix based on the regional characteristics of the
KLMA. These scores are presented in Table 7.5.
" The choices for this characteristic are "Very good alternative routes," "Some alternative routes," and "No
alternative routes."
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Table 7.5: KLMA Performance Matrix
-- 1 r- 1 T r TI
CRITERIA
0
C.)
C
6.)z
0
C.)
6.)
-o
6.)
0
C.)
0
0
-o
0
U
C)
C.)
6.)
H
0
6.)z
-o
~IJ
C.)
6.)
C,)
6.)
C.)
0I)
-5
H
0
6.)
0
U
0
C.)
6-.
0z
Decrease average travel time for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) 4 2 2 4 3 3 4 0
Decrease average travel time for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) 3 1 0 3 1 2 2 0
Decrease average travel time on city streets within CBD 4 4 4 1 -2 1 1 0
Decrease average travel time for peak-period arterial trips 4 2 0 -3 3 1 -3 0
Create a lower travel time option for autos on expressway(s) 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0
Improve reliability for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) 4 0 0 4 3 0 1 0
Improve reliability for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) 4 0 0 4 2 0 1 0
Improve reliability on city streets within the CBD 4 4 4 0 -1 0 0 0
Improve reliability for peak-period trips on arterial(s) 4 0 0 -3 1 0 -3 0
Create a reliable travel time option for autos on expressway(s) 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0
Reduce traffic fatality rate -l 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -2 0
Reduce number of traffic accidents 3 3 3 1 1 0 1 0
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on the expressway(s) 4 0 0 4 4 3 4 0
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD 4 4 4 1 -2 1 1 0
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets outside the CBD 4 0 0 -2 2 1 -2 0
Improve reliability of bus services operating on expressway(s) 4 0 0 4 4 0 1 0
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD 4 4 3 0 -2 0 0 0
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets outside the CBD 4 0 0 -2 0 0 -2 0
Improve air quality 3 2 2 0 -1 3 0 0
Reduce greenhouse gas production 2 2 2 2 -2 2 2 0
Reduce energy consumption and dependence 2 2 2 2 -2 2 2 0
Gross revenue generation potential 4 2 2 2 1 3 1 0
Promote new housing developments on suburban or undeveloped land -1 0 0 -1 2 -1 -1 1
Promote "Smart Growth" 1 0 0 1 -2 1 1 0
Promote automobile ownership -3 -1 -1 -1 1 -2 -1 0
Reduce vehicle ownership growth rate 3 1 1 1 -1 2 1 0
Improve pedestrian-friendliness 1 0 0 -1 -1 1 -1 0
Availability of free or low-cost alternatives -4 0 0 -1 4 -4 -1 4
Internalize external costs (i.e., implement the "user-pays" principle) 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 1
Because the first scenario did not assign weights to all criteria, scores for criteria that did
not receive weight are not used in calculating the index scores for this scenario. However,
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RPDAT calculates and presents these scores to the user regardless of whether he/she assigns
weight to them. Further, all scores are presented here because subsequent scenarios will assign
weights to additional criteria, and the scores will not change between policy scenarios.
RPDAT also calculated the following index scores (Table 7.6) for the KLMA based in
the inputs listed in Section 7.3.1:
Table 7.6: RPDAT Index Scores for the KLMA
Network Pricing 263
Area-Wide Pricing 135
Cordon Pricing 121
Distance-Based Pricing 80
Facility Pricing 66
Add New HOT Lanes 49
Conventional Tolling 32
No Pricing 20
7.3.3 Interpretation of Results and Recommendations
The RPDAT model suggests the KLMA should pursue network pricing, area-wide
pricing, or cordon pricing strategies to meet its policy objectives. Political feasibility, risk, and
uncertainty considerations were not accounted for in the model, but presumably should be when
making a policy decision. The index score for network pricing is significantly higher than the
other alternatives, which implies there is little ambiguity about its capacity to achieve the
weighted criteria better than the other alternatives. However, network pricing may not be
politically feasible in the region, which would suggest area-wide and cordon pricing might be the
feasible alternatives that are best. Area-wide appears more preferable than cordon pricing-most
likely because of the number of trips within the CBD that would not cross the cordon-but the
two index scores are similar in magnitude so both should be explored in greater detail.
Interestingly, conventional tolling, which is the current form of pricing in the region, is
the second-least preferable alternative-just ahead of no pricing. In Malaysia, conventional
tolling is used by to fund infrastructure construction that the government could not otherwise
finance, but the model suggests other road pricing strategies are capable of generating as much or
more revenue and would be better suited to achieve other policy objectives as well.
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7.4 Scenario Two: Including the Environment
The second scenario used the same weight proportions as the first, but assigned 15 points
to the "Improve the natural environment" high-level objective and scaled all the other high-level
objectives by approximately 85 percent. It was assumed that 70 percent of the "Improve the
natural environment" points should be allocated to the "Improve air quality" criterion and the
remaining 30 points were assigned to the "Reduce greenhouse gas emissions" criterion. The
weights used in this scenario are listed in Table 7.7.
Table 7.7: KLMA Weights for Scenario Two
CRITERIA WEIGHTS
Decrease average travel time for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) 3.4
Decrease average travel time for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) 1.7
Decrease average travel time on city streets within CBD 8.5
Decrease average travel time for peak-period arterial trips 3.4
Create a lower travel time option for autos on expressway(s) 0.0
Improve reliability for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) 1.8
Improve reliability for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) 0.9
Improve reliability on city streets within the CBD 4.5
Improve reliability for peak-period trips on arterial(s) 1.8
Create a reliable travel time option for autos on expressway(s) 0.0
Reduce traffic fatality rate 0.0
Reduce number of traffic accidents 0.0
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on the expressway(s) 5.0
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD 5.0
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets outside the CBD 5.0
Improve reliability of bus services operating on expressway(s) 3.8
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD 3.8
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets outside the CBD 2.5
Improve air quality 10.5
Reduce greenhouse gas production 4.5
Reduce energy consumption and dependence 0.0
Gross revenue generation potential 9.0
Promote new housing developments on suburban or undeveloped land 0.0
Promote "Smart Growth" 8.0
Promote automobile ownership 4.0
Reduce vehicle ownership growth rate 0.0
Improve pedestrian-friendliness 9.0
Availability of free or low-cost alternatives 4.0
Internalize external costs (i.e., implement the "user-pays" principle) 0.0
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As shown in Table 7.8, the rankings did not change dramatically but one strategy moved
down in rank. The index score for adding new HOT lanes fell while the index score for
conventional tolling moved up, which switched the rank of these two alternatives. This is most
likely because adding new HOT lanes increases capacity, which encourages more auto travel in
the long-run.
Table 7.8: RPDAT Index Scores for Scenario Two
Strategy Index Scores
Network Pricing 268
Area-Wide Pricing 146
Cordon Pricing 134
Distance-Based Pricing 111
Facility Pricing 65
Conventional Tolling 35
Add New HOT Lanes 22
No Pricing 16
The next section tests the sensitivity of the results further by analyzing a "pro-
expressway" scenario.
7.5 Scenario Three: "Pro-Expressway"
A "pro-expressway" scenario was used to determine whether the results of the model
changed if the Malaysian government adopted a set of policies that promoted auto ownership and
expressway use. This third scenario assumed that priority would be given to creating fast and
reliable travel time options for autos on expressways, generating revenue, promoting auto
ownership, and maintaining free or low-cost alternatives. Other criteria were also given weight,
which are shown in Table 7.9. The regional characteristics and scores in the performance matrix
do not change in this sensitivity analysis-only the weights that reflect policy priorities of the
decision maker.
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Table 7.9: KLMA Weights for "Pro-Expressway" Scenario
CRITERIA WEIGHTS
Decrease average travel time for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) 6.3
Decrease average travel time for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) 6.3
Decrease average travel time on city streets within CBD 0.0
Decrease average travel time for peak-period arterial trips 0.0
Create a lower travel time option for autos on expressway(s) 12.5
Improve reliability for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) 6.3
Improve reliability for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) 6.3
Improve reliability on city streets within the CBD 0.0
Improve reliability for peak-period trips on arterial(s) 0.0
Create a reliable travel time option for autos on expressway(s) 12.5
Reduce traffic fatality rate 3.0
Reduce number of traffic accidents 2.0
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on the expressway(s) 0.0
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD 0.0
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets outside the CBD 0.0
Improve reliability of bus services operating on expressway(s) 0.0
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD 0.0
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets outside the CBD 0.0
Improve air quality 0.0
Reduce greenhouse gas production 0.0
Reduce energy consumption and dependence 0.0
Gross revenue generation potential 15.0
Promote new housing developments on suburban or undeveloped land 0.0
Promote "Smart Growth" 0.0
Promote automobile ownership 15.0
Reduce vehicle ownership growth rate 0.0
Improve pedestrian-friendliness 0.0
Availability of free or low-cost alternatives 15.0
Internalize external costs (i.e., implement the "user-pays" principle) 0.0
The results of the second scenario are dramatically different from the first. Table 7.10
lists the index scores of the alternatives.
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Table 7.10: KLMA Index Scores for "Pro-Expressway" Scenario
Strategy Index Scores
Add New HOT Lanes 245
Facility Pricing 93
No Pricing 60
Network Pricing 52
Area-Wide Pricing 40
Cordon Pricing 34
Conventional Tolling 31
Distance-Based Pricing -17
Comparing Table 7.6 and Table 7.10 reveals that the ranking of the alternatives is quite
different between scenario one and scenario three. Adding new HOT lanes is the
overwhelmingly best alternative for the pro-expressway scenario; facility pricing and no pricing
are the next best alternatives.
Considering the different policy objectives of the two scenarios, it should not be too
surprising that adding new HOT lanes is the preferred alternative. The pro-expressway scenario
placed high priority on the availability of free alternatives, creating faster and more reliable
travel time options for expressway users, promoting auto ownership, and generating revenue.
Although adding new HOT lanes is not the best alternative for all criteria, it scores well for many
of the highly weighted criteria, giving it the highest overall score.
7.6 Scenario Four: "Pro-Expressway" and the Environment
The final scenario re-examined the third, but assigned 15 points to the "Improve the
natural environment" high-level objective and scaled the scenario three high-level objectives by
approximately 85 percent. Similar to the methodology used in scenario two, it was assumed that
70 percent of the "Improve the natural environment" points should be allocated to the "Improve
air quality" criterion and the remaining 30 points were assigned to the "Reduce greenhouse gas
emissions" criterion. The weights used in the fourth scenario are listed in Table 7.11.
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Table 7.11: KLMA Weights for Scenario Four
CRITERIA WEIGHTS
Decrease average travel time for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) 5.3
Decrease average travel time for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) 5.3
Decrease average travel time on city streets within CBD 0.0
Decrease average travel time for peak-period arterial trips 0.0
Create a lower travel time option for autos on expressway(s) 10.5
Improve reliability for all peak-period trips on expressway(s) 5.3
Improve reliability for all mid-day trips on expressway(s) 5.3
Improve reliability on city streets within the CBD 0.0
Improve reliability for peak-period trips on arterial(s) 0.0
Create a reliable travel time option for autos on expressway(s) 10.5
Reduce traffic fatality rate 2.4
Reduce number of traffic accidents 1.6
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on the expressway(s) 0.0
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD 0.0
Decrease travel time of bus services operating on city streets outside the CBD 0.0
Improve reliability of bus services operating on expressway(s) 0.0
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets in the CBD 0.0
Improve reliability of bus services operating on city streets outside the CBD 0.0
Improve air quality 10.5
Reduce greenhouse gas production 4.5
Reduce energy consumption and dependence 0.0
Gross revenue generation potential 13.0
Promote new housing developments on suburban or undeveloped land 0.0
Promote "Smart Growth" 0.0
Promote automobile ownership 13.0
Reduce vehicle ownership growth rate 0.0
Improve pedestrian-friendliness 0.0
Availability of free or low-cost alternatives 13.0
Internalize external costs (i.e., implement the "user-pays" principle) 0.0
The index scores for this scenario are shown in Table 7.12. Comparing these index
scores with those from scenario three, it is apparent that there are several changes. Adding new
HOT lanes is still the best strategy, but its dominance has lessened because it may have long-
term negative environmental impacts. No pricing fell from the third to the sixth most preferable
alternative, most likely because it scores the highest on the "Availability of free or low-cost
alternatives" criterion, which received less weight than in the third scenario. Although distance-
based pricing is still ranked last, its score improved considerably because pollution and
greenhouse gas charges can be incorporated into distance-based charges relatively easily, which
would enhance the natural environment.
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Table 7.12: RPDAT Index Scores for Scenario Four
Sategy Index Scores
Add New HOT Lanes 189
Facility Pricing 87
Network Pricing 83
Area-Wide Pricing 64
Cordon Pricing 58
No Pricing 52
Conventional Tolling 35
Distance-Based Pricing 25
The results of these four scenarios suggest that the overall ranking of the alternatives is
quite sensitive to the weights input by the user, as one would expect.
7.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter applied the Road Pricing Decision Analysis Tool to the Kuala Lumpur
Metropolitan Area. The results of the four policy scenarios suggest that RPDAT can be a useful
tool to help decide which road pricing strategies are best for a metropolitan area; however, the
weights chosen by the user can change the results considerably.
Using the set of weights associated with the first or second scenarios, the KLMA should
consider network pricing, area-wide pricing, and cordon pricing schemes for the metropolitan
area. If the government adopted a set of pro-expressway policies, adding HOT lanes would be
the suggested alternative.
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8 CONCLUSIONS
8.1 Conclusions
This thesis has identified the strengths and weaknesses of different road pricing strategies
and demonstrated the value of multi-criteria analysis (MCA) as a technique to help determine
which pricing alternatives are worthy of implementation or merit further consideration for a
specific metropolitan area. MCA is an economic evaluation technique that allows decision
makers to explicitly trade-off often-conflicting criteria to determine the most preferable
alternatives. This approach can improve the decision-making process for selecting road pricing
strategies to be implemented in a metropolitan area.
Many regions are considering implementing road pricing strategies, but the reasons for
their consideration are varied. Often the agency or metropolitan area has multiple or unclear
objectives. Congestion management, environmental improvement, and transportation finance are
the three most common goals, but road pricing has impacts on other areas of concern to decision
makers as well and pricing can change the way the transportation system operates. For example,
some types of road pricing-such as HOT lanes-have the capacity to create fast and reliable
travel time options for commuters, businesses, and leisure travelers who value their time highly
for particular trips. Chapter 3 classified road pricing strategies according to six different forms,
which allowed for generalized statements to be made regarding the strengths and weaknesses of
each form.
There is evidence to suggest that analytical tools and data are not currently available to
create accurate estimates of road pricing impacts with classical transportation models. Very few
pre- and post-implementation studies have been performed to assess the accuracy of road pricing
forecasts, but a lack of confidence in the models by some decision makers supports the thought
that existing models could be improved. If model estimates are not trusted, then there may be
little reason for using the models. The model most frequently utilized to evaluate pricing
strategies is the four-step model (4SM), which has fundamental difficulties in capturing the most
relevant characteristics of pricing. The model is being used for a purpose different from its
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original intent, which did not include the evaluation of policies involving little or no change to
the infrastructure supply.
The Road Pricing Decision Analysis Tool (RPDAT) introduced in this thesis can help
decision makers assess which forms of road pricing might be most regionally-appropriate and
consistent with policy priorities. Version 1.1 of RPDAT performs MCA for nine different road
pricing strategies and evaluates each according to 29 criteria. The tool can be used quickly with
few data inputs, making it an excellent screening tool for sketch-planning purposes.
In Chapter 7, RPDAT demonstrated that network, area-wide, and cordon pricing
respectively are the most appropriate road pricing options for the assumed policy priorities and
regional characteristics of the Kuala Lumpur Metropolitan Area (KLMA). If the Malaysian
government were to adopt a "pro-expressway" set of policies, however, the index scores would
change significantly and the most preferred alternative would be adding HOT lanes.
As expected, the Kuala Lumpur application demonstrates that RPDAT is sensitive to
input weights. The author believes that this phenomenon illustrates a very important concept
different forms of road pricing have different strengths and weaknesses and the "correct" road
pricing strategy for a metropolitan area will depend greatly upon its objectives.
RPDAT Version 1. 1 presents a generalized framework with which to evaluate road
pricing strategies for metropolitan areas, but there are several improvements that could be made
to the model. Additionally, this framework could also be integrated with other transportation
planning methodologies. Section 8.2 identifies recommendations for further research with
RPDAT and road pricing modeling.
8.2 Recommendations for Further Research
Three types of recommendations are presented: recommendations for improving the
capacity of classical transportation models to estimate the impacts of road pricing,
recommendations for improving RPDAT, and recommendations for integrating RPDAT with
other transportation planning methods.
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8.2.1 Improving Classical Transportation Models
Some approaches, such as bi-criterion traffic assignment, are theoretically more
appealing than the classical traffic assignment models used in the 4SM, but there are still
refinements necessary to make these techniques operational. An important research contribution
would be to incorporate workable distributions of value of time into the four-step model.
Microsimulation is preferable to the 4SM in theory, but its estimates are only as good as
the input assumptions. Currently, many academic researchers are working to develop more
advanced microsimulation techniques, which may prove to be the most appropriate for modeling
road pricing. These techniques merit further research.
The author is not aware of any forecasting models that incorporate the value of reliability.
Evidence presented in Chapter 4 suggests this is an important factor considered by travelers and
freight shippers/carriers when making a trip; therefore, its inclusion in a transportation model
would be another valuable contribution.
There is much to be learned about the factors used by drivers as decision variables in the
context of road pricing. The collection and analysis of empirical data from more pricing projects
will be necessary to better understand the parameters used as decision variables and the
aggregate impacts of strategies. This should advance the theory of driver behavior, which could
contribute to more effective modeling and may help address equity issues of concern to decision
makers.
Finally, several data insufficiencies need to be resolved to develop better pricing models.
The travel characteristics and behavior of commercial vehicles are not understood well and more
data is needed to estimate how this group will react to pricing policies. Commercial vehicles
may be among the chief beneficiaries of priced facilities if they can increase productivity, but it
is very difficult to estimate how many commercial vehicles will use a priced facility or their
willingness to pay for the improved service. Other major problems include the poor quality of
stated preference data and little documentation of reliability sensitivity."
Finally, more accurate revenue and traffic diversion estimates might make more roads
financially feasible by lowering the required rate of return from reduced risk. Increasing the
112 For more information on the freight impacts of congestion pricing, see: J. Waliszewski, "Toward Understanding
the Impacts of Congestion Pricing on Urban Trucking," Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005.
183
accuracy-and consequently the trust-in models used to consider pricing could mitigate some
of the major concerns associated with road pricing projects.
8.2.2 Improving RPDAT
Currently RPDAT Version 1.1 uses a metropolitan area's regional characteristics to
calculate the scores of the alternatives in the performance matrix. The algorithms used to
calculate the scores make the tool region-specific and are appropriate for sketch-planning
analysis; however, refining the formulas to deliver more accurate scores would be a valuable
next step. When more road pricing case studies and data are available, statistical analysis of
factors that make a region better-suited for particular road pricing strategies could be performed.
This evidence should create more accurate estimates of how well each alternative meets the
criteria. Identifying these factors with current data would at least be intellectually challenging
and may not even be possible; if they are identified, it may be difficult to determine the extent
that a factor increases the attractiveness of a particular road pricing measure. Integrating demand
elasticities into the performance matrix may also improve the sophistication of model scoring.
Incorporating more criteria and alternatives into the model would also increase its
usefulness to decision makers. Some criteria, such as the cost of scheme operations and
implementation, were not included in Version 1. 1 even though they are important variables.
These criteria were omitted because the choice of technology, network geometry, and other
location-specific characteristics greatly influence the scores, thus accurate scoring was not
possible. If more road pricing and some non-road pricing alternatives were included in the
model, it would expand the scope of the tool, which could be an important next step.
It may also be helpful to determine if there is a minimum RPDAT index score value that
indicates whether any of the strategies are worth pursuing. Of course, this would have to take
into account the score of the current strategy of the metropolitan area.
RPDAT should be expanded so that it can evaluate bridges and tunnels. Some regions
and agencies may wish to consider pricing on these facilities but cannot do so with Version 1.1.
Another variation that could ideally be included in the model is the distinction between variable
tolls versus dynamic tolls, but the differences may be unclear and too site-specific for the model.
If it were able to provide specific estimates of the impacts, this modification might also expand
the audience of potential users.
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Risk, uncertainty, and public acceptability are not accounted for in the model and a more
sophisticated multi-criteria method could be used to combine the scores and weights and
incorporate these parameters. If this change were made in a subsequent version, however, it
would be advantageous to retain the linear-additive model from Version 1.1 (as an option)
because of its attractiveness as a transparent process.
8.2.3 Integrate RPDAT with Other Transportation Planning Methods
The RPDAT framework is useful by itself for evaluating road pricing measures, but it
may be desirable to integrate the tool with other transportation planning methods such as
Regional Strategic Transportation Planning (RSTP). 11 Both methodologies are concerned with
regional transportation planning and perhaps RPDAT could be developed as a specific tool used
with RSTP.
8.3 Concluding Remarks
Several technical and non-technical challenges remain for wider deployment of road
pricing strategies. Political will, legal obstacles, perceived equity, and enforcement are just some
of the challenges that need to be overcome before road charging is commonplace. The author
neither advocates nor opposes road pricing measures, but hopes that this thesis advances the
understanding of road pricing strategies for the traveling public, decision makers, researchers,
and stakeholders.
1 For more information on RSTP, see: Sgouridis, "Integrating Regional Strategic Transportation Planning and
Supply Chain Management: Along the Path to Sustainability."
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9 APPENDIX Al: SECOND-BEST CONDITIONS
AND PRICING
"Second-best" conditions are said to exist if at least one potential substitute, complement,
or input is not priced at its marginal cost. This situation occurs in transportation as well as many
other sectors, so economists have developed rules for pricing in second best conditions. If the
mispriced services are supplements or complements to the service in question, denoted as service
i, then the optimal price for service i is:
P - MC =-Z [(E, / E) (Q, / Q)-(Pj - MC)] where,
Pi = price of service i;
MC = marginal cost of service i;
Ei = price elasticity of demand for service i;
Eij= cross price elasticity of demand for service j with respect to
the price of service i; and
Qi = quantity of service i.
This formula is valid with the condition that Pi < MC if the other goods are all substitutes
for it and the other goods are priced below marginal cost, and Pi > MC1 if the other goods arc all
complements.
Despite being an attractive theory and interesting economic exercise, second-best pricing
is rarely implemented because the rules for its application are rather complex.
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10 APPENDIX A2: REVENUE HYPOTHECATION
While economic theory suggests welfare is maximized when revenues are not earmarked,
urban policymakers strongly encourage that road pricing revenues be reinvested in the
transportation system." 4 Past experiences suggest that public acceptance is likely to be higher if
net revenues are hypothecated, i.e., earmarked, for local transportation improvements and
investments. The public is often opposed to road pricing if they believe the revenues will
contribute to the general government tax fund because they view the introduction of pricing
measures as merely an increase in taxes. They are likely to be more supportive, however, if they
believe the charge is giving them more value, hence the term value pricing that is used in the
United States. Cases where net revenues are devoted to improving transportation on the facility
from which they were collected-to transit in particular-are likely to have more public support.
Unpriced alternative routes, such as a ring road around an area-wide scheme or arterials parallel
to a priced expressway, should also be improved in order to avoid increasing congestion on these
roads if travelers choose to bypass the priced area. Transit priority on approaches to the priced
area are also recommended if the routes become congested.
In the event that net road pricing revenues were dedicated to regional transportation and
used for the creation of a single area-wide transportation fund, one might expect the region to
make more integrated investment decisions and improve the attractiveness of transit services. It
is much more difficult to share revenues between transportation modes when each is operated by
different agencies-even more so if one of the entities is a private operator. Public-private
partnerships create complications because the motives (such as maximizing profit) of the private
sector are different from those of the public sector and it is more difficult to ensure road pricing
revenues are spent in a manner that is perceived as best for the public. Public support would
likely be lacking for any such balance transfers unless there is transparency in government
actions and public access to accounting records.
114 Road pricing on a new facility is less likely to be perceived as having negative impacts to existing users because
there are no existing users. Therefore, revenue hypothecation is not as necessary to gain public support in this case;
however, toll revenues might be secured for debt financing if revenue bonds are issued to finance the new
construction, which is essentially a form of hypothecation to the facility for the lifetime of the bonds.
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Singapore, London, the 1-15 HOT lanes, and the German distance-based charging
schemes have all earmarked revenues to improving transportation. As an example, an
amendment to Section 11 of the HGV Act (regarding Germany's Toll Collect system) states that,
"Expenditure for the operation, monitoring and enforcement of the tolling system shall be paid
for out of the toll revenue. The remaining revenue shall be added to the transport budget and all
of it shall be ring-fenced to improve transport infrastructure, predominantly federal highway
construction."
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11 APPENDIX A3: FOUR-STEP MODEL
OVERVIEW
The four-step model (4SM) is the regional travel demand model used to evaluate most
urban transportation planning projects in the United States. It is a long-range transportation
planning tool originally developed over forty years ago, which is used to estimate changes in
travel and utilization of the transportation system in response to changes in demographics,
regional development, and the transportation supply (Caliper Corporation).
The 4SM estimates aggregate travel demand, meaning that it does not model the behavior
of individuals. Instead, the model assumes homogeneous land use and demographic
characteristics for sub-regions, which are referred to as traffic analysis zones, or TAZs; a
metropolitan area will often have hundreds of TAZs. An example TAZ might be a four block by
five block geographic area with low density single-family residential housing, high household
income, and an average of 2.4 automobiles per household, among other characteristics. Demand
for travel between TAZs is used in the 4SM process to determine the mode split and amount of
traffic assigned to each link on the transportation network.
The 4SM is comprised of four sequential steps. Trip Generation determines how many
trips will occur, Trip Distribution creates trip tables to see where those trips occur, Mode Split
(a.k.a. Mode Choice) assigns the trips to a particular transportation mode, and then Trip
Assignment (a.k.a. Route Choice or Traffic Assignment) assigns the trips to particular road links.
A (user) equilibrium approach is used to assign traffic to the road network.
The 4SM steps are usually applied separately for different trip purposes because trip-
making behavior varies across trip purposes (Caliper Corporation). Example trip purposes
include home-based work, home-based shopping, home-based other, non-home based, and
commercial vehicles. Trip rates are estimated on a 24-hour basis in many cases and then a time-
of-day factor is applied to the 24-hour trip table to produce trip tables for different time periods
(e.g., a.m. peak period, p.m. peak period, off-peak period) (Meyer and Miller).
The sequential nature of the model infers people first decide whether to make a trip, and
then they determine where they will go, then they pick a transportation mode, and finally they
choose which route to take. In reality, travelers obviously do not use this chronological
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methodology and more likely evaluate a combination of factors simultaneously; however, it is
incredibly difficult to estimate the decision making factors and model such an analytically
rigorous process. The 4SM does not claim to represent individual trip-making behavior, but
takes a pragmatic approach to reducing the extremely complex phenomenon of travel behavior
into analytically manageable components that can be dealt with using relatively simple
techniques and reasonable amounts of data (Meyer and Miller).
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12 APPENDIX A4: RATING SCALES
In a nominal scale, numerical values in the performance matrix represent a coded list of
qualitative scores (e.g., 0 = 'yes' and 1 = 'no'), thus making numerical operations or aggregation
inappropriate.
An ordinal scale represents a rank ordering of the alternatives. The differences between
rankings can have significance if a descending preference rating scale (with the most preferable
alternative assigned a value of n and the least preferred assigned a value of 1 when there are n
alternatives) is used.
Interval scales do not have an origin, making absolute comparisons impossible, but this
scaling system permits some numerical operations (e.g., averaging). An example would be a
scale that ranks alternatives from zero to ten, where zero is the "least preferable" and ten is the
"most preferable." The extreme values of the scale could be either real or hypothetical scores of
the alternatives. This scale often works well if the analysis compares all alternatives at the same
time. If hypothetical "best possible" and "worst possible" extreme values are not used in the
original scoring, the scores of the original alternatives may have to be modified if another
alternative is added.
A ratio scale has an origin and the absolute value of the number in the performance matrix
has significance; more information can be inferred and all standard numerical operations can be
performed with a ratio scale.
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13 APPENDIX B: DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS
4SM: Four-step model. See Appendix A3.
AC: Average cost.
Alternative: One of the options evaluated in the multi-criteria analysis.
BCA: Benefit-cost analysis.
BRT: Bus rapid transit.
CBD: Central business district.
CC: (London) congestion charging scheme.
Congestion pricing: See Section 2.3.5.
Conventional tolling: Tolling on a limited-access expressway where all lanes are priced and the
level of the charge does not vary by time-of-day or congestion-level. See Section 3.3. 1.
CPI: Consumer price index.
Criteria: Criteria are used to reflect the decision maker's objectives in a multi-criteria analysis.
See Section 5.4.3.
CV: Commercial vehicles.
Deadweight loss: A loss in social welfare derived from a policy or action that has no
corresponding gain. Congestion costs are deadweight loss and the result of a flaw in the price-
setting mechanism for roadway space. Deadweight loss represents economic inefficiency.
DM: Decision maker.
DOT: Department of Transportation.
Dynamic pricing: Tolls that vary by the level of traffic congestion to maintain free-flowing
traffic conditions while making efficient utilization of the lane capacity (e.g., San Diego 1-15
HOT lanes). Dynamic pricing is a form of congestion pricing.
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ERP: (Singapore) electronic road pricing scheme. See Section 3.3.4.1.
ETC: Electronic toll collection.
Express lanes: Express lanes are a form of managed lanes where vehicles pay for a premium
level-of-service. HOT lanes are an example of express lanes where discounts are given to
HOVs. Other forms of express lanes may not give toll discounts. Express lanes are a form of
managed lanes.
Externalities: See Section 2.3.2.
Facility pricing: Tolling on a limited-access expressway where all lanes are priced and the level
of the charge varies by time-of-day or congestion-level. See Section 3.3.2.
FHWA: U.S. Federal Highway Administration.
First-best conditions: First-best conditions assume perfect competition; complete information; no
externalities; no subsidies; and no indivisibilities of supply or demand.
Flat-rate tolling: See conventional tolling.
FTA: U.S. Federal Transit Administration.
GDP: Gross domestic product.
General-purpose (GP) lanes: Lanes on a roadway open to all classes of vehicles and have no
special requirements.
GPS: Global Positioning Systems.
ha: Hectare.
HOT: High-occupancy/toll (lane). A lane that permits HOVs to travel at a free or discounted
rate but charges low-occupancy vehicles a toll to use the same lane. HOT lanes manage demand
by varying the toll by time-of-day or level-of-congestion in efforts to maintain a certain
minimum level-of-service. HOT lanes are a form of express lanes.
HOV: High-occupancy vehicle (lane). An HOV has greater than or the same number of
occupants in a vehicle than the HOV criterion specified for the facility. Many HOV lanes
classify vehicles with two or more occupants as HOVs, although some facilities set more
stringent criteria. HOV lanes are a form of managed lanes, and typically provide premium
service relative to the general-purpose lanes.
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Hypothecation. Earmarking a revenue stream. See Appendix A2.
Index score: The final output of the multi-criteria analysis. Index scores indicate the overall
preference of an alternative and can be used to rank the alternatives.
ITS: Intelligent transportation systems.
IU: In-vehicle unit. The toll transponder for the Singapore cordon pricing scheme is referred to
as an IU.
J-I-T: Just-in-time (shipping).
Joint cost: See Box 2.
KL: Kuala Lumpur.
KLMA: Kuala Lumpur metropolitan area.
Long-run marginal cost (LRMC): The long-run marginal cost is the cost of accommodating an
extra vehicle with infrastructure expansion such that congestion does not increase.
LOS: Level-of-service.
LOV: Low-occupancy vehicle. LOVs have fewer occupants than the HOV criterion. LOVs are
typically SOVs.
LRT: Light-rail transit.
Managed lanes: Managed lanes are lanes other than general-purpose lanes, which have special
requirements for vehicle use. Special requirements may relate to vehicle type (e.g., allow
hybrids or prohibit trucks), vehicle occupancy (i.e., HOVs only), or payment of an additional
toll. HOV lanes, HOT lanes, and express lanes are examples of managed lanes.
MC: Marginal cost.
MCA: Multi-criteria analysis. See Section 5.2.
MCP: Marginal-cost pricing. See Section 2.3.3.
Microsimulation: Microsimulation models transportation choices at a disaggregate level.
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mph: Miles per hour.
MPO: Metropolitan planning organization.
Performance Matrix: Where alternative scores for multi-criteria analysis are documented. See
Section 5.4.4.
Public good: A public good must be non-excludable and there must be non-rival consumption.
Once non-excludable goods are provided, others cannot be prevented from enjoying them. If
non-rival consumption exists, additional people can consume the good without reducing other
consumers' enjoyment. Pure public goods are rare, and transportation does not meet these
criteria. Only the public sector will provide public goods. A lighthouse and national defense are
classic examples of public goods.
Ramsey Pricing: See Section 2.3.4.
Regional Characteristics: See Section 5.4.4.
RP: Revealed preference (data). This is empirical data derived from actual experiences and
projects. RP data is more preferable to SP data because it more accurately represents actual
choices and is less subject to perception errors of people being surveyed.
RPDAT: The Road Pricing Decision Analysis Tool. See Chapter 5 for description.
RSTP: Regional Strategic Transportation Planning.
RZ: Restricted zone for the Singapore electronic road pricing scheme. The RZ is the area within
the cordon.
Scores: Scores are used to indicate how well alternatives meet the different criteria in a multi-
criteria analysis.
Second-best: See Appendix Al.
Short-run marginal cost (SRMC): The short-run marginal cost is the cost of accommodating an
additional vehicle with extra congestion.
SOV: Single-occupancy vehicle. SOVs are a vehicle with only one person.
SP: Stated preference (data). This is hypothetical data derived from surveys distributed prior to
the policy change about how people think they would respond to a change in policy. This data is
less desirable than RP data because it is less accurate.
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TAZ: Traffic analysis zone. A small geographic unit within a region assumed to have
homogeneous demographic and land use characteristics. It is used in the 4SM. An example of a
TAZ would be a 3 block x 3 block low density residential zone where all households are
assumed to have the same socio-economic characteristics (i.e., same household income, same car
ownership, etc.).
TDM: Traffic demand management.
TfL: Transport for London.
U.S. DOT: United States Department of Transportation.
OST: U.S. DOT Office of the Secretary of Transportation.
Variable pricing: Tolls that vary by time-of-day and/or day-of-the-week according to a pre-
determined and published toll schedule (e.g. California SR91). Variable pricing is a form of
congestion pricing.
VMT: vehicle miles traveled.
VOR: Value of reliability.
VOT: Value of time.
vphpl: Vehicles per hour per lane.
Weights: Used to document the policy priorities of the decision maker in a multi-criteria
analysis. See Section 5.4.3.
ZEV: Zero-emissions vehicle.
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